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Abstract
This thesis studies how frictions shape macroeconomic outcomes and affect policies. The thesis
consists of three chapters.
The first chapter studies how distortionary taxation and volatile output together with govern-
ment discretion shape sovereign debt issuance and sovereign defaults. It is a novel theory to explain
why sovereigns borrow on both domestic and international markets and why defaults are mostly
selective (on either domestic or foreign investors). The model matches business cycle moments and
frequencies of different types of defaults in emerging economies. It is also shown, that secondary
markets are not a sufficient condition to avoid sovereign defaults. The outcome of the trade in
bonds on secondary markets depends on how well each group of investors can coordinate their
actions
The second chapter studies how the price stickiness friction affects the optimal rate of inflation
and gains from a monetary integration. Inflation constitutes a tax on consumption so the local
monetary authority finds it optimal to inflate. But also the average markup constitutes a cost of
holding money so the monetary authority finds it optimal to deflate. The findings are: i) in the local
currencies the first motive dominates and the optimal inflation is positive. ii) In a monetary union
the first motive is absent and the optimal inflation is negative. iii) A monetary union improves
global welfare. However, when the difference in price stickiness between two countries is large, only
one country benefits.
The third chapter studies how the intermediation friction affects a transmission of monetary
policy. It provides new evidence on the bank lending channel using bank-level data from Central
and Eastern Europe economies. The findings are: i) banks adjust their loans to changes in host
country’s monetary policy, ii) foreign-owned banks are less responsive to monetary policy of a host
country than domestic-owned banks, iii) contrary to previous studies, the effects i) and ii) are
present not only in the times of a crisis, but also in normal times. Second part of this chapter
presents two mechanisms that can explain the second effect. First, foreign banks may have access
to funds from parent banks. Second, foreign banks may serve more profitable borrowers. The first
mechanism renders monetary policy less effective in the level of foreign banks penetration, while the
second one does not. However, data do not unambiguously favor one explanation over the other.
3
4 CONTENTS
Chapter 1
Sovereign Debt Issuance and Selective
Default
Joint with Kirill Shakhnov (EIEF Rome, formerly EUI Florence)
Abstract
We propose a novel theory to explain why sovereigns borrow on both domestic and international
markets and why defaults are mostly selective (on either domestic or foreign investors). Domestic
debt issuance can only smooth tax distortion shocks, whereas foreign debt can also smooth produc-
tivity shocks. If the correlation of these shocks is sufficiently low, the sovereign borrows on both
markets to avoid excess consumption volatility. Defaults on both types of investors arise in equilib-
rium due to market incompleteness and the government’s limited commitment. The model matches
business cycle moments and frequencies of different types of defaults in emerging economies and
we show our hypothesis is confirmed by the data. We also find, that secondary markets are not a
sufficient condition to avoid sovereign defaults. The outcome of the trade in bonds on secondary
markets depends on how well each group of investors can coordinate their actions.1
Keywords: sovereign debt, selective default, debt composition, secondary markets
JEL Classification: E43, F34, G15, H63
1We would like to thank Manuel Amador, Fernando Broner, Russell Cooper, Giancarlo Corsetti, Antonia Diaz,
Juan Dolado, Tim Kehoe, Sandra Lizarazo, Frank Portier and Jaume Ventura for many useful comments and sug-
gestions. We are especially grateful to A´rpa´d A´braha´m, Evi Pappa and Ramon Marimon for all their advice and
constant support. The paper has benefited from discussions with seminar participants in Cardiff University, EUI
Florence, European Central Bank, ETH Zurich, University of Konstanz, UPF Barcelona, Vienna University of Eco-
nomics and Business, the Meeting of the Econometric Society at the University of Minnesota, the SCE Computing in
Economics and Finance conference in Oslo, the Workshop on Dynamic Macroeconomics in Vigo, the Annual Congress
of the European Economic Association at the University of Mannheim, UniCredit & Universities Young Economists
Conference in Belgrade and the RCEA Conference in Economics and Finance in Rimini.
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6 Sovereign Debt Issuance and Selective Default
1.1 Introduction
Humanity has witnessed sovereign debt crises for hundreds of years. The first recorded instance
of sovereign default dates back to 377 B.C. in ancient Greece. Sovereign default has been studied
extensively in the literature. However, the focus has mainly been on default on external debt, while
the study of domestic defaults has been neglected. Reinhart and Rogoff (2011b) have documented
and categorized all default events in the last 210 years. Based on their observations, there have
been at least 58 de jure defaults on domestic public debt. This is certainly an underestimate, due
to the difficulty of detecting pure domestic defaults.2 Also, out of 267 defaults in this period, only
17 times did the government default simultaneously on both domestic and foreign debt.
In this paper, we address the open question of why governments usually default selectively on
either foreign or domestic debt. We do so by providing a novel theory of domestic debt and default,
where domestic debt is issued to smooth tax distortions, and combining it with the well established
literature on foreign debt and default. We present a two-period model to deliver the economic
intuition, and a calibrated quantitative model to replicate data moments. We show that our theory
is empirically plausible, as it is able to match frequencies of different types of default and debt
compositions. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first contribution that is able to replicate
two stylized facts: that defaults happen mostly in a selective fashion, and that the composition of
bondholders matters for interest rates and the volume of total public debt. The two-period version
of the model is the starting point for an additional discussion of the role of secondary markets
in solving sovereign default problems. Our analysis questions the efficiency role associated with
secondary markets.
We build an incomplete markets model in which the government has limited commitment. The
government has to cover its expenditures and has three means of financing them: it issues one-
period defaultable bonds on an international and a domestic market, and it collects taxes. Tax
collection is costly because taxes are distortionary. The economy is subject to two shocks: an output
shock and a tax distortion shock. While the output shock provides incentives for the government
to borrow on international markets, the tax distortion shock creates a wedge between domestic
borrowing and taxation. This breaks Ricardian equivalence in our endowment economy, and draws
a distinction between tax-financed and debt-financed expenditure policies. In this we provide a
simple theory of domestic debt issuance.
Foreign debt can be used to smooth out both shocks, which makes it a more valuable instrument.
However, if the correlation of the two processes is sufficiently low, then using only one instrument
to smooth two shocks would result in households’ consumption being too volatile. Therefore, the
government engages in borrowing on both markets. When the government has outstanding debts
2For example, the large-scale 1989 pure domestic default is relatively unknown outside Argentina. The most well
know domestic default happened in Russia 1998, which was one of the largest local currency debt defaults (US $39
billion). This number does not include de facto default through inflation, the nationalization of pensions and other
forms.
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on both markets it faces two trade-offs: one between foreign repayment and default, and another
between domestic repayment and default.
The mechanism of foreign default is similar to that in Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) and Arellano
(2008). A benevolent government accumulates defaultable foreign debt in order to smooth resi-
dents’ consumption over the business cycle. Interest rates reflect default probabilities, which are
endogenous to the borrower’s incentives to default. The government decides each period whether
to transfer resources away from the economy as a repayment of debt to foreign investors or to keep
resources at home and suffer default penalties. When output is low, ceteris paribus, it is more
costly for a risk averse borrower to respect the contract. Default occurs along the equilibrium path
after a long enough sequence of negative output shocks. These contributions gave rise to a large
literature, which has nonetheless not yet considered domestic debt and default in an open economy
setting.
While the mechanisms and trade-offs behind foreign default are clear, the domestic default
literature is still at an early stage. There are two recent contributions that adhere to the benevolent
government assumption and study domestic default in a Ramsey setting. D’Erasmo and Mendoza
(2013) propose a heterogeneous agent model in which a utilitarian government relies on lump-
sum taxes and defaultable bonds to finance stochastic governments expenditures. Default has a
redistributive aspect, because it hurts mostly the rich, while repayment by taxation hurts mostly the
poor. Pouzo and Presno (2014), on the other hand, consider a model in which the government relies
on distortionary labor income taxes and defaultable bonds to finance its stochastic expenditures.
The government might default to mitigate these distortions. The second crucial trade-off in our
model, the one behind domestic debt and default, is similar to their mechanism. Both contributions,
however, are closed-economy models that do not consider borrowing on international markets.
Both repayment and default on domestic debt are transfers of resources within the economy. In
a case of default on domestic debt, the government suffers default penalties similar to the penalties
imposed after foreign default. When the government decides to repay, it needs to finance this
repayment by collecting taxes. When distortions from taxation are high, the government prefers to
issue debt rather than collect taxes, hoping that in the future tax collection will be less distortionary,
giving it the ability to repay the debt at a lower cost. The government thus issues domestic debt up
to an endogenous debt limit, and if the possibility of repayment through non-distortionary taxes
does not arrive it has no other choice than to default.
Vasishtha (2010) and Erce (2012) study the selective nature of sovereign default with foreign
and domestic investors. The former generates domestic debt issuance through disutility of taxation,
but in equilibrium foreign default never happens. In the latter, both domestic and foreign debt
levels are exogenously predetermined. Our analysis shows that incorporating two shocks, to output
and to taxation, is crucial to generating equilibria with both types of selective default, and that the
feedback loop from selective default to debt issuance should not be neglected. In our paper, both
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domestic and foreign debt issuance and selective default are optimal decisions of the government.
In addition, Cooper et al. (2008) study how the distribution of debt among domestic and foreign
investors influences the government’s incentives to default. They find conditions (government ex-
penditure and the fraction of debt held by foreign investors being high enough) under which the
government has incentives to default, but the underlying composition of debt is given exogenously.
In this paper, we derive endogenous fractions of public debt held by domestic and foreign investors.
The main contributions of this paper are the new theory of selective sovereign defaults and a
quantitative framework to study sovereign debt issuance and debt composition. But our analysis
also has also some other, quite novel implications. After the Great Recession, secondary sovereign
debt markets attracted increasing interest among economists. Based on the two-period version of
our model, we analyze the role of secondary markets in solving the problem of sovereign risk. Broner
et al. (2010) show that, even in the absence of default penalties, sovereign risk does not prevent
governments from borrowing on international markets if foreign creditors can resell their assets
to domestic investors on secondary markets under the assumption that tax collection is costless.
Instead, we assume that taxation is costly, and show that the result of the trade depends on how
well each group of investors can coordinate their actions. In particular, without any coordination,
trade on secondary markets generates a possible welfare loss, as it incentivizes the government to
default on all its debt, instead of only foreign debt. We also prove that whenever secondary markets
fail to reduce the default problem, debt haircuts can play a useful role, and vice versa.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we summarize empir-
ical facts on domestic and foreign public debt holdings and selective defaults. Section 3 studies
equilibrium in a two-period model and shows intuitively the main trade-offs. Section 4 presents an
infinite-horizon version of the model and the results of a calibration exercise. Section 5 analyzes
the role of secondary markets and haircuts. The last section concludes.
1.2 Facts
The goal of this section is to establish three stylized facts that motivate our analysis. First, that
sovereign defaults happen mostly in a selective fashion; second, that governments have a number
of tools to discriminate among different types of bondholders; and third, that the composition of
bondholders matters. In this section we review some empirical studies of selective sovereign defaults
and the composition of bondholders, and augment them with our findings.
Before we begin our discussion, we set the scene with some definitions. There are three different
ways to draw the distinction between domestic and foreign debt. According to the legal definition,
domestic debt is any debt issued according to domestic law, regardless of its currency, and regardless
of who holds it. According to the economic definition, domestic debt is held by residents, regardless
of the currency and the law under which it was issued. Finally, according to the currency definition,
domestic debt is the debt denominated in home currency, regardless of law and the residency of
Chapter1 9
bond holders. The second definition creates clear differential incentives for the sovereign to default.
For this reason, throughout the model, we adopt the economic definition.
An important point to raise is that these three definitions do not necessarily overlap. However,
Reinhart and Rogoff (2011a) claim that: “The overwhelming majority of external public debt, debt
under the legal jurisdiction of foreign governments, has been denominated in foreign currency and
held by foreign residents”. This was certainly true before the wave of capital flow liberalizations
starting in the 1980s. After this, the mapping between the legal and the economic definitions is
less ideal.3 Still, we observe selective sovereign defaults both before and after the wave of capital
flow liberalizations.
For our stylized facts and in our calibration we rely on three sources of data. Merler and
Pisani-Ferry (2012) provide the breakdown of the public debt by the residence of holders for ten
industrialized economies between 1990 and 2012. For the developing economies we rely on the
dataset compiled by Panizza (2008), which covers the data of up to 130 countries between 1990
and 2007. Data for developing economies is however obtained using the legal definition. Our third
source is the dataset on crises and defaults provided by Reinhart and Rogoff (2011b), which covers
up to 70 countries between 1800 and 2010. The legal definition of debt is also used for the default
data. In what follows we present three empirical facts that motivate and guide our theoretical
analysis.
1. Sovereign defaults usually happen in a selective fashion. The database collected by
Reinhart and Rogoff (2011b) reveals interesting features of sovereign default episodes between 1800
and 2010. First, domestic debt, usually neglected in the theoretical literature on sovereign risk,
plays an important role in the build-up, during and after sovereign defaults on foreign holdings.
This argument is extensively developed in Reinhart and Rogoff (2011a). Second, sovereign defaults
happen on both domestic and foreign debt holdings, usually in a selective fashion. Whereas foreign
defaults are common, domestic defaults are hardly rare. Out of 267 episodes of sovereign debt crisis
identified across 70 countries in the last 210 years, 205 were pure foreign, 26 were pure domestic, and
36 featured government default on both domestic and foreign debt. Only 17 times did the default on
home and foreign debt happen within the same year. In Figure 1.1 we plot the fraction of sovereign
borrowers that were in foreign, domestic or total default in a given year between 1800 and 2010.
These findings suggest that the assumption that sovereigns can default selectively fits reality better
than the two alternative assumptions commonly used in the literature: that domestic debt is al-
ways senior and so only foreign debt is defaulted on, or that defaults can only be non-discriminatory.
3A notable example here is the Mexican crisis of 1994. Short-term securities called tesobonos were dollar-
denominated (foreign debt according to the currency definition), issued according to Mexican law (domestic debt
according to the legal definition) and held by investors both in the US and Mexico (partly domestic and partly foreign
debt according to the economic definition). Also, at that time, there were no means of tracing the final creditor either
by nationality or by residence. Therefore, a default on tesobonos obligations could not have been classified either as
domestic or as foreign selective default. Luckily, Mexico did not default in 1994.
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Figure 1.1: Fraction of countries in different types of default
Source: Own calculations based on Reinhart and Rogoff (2011b)
2. Governments have a number of tools to discriminate among types of bondhold-
ers. How can the government default on foreign investors while repaying domestic investors or
vice versa? The assumption that the two types of bondholders are indistinguishable, and therefore
sovereigns can only default on total debt outstanding, underestimates the creativity of governments.
Among the tools that governments use to discriminate against particular types of bondholders,
the most popular are capital controls, exchange controls and freezes on deposits. In 1990 Brazil
defaulted on its domestic debt but kept servicing its foreign debt. All foreign exchange transactions
were directed through the central bank and a multiple exchange rate regime was introduced as well
as a freeze on local currency deposits.
In 1998 Russia defaulted on both foreign and local currency debt, imposing capital and exchange
rate controls. However, in subsequent years Russia “undefaulted” on its foreign obligations and
kept servicing debts to foreign investors. Moreover, bonds held by domestic companies were also
repaid, so Russia effectively defaulted only on domestic households’ holdings of public debt. Default
was accompanied by both foreign and local currency deposit freezes.
Argentina’s 2001 default is often considered as a model case of foreign default.4 In fact, this
4Many sovereign default models are calibrated to mimic salient features of this default (e.g. Arellano (2008)).
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episode is cataloged as a total default. First, all resident-held bonds, both domestic and foreign cur-
rency denominated, were converted to government-guaranteed loans, which were all later converted
to pesos at a much lower rate than the market exchange rate. Also, 60% of the debt defaulted on
in December 2001 was held by Argentines.
Recent examples of what could be considered pure foreign default (in peaceful times) include:
Bolivia in 1989 (most domestic debt was repurchased a year before default), Pakistan in 1999 (which
stopped payments on outstanding obligations to creditors in the UK, Europe and the US and put
a freeze on foreign currency deposits mostly owned by non-residents) and most probably Cyprus in
2013 (freeze and partial expropriation of deposits exceeding e100,000, which were mostly owned
by non-residents).
3. The composition of bondholders matters. Empirical work on the composition of bond-
holders is growing. We draw on this literature, particularly on Andritzky (2012) and Dell’Erba
et al. (2013), to show that the composition of investors is correlated with interest rates and the
total level of debt to GDP. Dell’Erba et al. (2013) find that there is a significant correlation be-
tween spreads and debt levels when the majority of the debt is denominated in foreign currency
(in both emerging economies and Eurozone countries). They also document that financial crises
have more profound effects on economies that rely more on foreign borrowing. Andritzky (2012)
finds a strong positive correlation between the fraction of domestic debt in total debt and the total
debt-to-GDP ratio, and a negative correlation between the fraction of foreign debt and spreads in
advanced economies. The present paper contributes to this literature by providing a framework to
study the driving forces behind debt composition and its consequences for spreads, total debt and
default incentives.
1.3 Two Period Model
We begin by introducing the model in a simplified and tractable two-period version. We study an
endowment economy that consists of three types of actors: domestic households, foreign investors
and a benevolent government. The government can raise resources in three different ways: by
issuing bonds to domestic households, by issuing bonds to foreign investors and by collecting taxes.
Taxes are lump sum, but collecting taxes comes at a cost to the economy. We assume raising an
amount T of taxes by the government induces a loss of T (1 + τ) resources to agents. This is a key
element that will break Ricardian equivalence in this endowment economy and create a trade-off
between taxes and domestic debt.
Domestic households are identical and risk averse. The representative household decides on her
12 Sovereign Debt Issuance and Selective Default
bond holdings to maximize lifetime utility subject to two intra-period budget constraints:
max
bh
(u (c1) + βE [u (c2)]) (1.3.1)
subject to:
y1 = c1 + T1(1 + τ1) + qhbh, (1.3.2)
y2 + (1− dh)bh = c2 + T2(1 + τ2), (1.3.3)
where y is the exogenous output, c is consumption, T is taxes, τ is the distortion imposed by taxes,
bh is domestic bond holdings, q
h is the discount price of domestic bonds and dh is the government’s
decision to repay (dh = 0) or default on (dh = 1) domestic debt.
Foreign investors are risk neutral and have deep pockets. They borrow on international markets
at risk-free rate r and lend funds to the government at discount qf to break even in expectation:
qf =
E [1− df ]
1 + r
(1.3.4)
The government has to cover expenditures only in the first period g1 > 0. Government expendi-
tures in the second period are g2 = 0. This creates an incentive to borrow due to the consumption
smoothing motive. In the first period, the government decides on debt issuances in the domestic
and foreign markets bh and bf . In the second period, the government takes repayment decisions
dh and df . The government maximizes the lifetime utility of domestic households subject to two
intra-period government budget constraints:
g1 = qhbh + qfbf + T1, (1.3.5)
(1− dh)bh + (1− df )qf = T2. (1.3.6)
If the government decides to default, the economy will suffer proportional output penalties.
After domestic default, output in the second period is reduced to
yhd = y2(1− δh), (1.3.7)
and after foreign default, output in the second period is reduced to
yfd = y2(1− δf ). (1.3.8)
If the government decides to default on both markets, the economy will suffer from both output
penalties.
Finally, in the second period the economy is subject to two shocks: an output shock and a tax
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distortion shock. Both processes are stochastic Markovian and assume two outcomes:
y2 =
yH with prob. ΠyyL with prob. 1−Πy, (1.3.9)
τ2 =
τL with prob. ΠττH with prob. 1−Πτ , (1.3.10)
where subscript H stands for high and L for low.
If the debts are repaid with taxes, the government imposes distortions on the economy. If they
are repaid with new debt, the government might go into default. The main driving forces of the
government’s optimal policies are two trade-offs. The first is the trade-off between a transfer of
resources away from the economy as foreign debt repayment versus a loss of resources due to foreign
default penalties. The second is between imposing distortions on the economy from tax collection
versus imposing a loss of resources from domestic default penalties. Unlike in cases where Ricardian
equivalence holds, the timing of taxes matters here.
1.3.1 Default schedule
We solve the model by backward induction starting in the second period. Given debt issuance
decisions from the first period bh and bf , in the second period the government takes default deci-
sion that maximize domestic households’ utility from consumption. As it is the terminal period
there is no demand for government bonds in the second period, so the only source of income for
the government is taxation. In the second period, four scenarios may arise: repayment, foreign
default, domestic default and total default. Substituting the government’s repayment decisions
(dh ∈ {0, 1}, df ∈ {0, 1}) and default penalties (1.3.7), (1.3.8) into households’ second-period bud-
get constraint (1.3.3) and the government’s second-period budget constraint (1.3.6), household
consumption levels in each of the four scenarios are given by the following equations: (Notice that,
in order to repay an amount bh of domestic bonds to households, the government needs to raise
bh(1 + τ) taxes, which yields a net loss of τbh resources to the economy.)
cr = y2 − bf (1 + τ2)− bhτ2, (1.3.11)
cfd = y2(1− δf )− bhτ2, (1.3.12)
chd = y2(1− δh)− bf (1 + τ2), (1.3.13)
ctd = y2(1− δh)(1− δf ), (1.3.14)
where consumption superscripts stand for repayment, foreign default, home default and total default
respectively.
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A. Foreign default schedule
When deciding whether to default on foreign investors, the government compares household con-
sumption under repayment and under foreign default. It is immediate to see that foreign debt will
be repaid whenever:
bf
y2
≤ δf
1 + τ2
, (1.3.15)
where the left-hand side is the foreign debt-to-GDP ratio and the right-hand side is a number
defined by parameters of the model. Whenever the inequality has the opposite sign, the government
defaults on foreign debt.
Proposition 1. If taxation is costly then the government’s optimal policy on the international
market is characterized by the foreign default threshold (1.3.15). Whenever the debt is below this
threshold, it is riskless and is always repaid. Whenever it is above the threshold, it will always be
defaulted on and therefore can never be issued. If either output or tax distortions are stochastic,
the default threshold is also stochastic, debt can be risky and default can arise in equilibrium.
Proof. The first part follows directly from comparing (1.3.11) and (1.3.12). For the second part,
suppose that future output y2 and tax distortions τ2 are known in period one. Any debt bf
exceeding
y2δf
1+τ2
will be defaulted on with certainty in period two, therefore its discount price in
period one is zero. The government is only able to take out loans bf ≤ y2δf1+τ2 which are repaid with
certainty. Foreign default cannot arise in equilibrium. For bf to be in the default area with positive
probability, we need at least one parameter to be stochastic.
B. Domestic default schedule
Similarly, we can define the domestic debt limit. Domestic debt will be repaid whenever:
bh
y2
≤ δ
h
τ2
, (1.3.16)
where the left-hand side is the domestic debt-to-GDP ratio and the right-hand side is a number
defined by parameters of the model. Whenever the inequality has the opposite sign, the government
defaults on domestic debt. Most importantly, the denominator on the right-hand side of inequality
(1.3.16) is of a different magnitude than that in (1.3.15). This is because repayment of foreign
debt is a transfer of resources out from the economy, while repayment of domestic debt is only a
redistribution of resources within the economy. This redistribution is costly, and these costs are
captured by the parameter τ2. Inequality (1.3.16) allows us to prove two interesting propositions.
Proposition 2. If taxation is costless and home default induces small positive costs to the economy,
then any level of domestic debt is repaid.
This is the result of Broner et al. (2010), where taxes are assumed to be lump sum and default
on domestic agents induces redistribution costs, which are endogenously derived (here captured
Chapter1 15
by the parameter δh). This result has powerful consequences. For example, if any level of debt
is sustainable on the domestic market, then if secondary debt markets are efficient, any level of
foreign debt is also sustainable in repayment equilibrium. Foreign debt can always be repaid even
without exogenous default penalties, and a sufficient solution to the default problem is to improve
the efficiency of secondary debt markets.
Proposition 2 shows that the assumption of lump-sum taxes is the key to deriving the Broner
et al. (2010) result. Without this assumption, there is finite limit to the amount of domestic debt
that can be sustained in repayment equilibrium.
Proposition 3. If taxation is costly then the government’s optimal policy on the domestic market is
characterized by the domestic default threshold (1.3.16). Whenever the debt is below this threshold,
it is riskless and is always repaid. Whenever it is above the threshold, it will always be defaulted
on and therefore can never be issued. If either output or tax distortions are stochastic, the default
threshold is also stochastic, debt can be risky and default can arise in equilibrium.
Proof. The first part follows directly from comparing (1.3.11) and (1.3.13). The proof of the second
part is analogous to the proof of Proposition 1.
Inequalities (1.3.15) and (1.3.16) completely characterize government policy in the second pe-
riod. Notice that whenever both inequalities are reversed, it is also the case that ctd > cr, which
is consistent with the definition of total default being simultaneous default on both domestic and
foreign debts outstanding.
C. Default policies in the second period
Having established default thresholds in the second period, we posit an equilibrium in which, de-
pending on the realizations of stochastic shocks, all four outcomes (repayment, foreign default,
domestic default and total default) arise in the second period. The purpose of this part is to find a
set of parameters that can sustain this equilibrium and, in the next subsection, to check that this
set of parameters delivers debt issuances that are consistent with the posited equilibrium. By doing
this we want to understand the mechanics and interactions between debt issuances and selective
default, and prove that the set of parameters that is able to deliver the four outcomes is non-empty.
Both of the stochastic processes in this economy have two outcomes. Therefore, we impose equi-
librium conditions that would map the four possible realizations of joint (y, τ) stochastic processes
into four equilibrium outcomes. These conditions are:
1. After a bad output shock y2 = yL, the government defaults on foreign debt regardless of the
realization of the tax distortion shock.
2. After a good output shock y2 = yH , the government repays foreign debt regardless of the
realization of the tax distortion shock.
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3. After a bad tax distortion shock τ2 = τH , the government defaults on domestic debt regardless
of the realization of the output shock.
4. After a good tax distortion shock τ2 = τL, the government repays domestic debt regardless
of the realization of the output shock.
Mathematically these conditions can be summarized by four inequalities that follow from sub-
stituting realizations of y and τ into (1.3.15) and (1.3.16):
yLδf
1 + τL
< bf ≤ yHδf
1 + τH
, (1.3.17)
yHδh
τH
< bh ≤ yLδh
τL
, (1.3.18)
where the inequalities in (1.3.17) correspond to conditions 1) and 2) respectively, and the inequalities
in (1.3.18) correspond to conditions 3) and 4) respectively. How these conditions translate into a
mapping between (y, τ) outcomes and repayment-default decisions can be easily understood by
looking at Figure 1.2. The red (dotted) line represents the domestic default threshold, while the
blue (solid) line represents the foreign default threshold. In the second period, four situations
may occur. Circles show allocations for which debt is repaid, while crosses show defaults. Colors
represent respective debt types (red for home, blue for foreign). A negative shock to output is
shown as an increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio.
Figure 1.2 shows four possible outcomes denoted by letters A to D. Tax distortions τ are on the
horizontal axis, while the vertical axis represents domestic and foreign debt-to-GDP ratios in the
second period bhy2 and
bf
y2
. A negative output shock is shown as a move up, and a negative taxation
shock is shown as a move to the right. A) After a good output shock and a good tax distortion
shock, both debts fall below the default thresholds and therefore both are repaid. B) After a bad
output shock and a good tax distortion shock, foreign debt (blue cross) is above its threshold and
is therefore defaulted on. However, domestic debt (red circle) is still repaid, as it falls below its
threshold. C) After a good output shock but bad a tax distortion shock, the situation is the reverse
of B. D) After a bad output shock and a bad tax distortion shock, both debts are above default
their thresholds and are therefore defaulted on.
1.3.2 Debt policies in the first period
In this section we solve for first-period debt issuance decisions that are consistent with the second-
period default decisions described by (1.3.17) and (1.3.18) (or equivalently by Figure 1.2). In the
remainder of this paper we assume a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) instantaneous utility
function for domestic agents:
u(c) =
c1−σ
1− σ .
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Figure 1.2: Default thresholds and selective defaults
The aim of this section is to first find a set of parameters for which foreign default is driven by
the output shock and domestic default is driven by the tax distortion shock. The solution algorithm
is provided in Solution Algorithm. We show that this set is non-empty (see Two Period Model).
Second, we examine the comparative statics of an equilibrium solution.
The government chooses debt issuances bh and bf to maximize the lifetime utility of domestic
agents:
max
{bh,bf}
u(c1) + βE [u(c2)] , (1.3.19)
where
c1 = y1 + τ1qhbh − (1 + τ1)(g − qfbf ),
c2 =

(1.3.11) with prob. ΠyΠτ
(1.3.12) with prob. (1−Πy)Πτ
(1.3.13) with prob. Πy(1−Πτ )
(1.3.14) with prob. (1−Πy)(1−Πτ ),
subject to price schedules derived from foreign investors’ zero-profit condition and domestic
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households’ first-order condition:
qf =
Πy
1 + r
, (1.3.20)
qh = β
ΠyΠτu
′(cr) + (1−Πy)Πτu′(cfd)
u′(c1)
. (1.3.21)
Debt issuances must obey first-order conditions given by:
(bh :) (τL − τ1)qh = τ1bh∂qh
∂bh
, (1.3.22)
(bf :) u
′(c)
(
(1 + τ1) qf + τ1bh
∂qh
∂bh
)
= β (1 + τL)
(
ΠyΠτu
′ (cr) + Πy (1−Πτ )u′
(
chd
))
.
(1.3.23)
Comparative statics reveal that this two-period environment can account for two empirically
observed facts. First, that the share of foreign investors is negatively correlated with interest rates;
and second, that the share of domestic investors is positively correlated with the total public debt
of the economy (see for example Andritzky (2012)). We document these findings graphically in
Two Period Model. Graphical Solutions.
Now that the trade-offs behind our model have been described in detail, we can turn to quan-
titative analysis of an infinite-horizon version of the model.
1.4 Quantitative Analysis
We build an incomplete-markets model in which the government has limited commitment. Let time
be indexed by t = 0, 1, 2, . . . The economy has an exogenous stochastic stream of income yt ∈ Y,
which is a Markov process. At each time t the government has to cover a fixed exogenous stream
of government expenditure gt.
In each period t the government decides either to repay or default on outstanding foreign and
domestic debt. When the government chooses to default, the economy suffers from output penalties
and is excluded from borrowing on the market where default happened for a random number of
periods. We allow the expected exclusion durations and output costs to differ between types of
default.
1.4.1 Households
Households are identical and risk averse. Their utility is given by:
∞∑
t=0
βtE0 [u(ct)] ,
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where β is the discount factor, c is consumption and u(c) is increasing and strictly concave. House-
holds are allowed to save using domestically issued government bonds bh. They take bond discount
prices and taxes as given. They face an intra-temporal budget constraint, which differs depending
on the government’s decision to default on either of the two bonds.
If the government repays both domestic and foreign debt, households’ budget constraint is the
following:
cr = y − T (1 + τ) + bh − qhb′h, (1.4.1)
where bh is the amount of domestic debt owed and repaid by the government to households, b
′
h
is the new issuance of government domestic debt (household savings), qh is the domestic bond’s
discount price, T is the amount of lump-sum taxes and τ is the distortion imposed by taxation.5
If the government defaults on foreign debt, households are still allowed to save in the domestic
market. However, foreign default induces output costs and affects the endogenous price of domestic
bonds:
cfd = y(1− δf )− T (1 + τ) + bh − qfdh b′h. (1.4.2)
In the case of domestic default, the government maintains foreign borrowing, but the domestic
debt market is closed:
chd = y(1− δh)− T (1 + τ). (1.4.3)
Similarly, in the case of simultaneous domestic and foreign default, which we will refer to as
total default:
ctd = y(1− δf )(1− δh)− T (1 + τ). (1.4.4)
1.4.2 Foreign investors
Foreigners are risk neutral investors with deep pockets and access to international credit markets,
where they can save and borrow at a constant interest rate r. When lending resources to the
government they account for the possibility of default and break even in expected terms, therefore
their policy can be summarized as:
qf =
(1−∆f )
1 + r
,
where qf is the discount price of government bonds issued with foreign investors and ∆
f is the
probability of foreign default.
5Whenever taxes are negative, the household budget constraint yields cr = y−T (1−τ)+bh−qhb′h, so that rebates
are distortionary and distortion does not increase the amount of resources when taxes are negative. The same is true
for the selective and total default cases.
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Figure 1.3: Government decision tree
V 0(bh, bf , s)
V r(bh, bf , s)
V 0
V td(s)
θhθf
V 0
(1− θh)θf
V hd
θh(1− θf )
V fd
(1− θh)(1− θf )
V td
V fd(bh, s)
θf
V 0
1− θf
V fd V td
V hd(bf , s)
θh
V 0
1− θh
V hd V td
When both markets are open (V 0), the government can decide to repay both debts (V r), default on both debts
(V td), repay only domestic debt (V fd) or repay only foreign debt (V hd). Subsequent possible choices are depicted
on the lower levels of the decision tree.
1.4.3 Recursive equilibrium
We define a recursive equilibrium in which domestic households, foreign investors and the gov-
ernment act sequentially and the government acts with discretion. The aggregate state of the
economy S = (bh, bf , s) is given by two endogenous debts bh, bf and two exogenous processes for
income and tax distortions s = (y, τ). Every period, the government decides whether to repay its
two outstanding debts, default on domestic debt, default on foreign debt or default on both:
V 0(bh, bf , s) = max{V r(bh, bf , s), V fd(bh, s), V hd(bf , s), V td(s)} (1.4.5)
The government’s repayment decision is summarized by two default indicators df ∈ {0, 1} and
dh ∈ {0, 1}, where di={h,f} = 0 stand for repayment, df = 1 stands for foreign default and dh = 1
for domestic default. After a default, the government is excluded from borrowing on the market
and faces probability θh, θf of returning to borrowing on domestic and foreign markets respectively.
The government’s choices are presented graphically in Figure 1.3, where tree branches correspond
from left to right to: repayment of both debts, default on both debts, default on foreign debt only
and default on domestic debt only. After repayment, the government goes back to node V 0. After
any type of default, the government first draws probabilities θh, θf that one or the other market
will open. Subsequent possible choices are depicted on the lower levels of the tree. (Total default
has been put on the second branch due to graphical reasons.)
If the government decides to repay it solves the following problem:
V r(bh, bf , s) = max
b′h,b
′
f
{
u(cr) + βE
{
V 0(b′h, b
′
f , s
′}} (1.4.6)
Chapter1 21
subject to households’ budget constraint (1.4.1), the foreign bond price schedule
qf (b
′
f , s) =
E
{
1− d′f (b′h, b′f , s′)
}
1 + r
(1.4.7)
and households’ first-order condition:
qh(bh, bf , b
′
h, b
′
f , s) = β
E
{(
1− d′h
(
b′h, b
′
f , s
′
))
u′
(
c′
(
b′h, b
′
f , s
′
))}
u′ (c (bh, bf , s))
, (1.4.8)
where, unlike for foreign bonds, the price of domestic bonds depends not only on the probability
of default, but also on households’ welfare both today and tomorrow, and the government budget
constraint
T + qhb
′
h + qfb
′
f = g + bh + bf . (1.4.9)
If the government defaults on foreign debt (and keeps servicing its domestic obligations) the
economy suffers an output cost, and is allowed to return to international borrowing in the future
with probability θf . With probability 1−θf the country remains only on the domestic bond market
and the government can still decide to also default on domestic bonds (yielding total default). The
government’s problem is summarized by:
V fd(bh, s) = max
b′h
{
u(cfd) + βE
(
θfV 0(0, b′h, s
′) + (1− θf )max{V fd(b′h, s′), V td(s′)})
}
(1.4.10)
subject to households’ budget constraint (1.4.2), households’ first-order condition
qfdh (bh, b
′
h, s) = β
E
{(
1− dfd′ (b′h, s′)
)
u′
(
cfd
′
(b′h, s
′)
)}
u′ (cfd (bh, s))
(1.4.11)
(where the number of states is reduced relative to the repayment case, as foreign debt does not
affect welfare because it is defaulted on) and the government budget constraint
T + qfdh b
′
h = g + bh. (1.4.12)
Third, if the government decides to default on domestic debt outstanding, it remains active on
international markets, comes back to domestic borrowing with probability θh, can still default on
foreign debt and suffers a domestic output penalty:
V hd(bf , s) = max
b′f
{
u(chd) + βE
(
θhV 0(b′f , 0, s
′) + (1− θh)max{V hd(b′f , s′), V td(s′)})
}
(1.4.13)
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subject to households’ budget constraint (1.4.3), the foreign bond price schedule
qhdf (b
′
f , s) =
E
{
1− dhd′(b′f , s′)
}
1 + r
(1.4.14)
and the government budget constraint
T + qhdf b
′
f = g + bf . (1.4.15)
Lastly, at any given time the government can decide to pursue total default. The economy
suffers output penalties for both domestic and foreign default, and the government comes back to
international and domestic borrowing with probabilities θf and θh respectively. The government’s
problem is summarized by:
V td(s) = u(ctd)+βE
(
θfθhV 0(0, 0, s)+θf (1−θh)V hd(0, s′)+(1−θf )θhV fd(0, s′)+(1−θf )(1−θh)V fd(s′)
)
(1.4.16)
subject to households’ budget constraint (1.4.4) and the government budget constraint
T = g. (1.4.17)
Now that actions and optimization problems are defined for each actor in the economy, we can
define the equilibrium:
Definition 1. Recursive equilibrium in this economy is (i) the set of prices in repayment periods
for domestic bonds qh(bh, bf , s) and foreign bonds qf (bh, bf , s) and the set of prices in partial default
periods qfdh (bh, s) and q
hd
f (bf , s); (ii) government debt policies in repayment periods b
′
h(bh, bf , s) and
b′f (bh, bf , s) and in partial default periods b
fd
h
′
(bh, s) and b
hd
f
′
(bf , s); and (iii) government default
schedules in repayment periods dh(bh, bf , s) and df (bh, bf , s) and in partial default periods d
fd
h (bh, s)
and dhdf (bf , s) such that:
1) Taking as given domestic bond price schedules dh and d
fd
h and government domestic debt is-
suances b′h and b
fd
h
′
, households’ consumptions cr and cfd satisfy households’ budget constraints
and first-order conditions.
2) Taking as given government foreign default schedules df and d
hd
f , prices qf and q
hd
f are consistent
with foreign investors’ expected zero profits.
3) Taking as given prices qh, qf , q
fd
h and q
hd
f , the government’s default schedules dh, df , d
fd
h and d
hd
f
and debt policies b′h, b
′
f , b
fd
h and b
hd
f solve the government’s optimization problem.
4) Government bond and tax policies and default schedules satisfy the government budget constraint.
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1.4.4 Calibration
To solve the model numerically, we need to assume specific functional forms and assign parameters.
Table 1.1 represents the parameters, which are selected directly from data. We assume the CRRA
utility function with a risk aversion coefficient σ equal to two. The risk-free interest rate r is set
to 1.7%, which is the average yearly interest rate of a five-year US Treasury bond during this time
period. These parameters are common values used in the real business cycle and default literatures.
We calibrate the AR(1) stochastic process for output, based on the series of Argentinian GDP:
log(yt) = ρylog(yt−1) + ut, (1.4.18)
where ut ∼ N (0, y).
The government faces two types of costs upon default. The output cost is assumed to be
asymmetric as in Arellano (2008):
ydeft = min{yt, γy}, (1.4.19)
where y is the mean of the output process and γ takes one of three values for domestic, foreign and
total default respectively. The cost function implies that default is more costly with a high output
realization. The level of government expenditure is set to be the average Argentinian government
expenditure of 25% of GDP for the period 1993–2011. This number is not substantially different
from the cross-country average of 31% for developing countries. Based on Reinhart and Rogoff
(2011b) dataset we calculate the median length of domestic default to be 2.5 years and that of
foreign default to be 4.6 years.6 This estimate is slightly low in comparison with the usual average
exclusion period of 7.5 years for Argentina usually applied in default literature.7 Our process of
tax distortions is of a reduced form and cannot be directly taken to data, therefore we make two
additional assumptions. First, we assume symmetry in the process (switching states from high to
low and from low to high happens with the same probability). Second, we assume taxes in the
good state to be almost non-distortionary. However, τL cannot be zero (as discussed in Proposition
2) as it would make domestic debt riskless and thereby prevent the algorithm from converging.
After choosing eight parameters directly, we are left with six parameters to be calibrated. Table
1.2 summarizes the parameters and moments that we match. We use Reinhart and Rogoff’s dataset
to calculate frequencies of different types of default, periods of market exclusion and drops in output
after different types of default. As in previous literature, we calibrate the discount factor to target
a debt service expenditures-to-GDP ratio of 5.53%. The foreign output cost γf is calibrated to
match the frequency of foreign defaults in Argentina in the last 210 years. Then, we set γh such
that the output drop after domestic default is on average three times higher than after foreign
6Calculated as the median of averages of defaulting countries
7Gelos et al. (2011) measure exclusion as the years between default and the date of the next issuance of public
and publicly guaranteed bonds or syndicated loans.
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Table 1.1: Parameters selected directly
Parameter Value Source
Risk-free interest rate r = 1.7% 5-year US bond yearly yield
Risk aversion σ = 2 Standard in literature
Persistence of output ρy = 0.945 Argentina 1993–2001
Std. dev. of output y = 0.025 Argentina 1993–2001
Government expenditure g/y = 0.25 Argentina 1993–2001
Re-entry to foreign market θf = 0.22 4.6 yrs. exclusion (R&R 2011b)
Re-entry to domestic market θh = 0.5 2 yrs. exclusion (R&R 2011b)
Low tax distortion τl = 0.01 Assumed
Table 1.2: Parameters selected by matching moments
Parameter Value Target
Discount factor β = 0.95 Debt service to GDP 5.53%
Foreign default output cost γf = 0.97 F-default frequency 3.5%
Domestic default output cost γh = 0.91 Output drop after D-default
High tax distortion τh = 0.1 D-debt to GDP 24.8%
High distortion persistence pihh = 0.7 D-default freq. 2.5%
Low distortion persistence pill = 0.7 Symmetric pihh = pill
default (as documented by Reinhart and Rogoff). The persistences of distortion states are assumed
to be symmetric and are set to match the frequency of domestic defaults in Argentina in the last
210 years.
Unfortunately, Reinhart and Rogoff’s dataset does not report debt composition. Therefore, to
calculate debt-to-GDP ratios, we employ the dataset of Panizza (2008), who constructs his data
based on the legal definition, which is consistent with Reinhart and Rogoff (2011b). We try to
match the domestic debt-to-GDP ratio in Argentina of 24.8%, although the model is not quite able
to match this particular moment closely.
1.4.5 Simulation results
In this section we analyze default policies, debt policies and equilibrium prices in the calibrated
model. Next we examine the quantitative performance of the model against the data. We describe
the algorithm for solving the model numerically in Solution Algorithm. Both default and debt
policies are four-dimensional objects, as the state space for the economy consists of two endogenous
(domestic and foreign debt) and two exogenous (output and tax distortions) states. For each
variable of interest, we compare policies for different levels of the same type of debt, keeping the
value of the second type of debt constant.
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Figure 1.4: Foreign debt policies given bh = 1.8
The most interesting findings of the model are revealed by Figures 1.4 and 1.5. Figure 1.4 plots
debt policies for foreign debt given that outstanding domestic debt is positive bh = 1.8. Foreign
debt policies are similar to those found in other quantitative models of sovereign default. The
country accumulates foreign debt when output is high due to low interest rates. Interest rates
are low as a result of the default set being decreasing in y. Also, the government accumulates
more debt when the economy suffers from high tax distortions. This is explained by the fact that
the government avoids using distortionary taxation and instead finances its expenditures via both
foreign and domestic (as we shall see) debt.
Figure 1.5 plots policies for domestic debt. When tax distortions are low (left panel), the
government finances its expenditures in full via taxation for any level of debt outstanding. This is
the situation in which raising taxes comes at the lowest cost for the economy. In fact, the government
is building up assets on the domestic debt market (optimal domestic debt is the negative corner
solution) in order to be able to accommodate more debt movements in the future, when distortions
may be high. When tax distortions are high (right panel) and output is low, the government is in
a state of default and no trade is taking place on domestic debt markets. When output is middle
or high, the government employs a “gambling for redemption” policy. It finds it optimal to always
increase the stock of domestic debt up to the point where it reaches endogenous debt constraints.
Thus, the government is piling up domestic debt in the hope that it will be able to repay all of
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Figure 1.5: Domestic debt policies given bf = 1.8
it with taxes, should the low-distortion day arrive. Whenever this day happens, the government
repays its debt in full. If this day does not come, the government is forced to default on its domestic
debt obligations.
Figures 1.6 and 1.7 plot repayment and default policies in debt–output space. White stands for
repayment, light gray for foreign default, dark gray for domestic default and black for total default.
We can see that the repayment–default trade-off for foreign debt is mostly driven by the output
process, while tax distortions do not matter. On the other hand, the default area for domestic debt
is much bigger for the high tax distortion than for the low tax distortion scenario. Also, as in both
cases we set the second type of debt to zero, we cannot observe total default.
To assess the performance of the model, we simulate 1,000 paths from the model, each with
length 10,000, and burn the first 1,000 simulations of each path. Then we compare the resulting
business cycle statistics with the corresponding statistics from the data. Table 1.3 shows that the
results for the benchmark calibration are in line with the data. Our model performs well in many
dimensions. The model replicates reasonably high debts levels and at the same time reasonably
low default probabilities. It predicts that consumption is more volatile than output, and that net
exports are strongly countercyclical.8
It is worth stressing once again that the two shocks have opposite effects on the economy. While
8See Neumeyer and Perri (2005)
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Table 1.3: Cyclical properties
Data (Argentina) Model Arellano (2008)
Foreign default frequency 3.5% 3.5% 3%
Domestic default frequency 2.5% 5.6% x
Total default frequency 1.5% 0.3% x
Average foreign spread 12.67pp 8.9pp 3.58pp
Average domestic spread x 15.5pp x
Foreign debt-to-GDP 17.22% 3.7% 5.95%
Domestic debt-to-GDP 24.78% 13.7% x
Consumption std./ Output std. 1.098 1.088 1.098
the tax distortion shock has a substantial impact on domestic debt accumulation, it has a mild
impact on foreign debt accumulation. The opposite is true for the output shock.
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Figure 1.6: Default sets for foreign debt given bh = 0
Figure 1.7: Default sets for domestic debt given bf = 0
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1.5 Empirical Evidence
This section confronts the two main testable implications of our model with the data. First,
the model predicts foreign default is more likely in low output states of the world and is almost
independent of the level of tax distortions. Second, domestic default is more likely with high tax
distortions and is less dependent on the output realizations.
The idea that taxes are distortionary is not new and has been widely applied in both theoretical
and empirical literature on optimal taxation and optimal level of government spending. In this
paper we abstract from these considerations, but take an insight by Browning (1976) as a starting
point. The social cost of financing a marginal dollar of public expenditure is the sum of that dollar,
which is diverted from private use plus the change in the total welfare cost of taxation caused by
increasing tax revenue by the dollar. Stuart (1984) terms the latter component ”marginal excess
burden” and its definition fits our notion of tax distortions τ perfectly. The are numerous studies
that estimate ”marginal excess burden” using quantified theory. Harberger (1964) classic estimate
puts it at around 2.5¢per additional dollar raised, while Browning (1976) using the same formula
calculates it to be between 9¢and 16¢in 1974. Stuart (1984) proposes a new, general equilibrium
approach, which results in estimates being 1.5 times those of Browning. Seminal contribution by
Feldstein (1999) using micro level data and accounting for multiple channels of adjustments to
tax code changes puts an average dead-weight loss from personal income tax at 32,2% and, more
importantly, shows that marginal losses can be as high as 2$ per additional 1$ raised. Our takeaway
from this literature is that tax distortions τ are significant, positive and variable9.
To test our two main predictions we collect the data on both types of defaults, domestic and
foreign, and the data on output and taxes. However, there is no readily available measure of tax
distortions. The next section explains how we construct a proxy for this.
1.5.1 Methodology
The tax revenue from a specific tax TRi is by definition equal to the product of the tax rate tri
and the tax base TBi.
TRi = tri × TBi (1.5.1)
If a tax is non-distortionary, a change in the tax rate does not affect the tax base. If a tax is
distortionary, a change of the tax rate would reduce the tax base. A visual example of this effect
is the Laffer curve. When a tax rate increases in the range close to 0 revenue also goes up almost
one-to-one. The higher is the tax rate however, increases in revenue are slowing down, as tax base is
decreasing (tax distortions start playing a role). At some point maximum is reached, above which
reduction in tax base dominates any increase in tax rate and tax revenue goes down.
9When marginal burden is different from average burden as in Feldstein (1999) then any exogenous change in a
tax code would result in a change in an average burden.
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Moreover, if a government undertakes any changes (decreasing deductions, taming tax avoid-
ance, making labor more inelastic etc.) so that a tax base goes up without any change it a tax rate,
if more income could be raised with the same primary tool, this should be also seen as a reduction
in tax distortions.
Hence, we any change in the tax base TRi is a sufficient proxy for the change in tax distortions
(model τi).
1.5.2 Data
The data on default, as described in the second section of this paper, comes from the updated
database accompanying Reinhart and Rogoff (2011b) and covers up to 130 countries for the years
1800-2014. From this database we obtain our dependend variables, dummy indicators for foreign
Deff and domestic Defd default.
Output data we obtain from Penn World Tables 8.1 (Feenstra et al. (2015)) which cover up to
209 countries for the years 1950-2011. Data on tax revenues comes from The ICTD Government
Revenue Dataset (Prichard et al. (2014)) which covers up to 130 countries for the years 1980-2010.
Finally, data on tax rates we have obtained and compiled from two main sources: World Tax
Database (WTD) by Office of Tax Policy Research (2015) (up to 60 countries between 1950 and
2002) which is our primary source on corporate income tax rates and World Tax Indicators (WTI)
by Andrew Young School of Policy Studies (2010) (up to 180 countries for the years 1981-2005)
which is our primary source on individual income tax rates. These are complemented by two further
sources: Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation (2015) (CBT; up to 48 countries for the
years 1979-2014) and KPMG (2015) (up tp 79 countries for the years 2002-2014). All our variables
come in yearly frequency. Our estimation sample with the full data coverage is 89 countries for the
years 1981-2011 yielding a total of 1432 country-year observations.
1.5.3 Estimation
We estimate the following two regression equations:
Pr(Deffi,t = 1) = α
f
0 + α
f
1GDPi,t−1 + α
f
2TBi,t−1 (1.5.2)
Pr(Defdi,t = 1) = α
d
0 + α
d
1GDPi,t−1 + α
d
2TBi,t−1 (1.5.3)
where Def is a default indicator and Pr probability of default in country i in period t. Deff is
an indicator for the beginning of a foreign default episode. It takes value 1 if a country i was in a
foreign default in year t, but was not in a foreign default in year t − 1 and 0 otherwise. Defd is
an indicator for the beginning of a de facto domestic default episode, which includes both de jure
domestic default and a hyperinflation crisis. It takes value 1 if a country i was either in a domestic
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Table 1.4: Foreign Default
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Probit RE Logit RE Logit FE Logit Pooled
GDP -0.509∗∗ -0.940∗∗ -0.505 -0.904∗∗
(0.180) (0.328) (0.340) (0.300)
Tax Base -0.0302 -0.0808 -0.187 -0.0780
(0.0208) (0.0538) (0.102) (0.0512)
r2
N 1490 1490 371 1490
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
default or in a hyperinflation crisis in year t, but was in neither in year t− 1 and 0 otherwise10.
GDP is the rate of growth of real GDP per capita denominated in fixed US dollars and TB is
the Tax Base calculated from equation (1.5.1). Our independent variables are lagged one period
to avoid possible endogeneity problem. In regressions we use Tax Base for both corporate taxes.
There is a good rationale for that. Corporate taxes are, to the best of our knowledge, always
flat-rate taxes. This is however not true for personal income taxes, which are usually progressive.
Our data sources have good coverage of the highest rate of the personal income tax, which is far
from being a good proxy for the average effective rate of the personal income tax. Our model
implies that foreign default is mostly driven by fluctuations in output and is almost independent
from tax distortion shock, therefore we expect αf1 to be significant and negative and α
f
2 to be zero.
On the other hand, in our model domestic default is driven mostly by tax distortion shock but also
depends on output shock. Fluctuations in tax distortions τ are inversely related to fluctuations in a
tax base TB as explained in the Methodology subsection. Therefore we expect αd2 to be significant
and positive and αf2 to be non-positive.
We run two benchmark and two robustness regressions for each foreign and domestic default.
As a benchmark we run probit and logit with random effects. To check robustness of our results
we complement those two pooled logit and logit with fixed effects.
Table 1.4 presents regression results for the foreign default, that is equation (1.5.2). The estimate
of the coefficient of the rate of growth of real GDP is positive and significant, while changes in the
tax base do not affect the probability of the foreign default. This result confirms our hypothesis, that
foreign default is driven by the output fluctuations and tax distortions do not play any significant
role.
Table 1.5 presents results for the domestic default, that is equation (1.5.3). As can be seen, the
higher is the tax base (which corresponds to the lower distortions) the lower is the probability of
10Following Reinhart and Rogoff (2011b) these crises are defined as follows: foreign default is defined as the failure
to meet principal or interest payment on a due date. This definition also applies for domestic default. The distinction
between domestic and foreign default is based on legal definition of debt. In addition, domestic debt crises have
involved the freezing of bank deposits and or forcible conversions. An inflation crisis occurs when annual inflation is
20 per cent or higher.
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Table 1.5: Domestic Default
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Probit RE Logit RE Logit FE Logit Pooled
GDP -0.0294 -0.00184 0.387 -0.177
(0.279) (0.584) (0.774) (0.424)
Tax Base -0.0479∗ -0.110∗ -0.127∗ -0.0958∗
(0.0225) (0.0512) (0.0639) (0.0407)
r2
N 1496 1496 387 1496
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
domestic default. As expected, the impact of the corporate tax base is negative and significant.
The real rate of GDP growth however, has no impact on domestic default. This confirms our second
hypothesis, that domestic default is more likely with high tax distortions and is less dependent on
the output realizations.
1.6 Secondary Markets and Haircuts
With the introduction of unconventional monetary policies during the Great Recession, secondary
sovereign debt markets have attracted increasing interest among economists. In this section we
return to the two-period model setting from Section 1.3 to study how secondary markets affect the
government’s incentives to repay or to default. We will introduce secondary markets in the second
period. Secondary markets open after nature selects the output and taxation shocks. Therefore all
participants in the market have perfect foresight of what the government will do (repay or default)
if no trade in assets takes place on secondary markets.
1.6.1 Setup
The starting points for the discussion are Propositions 1, 2 and 3, where we have established that
with costly tax enforcement there exist finite default thresholds for both foreign and domestic debt,
and that both debts can be risky due to the stochastic nature of output and taxation distortions.
There are four possible outcomes of the model in the moment at which secondary markets open,
which are summarized in Figure 1.2. When either both debts are repaid (situation A) or defaulted
on (situation D), the workings of the secondary markets would not change the final outcome.
Therefore our discussion will focus on selective foreign default (situation B).11 Under situation B
in the second period output is low y2 = yL and tax distortions are low τ2 = τL.
First we will summarize our assumptions about what is happening in the economy at the
moment the secondary markets open, and we introduce some notation. As long as default costs
11Selective domestic default, situation C, is its mirror image.
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are positive, there are positive amounts of both foreign and domestic debts outstanding: bf and
bh. Each debt has its respective default threshold which we derive from (1.3.15) and (1.3.16) and
denote in levels: B¯f and B¯h.
After a good shock to taxation and a bad shock to output, foreign debt is above its default
threshold bf > B¯f but domestic debt lies below its default threshold bh < B¯h. As foreigners know
they will be defaulted upon, they are willing to sell their claims in the secondary market. As
domestic investors know there is still some room for an increase in repayable domestic debt, they
are willing to buy them. Bonds in the secondary market sell at discount price qSM .
For the sake of consistency with the model we keep track of domestic debt outstanding. However,
our analysis is also valid for the case when bh = 0, as in Broner et al. (2010). Therefore we can
see this section as a generalization of their work in which we allow for costly enforcement.12 As
we shall see, what matters for creating repayment incentives through secondary markets is not the
level of home or foreign debt outstanding, but the relative difference between above-the-threshold
foreign holdings bf − B¯f and below-the-threshold domestic accommodation space B¯h − bh. We
will call the former expression “defaultable foreign debt overhang” and the latter “domestic debt
accommodation space”.
We formulate this situation as a noncooperative game. There are three types of agents: do-
mestic investors, foreign investors and the government. First, both populations of investors take
simultaneous decisions on the amounts supplied and demanded in the secondary market given the
secondary market discount price and beliefs about the government’s subsequent action (default or
repay). After trades have taken place, the secondary market closes and the government decides to
either repay or default on foreign and domestic investors.
Foreign investors’ strategy space is the quantity of bonds supplied in the secondary market:
sf = {bSMf (qSM , dSMf )}, xf ∈ [0, bf ].
Domestic investors’ strategy space is quantity demanded in the secondary market:
sh = {bSMh (qSM , dSMh )}.
The government’s strategy space consists of two decisions (repay or default) on the two markets:
sg = {dSMf × dSMh }, dSMf ∈ {0, 1}, dSMh ∈ {0, 1}.
Given strategies of the three players we can define payoffs for each player. Because of risk
neutrality of the foreign investor her payoff is defined as her consumption in the second period and
12In Broner et al. (2010), a government with discretion wants to default on foreign debt because it faces no penalties
upon default δf = 0. In our analysis, foreign default is due to the government’s discretionary behavior with δf > 0
and an unfortunate output shock.
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is the function of her decision (quantity supplied on the secondary market bSMf ), domestic investor’s
decision (quantity demanden on the secondary market bSMh ) and the government’s decision (to
default or repay foreign debt dSMf ):
Uf (bSMh , b
SM
f , d
SM
f ) =

(bf − bSMf ) + qSMbSMf if dSMf = 0 and bSMf = bSMh
qSMbSMf if d
SM
f = 1 and b
SM
f = b
SM
h
bf if d
SM
f = 0 and b
SM
f 6= bSMh
0 if dSMf = 1 and b
SM
f 6= bSMh
(1.6.1)
where bf is the amount of government bonds that foreign investors hold from the first period and
qSM is the discount price of bonds on the secondary market in the second period. The first two
cases of equation (1.6.1) refer to a situation when demands meets supply and there is trade in
bonds on the secondary market. The last two cases refer to a situation when there is no trade on
the secondary market. On the other hand first and third case of equation (1.6.1) describe payoffs
to a foreign investor when the government repays foreign debt, whereas second and fourth case
describe payoffs to a foreign investor when the governments defaults on foreign debt.
Similarly, we define the payoff for the domestic investor. Her payoff differs from foreign in-
vestor’s payoff mainly due to risk aversion. The payoff of the domestic investor is the utility from
consumption (u(c) as defined in equation (1.3.19)) in the second period after secondary market
closes. The domestic investor decides on the quatity demanded in the secondary market bSMh tak-
ing the supply of bonds from foreign investors bSMf and the government decision to default or repay
domestic debt dSMh as given:
Uh(bSMh , b
SM
f , d
SM
f ) =

u
(
y2 + bh + b
SM
h
(
1− qSM)− T2 (1 + τ2)) if dSMh = 0 and bSMf = bSMh
u
(
y2 − qSMbSMh − T2 (1 + τ2)
)
if dSMh = 1 and b
SM
f = b
SM
h
u (y2 + bh − T2 (1 + τ2)) if dSMh = 0 and bSMf 6= bSMh
u (y2 − T2 (1 + τ2)) if dSMh = 1 and bSMf 6= bSMh
(1.6.2)
Finally, the government moves after the secondary market closes. The government decides
whether to default of repay both debts dSMh , d
SM
f taking b
SM
h and b
SM
f as given and its payoff is
defined by (1.6.2). The government decision boils down to two default thresholds policies as shown
in derivations (1.3.11)-(1.3.16). These policies, given the trade on the secondary market in the
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second period, translate to:
dSMh (b
SM
h , b
SM
f ) =
0 if bh + bSMh ≤ B¯h1 if bh + bSMh > B¯h (1.6.3)
dSMf (b
SM
h , b
SM
f ) =
0 if bf − bSMf ≤ B¯f1 if bf − bSMf > B¯f (1.6.4)
A Nash equilibrium of this game is the triplet of strategies {sf∗, sh∗, sg∗} for which quantity de-
manded bSMh equals quantity supplied b
SM
f given market clearing price q
SM∗ and beliefs of investors
are consistent with the government decisions dSM∗h , d
SM∗
f :
bSM∗ = bSMf (q
SM∗, dSM∗f ) = b
SM
h (q
SM∗, dSM∗h ) (1.6.5)
dSM∗h = d
SM
h (b
SM∗
h , b
SM∗
f ) (1.6.6)
dSM∗f = d
SM
f (b
SM∗
h , b
SM∗
f ) (1.6.7)
We split our analysis into two parts. In the first, we analyze the situation when foreign debt
overhang is greater than domestic debt accommodation space (bf−B¯f ) > (B¯h−bh). That is, in order
to be repaid, foreign investors have to sell more bonds than domestic investors can accommodate
and still be repaid. It is thus impossible that both groups be repaid after the secondary market
closes. In the second part, we analyze the reverse situation, when foreign debt overhang is smaller
than domestic debt accommodation space (bf−B¯f ) < (B¯h−bh). In this situation domestic investors
can safely buy what foreign investors need to supply in order to be repaid. In theory, secondary
markets could allow both groups of investors to be repaid.
We will look for Nash equilibria in pure strategies with continuous strategy sets. The precise
outcomes of the model will depend on the assumptions we make about the possibility of investor
coordination and of voluntary debt haircuts. In terms of investor coordination, we consider two
different cases. First, we consider the case in which the set of investors is a continuum (infinite
number of investors, each investor has size zero). Second, we modify this assumption and introduce
a finite number of investors (each investor has size ). This theoretical notion has a very intuitive
interpretation in our game. By assumption, a zero-size investor does not internalize the effects of
her individual decision on aggregate action of the set of investors of her class (domestic or foreign),
whereas an -size investors does. If there are externalities in this game (and we shall see that indeed
externalities arise) then an -size investor internalizes them. Therefore it is equivalent to say that
zero-size investors cannot coordinate their actions while -size investors can coordinate. For each
of the two parts (foreign debt overhang dominates, domestic accommodation space dominates) we
will analyze four cases, when each set of investors either can or cannot coordinate.
The second important assumption is either forbidding or allowing free disposal. When free
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Table 1.6: Secondary Markets and Haircuts
when Foreign Debt Overhang is Greater
Foreign Investors
Coordinate Don’t coordinate
Domestic Investors
Coordinate
FD (δf ); bSM ∈ (B¯h − bh, bf − B¯f ) FD (δf );bSM = B¯h − bh
SM reduce welfare SM reduce welfare
Haircut equilibrium restores repayment No Haircut equilibrium
Don’t coordinate
DD (δh); bSM = bf − B¯f TD (δf + δh);
SM likely increase SM reduce welfare
Haircut equilibrium restores repayment No Haircut equilibrium
disposal is forbidden, the amount of bonds issued must be equal to the amount of bonds claimed.
When free disposal is allowed, each investor can voluntarily burn some of her bonds, so the amount
of bonds claimed can be lower than the amount of bonds issued. Free disposal also has a very
intuitive interpretation in our example. When free disposal is allowed and exercised, we can think
of this as a voluntary debt haircut.
Table 1.6 gives a brief summary of the results of secondary markets and haircuts, when foreign
debt overhang dominates. We are initially, before the secondary market opens, in situation B: the
economy would suffer the foreign default cost δf and the amount of domestic debt bh needs to be
either rolled over or repaid by distortionary taxation. If trade on the secondary market does not
alter the outcome in terms of default of the primary market (the first row of Table 1.6), any trade
on secondary market is undesirable from the welfare point of view, because it either increases the
risk of default or induces dead-weight losses of distortionary taxation. If trade on the secondary
market alters the outcome in terms of default of the primary market(the second row of Table 1.6),
the welfare analysis is ambiguous in some cases. However, we can provide intuition for some cases.
First, if both domestic and foreign investors are infinitesimal, the economy suffers the output loss
(1− δf )(1− δh)y upon total default instead of the output loss (1− δf )y upon foreign default, but
both debts are set to zero. However, if it was desirable to have total default from the welfare point
of view, total default would happen on primary market. Second, if foreign investors are -size and
domestic investors are infinitesimal, the economy suffers the output loss (1 − δh)y upon domestic
default instead of the output loss (1 − δf )y upon foreign default and a substantial reduction of
foreign debt.
Table 1.7 gives a brief summary of the results of secondary markets and haircuts, when domestic
accommodation space dominates. We are initially, before the secondary market opens, in situation
B: the economy would suffer the foreign default cost δf and the amount of domestic debt bh needs
to be either rolled over or repaid by distortionary taxation. Trade on the secondary market restores
repayment of both debt. if both domestic and foreign investors are infinitesimal, the economy suffers
the output loss (1− deltaf )(1− deltah)y upon total default instead of the output loss (1− deltaf )y
upon foreign default, but both debts are set to zero. However, if it was desirable to have total
default from the welfare point of view, total default would happen on primary market. Second, if
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Table 1.7: Secondary Markets and Haircuts
when Domestic Accommodation Space is Greater
Foreign Investors
Coordinate Don’t coordinate
Domestic Investors
Coordinate
SM restore repayment on both markets
Don’t coordinate Haircut equilibrium restores repayment No Haircut equilibrium
foreign investors are -size and domestic investors are infinitesimal, the economy suffers the output
loss (1−deltah)y upon domestic default instead of the output loss (1−deltaf )y upon foreign default
and a substantial reduction of foreign debt.
1.6.2 Equilibria when foreign debt overhang dominates
Proposition 4. If both domestic and foreign investors are infinitesimal (cannot coordinate) and
the defaultable foreign debt overhang is greater than the domestic debt accommodation space:
a. Nash equilibrium is indeterminate and degenerate.
b. bSM ∈ (B¯h − bh, bf − B¯f ), qSM = 0.
c. Both debts are defaulted on: dSMh = 1, d
SM
f = 1.
Proof. See Appendix 1.8.4.
The only Nash equilibrium under this specification of the game is indeterminate and occurs at
a discount price equal to zero. This specification of the game suffers from a well known equilibrium
existence problem due to discontinuous payoffs (see Dasgupta and Maskin (1986a) and Dasgupta
and Maskin (1986b)). Because of discontinuous payoffs, the best response functions of both investors
do not cross at any positive price, which is demonstrated in the proof of the proposition.
Proposition 4 shows then that under certain circumstances secondary markets do not help cre-
ate incentives for repayment of government debt, when those incentives are absent on the primary
market. Moreover, as the equilibrium is indeterminate and degenerate, the outcome of secondary
market trade is uncertain. This result may shed some light on why, in turbulent times, secondary
markets may cease to function. Russia in 1998 effectively defaulted on its obligations towards house-
holds but repaid its obligations to firms. Why there was no significant re-trade of bonds between
households and firms on the secondary market remains an open question, but this proposition may
provide some intuition.
We investigate this result further in altering the assumptions that neither domestic nor foreign
investors can coordinate their actions. We formalize this idea by relaxing the assumption of each
investor being zero-measure. Instead we assume that the measure of each investor is  > 0, so that
the economy is populated by 1 investors.
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Figure 1.8: Trade in secondary markets improves welfare (Proposition 5)
Proposition 5. If domestic investors are -size (are able to coordinate) and the defaultable foreign
debt overhang is greater than the domestic debt accommodation space:
a. Nash equilibrium in pure strategies is indeterminate but yields a unique allocation.
b. bSM = B¯h − bh, qSM = 0.
c. Domestic debt is repaid dSMh = 0 and foreign debt is defaulted on d
SM
f = 1.
Proof. See Appendix 1.8.4.
The result in Proposition 5 is graphically depicted in Figure 1.8. The red circle and the blue
cross show the situation before trade on the secondary market. With trade, domestic investors
increase their holdings up to their default threshold and are repaid (black circle). Foreign investors
decrease their holdings, but are nevertheless defaulted on (black cross) as their bond holdings are
still above the default threshold. Note that the equilibrium in Proposition 5 holds when foreign
investors both can and cannot coordinate. The ability to coordinate among domestic investors is
not only a sufficient condition to sustain repayment incentives on the domestic market, but also
allow domestic investors to capture the whole surplus generated by trade on the secondary market
(qSM = 0). Hence, trade on the secondary market does not affect welfare of foreign investors.
Lastly, let us study the reverse situation. Now foreign investors can coordinate and domestic
investors are all zero-measure.
Proposition 6. If foreign investors are -size (are able to coordinate), domestic investors are
infinitesimal (cannot coordinate) and the defaultable foreign debt overhang is greater than the do-
mestic debt accommodation space:
a. Nash equilibrium in pure strategies is unique and degenerate.
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Figure 1.9: Trade in secondary markets destroys welfare (Proposition 6)
b. bSM = bf − B¯f , qSM = 0.
c. Domestic debt is defaulted on dSMh = 1 and foreign debt is repaid d
SM
f = 0.
Proof. See Appendix 1.8.4.
Proposition 6 shows an interesting result. Under the mix of unfavorable circumstances for
domestic investors (a low accommodation space relative to the foreign debt overhang, and a lack
of domestic coordination while foreign investors can coordinate), introducing a secondary market
reverses the selective default result that would otherwise occur on the primary market.
This situation is shown in Figure 1.9. Again, the blue cross and the red circle stand for the
situation before secondary markets open (foreign default and domestic repayment). Now foreign
investors are able to re-trade their defaultable debt overhang to home investors, and are repaid by
the government (black circle). Domestic investors exceed the domestic debt default threshold and
are defaulted on by the government (black cross). Instead of defaulting on its foreign obligations,
the government defaults on domestic debt holdings, and foreign obligations are repaid.
Proposition 7. If foreign investors are allowed free disposal and are -size (can coordinate):
a. The game is reduced to two players: foreign investors and the government.
b. Equilibrium is unique.
c. bf − B¯f is freely disposed of.
d. Both debts are repaid: dh = 0 and df = 0.
Proof. See Appendix 1.8.4.
Proposition 8. If foreign investors are allowed free disposal and are infinitesimal (cannot coordi-
nate), the Nash equilibrium in pure strategies does not exist.
40 Sovereign Debt Issuance and Selective Default
Proof. See Appendix 1.8.4.
Propositions 7 and 8 show that voluntary haircuts would occur only when foreign investors are
able to coordinate. This is because without coordination each investor has incentives to deviate
from the haircut allocation and freely dispose less than bf−B¯f , not expecting this would change the
government’s decision. After a voluntary haircut, foreign debt is repaid. Domestic debt is unaffected
and also repaid. Interestingly, voluntary haircuts increase welfare and restore repayment incentives
in situations when secondary markets may fail to deliver a well-behaved equilibrium (Proposition
6).
Results in this section may shed some light on the Greek government debt crisis, when in 2012
private investors agreed to a voluntary haircut while the trade of government bonds on secondary
markets was negligible.
1.6.3 Equilibria when domestic accommodation space dominates
In this part we analyze the situation in which the foreign debt overhang is smaller than the domestic
debt accommodation space (bf + bh) < (B¯h + B¯f ).
Proposition 9. If domestic investors can accommodate all of the defaultable foreign debt overhang:
a. Nash equilibrium is indeterminate (but well-behaved).
b. bSM ∈ (bf − B¯f , B¯h − bh), qSM = 1.
c. Both debts are repaid: dSMh = 0 and d
SM
f = 0.
Proof. See Appendix 1.8.4.
The result in Proposition 9 is similar to Broner et al. (2010). In their paper, before the secondary
market opens the government wants to default on foreign investors (and domestic debt is zero).
In the secondary market, foreigners re-trade all of their holdings to domestic investors, and the
government repays in full to domestic investors. Here, foreign investors only re-trade the amount
above their default threshold (in Broner et al. (2010) this threshold is zero), but it is enough to
restore repayment on the foreign market. Domestic investors increase their holdings, but are still
below the default threshold (in the cited paper this threshold is infinity) and are therefore also
repaid by the government. The necessary condition for secondary markets to restore repayment on
both markets when tax enforcement is costly is that the foreign debt overhang is smaller than the
domestic debt accommodation space (bf − B¯f ) < (B¯h − bh).
This result affects the workings of the primary market, as it turns risky foreign debt into riskless
debt. Therefore the discount price on the primary market is qf =
1
1+r .
The aim of this section is to show that the effects of secondary markets for government bonds
are ambiguous in the situation where either domestic or foreign debt would otherwise be defaulted
on. This section by no means exhausts the topic. What this section proves is that strengthening the
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role and efficiency of secondary markets is not a remedy that can automatically solve the sovereign
risk problem. We find that the equilibria are dependent on underlying conditions, such as investors’
coordination abilities and the relative size of demand and supply of bonds. Clearly more research,
both empirical and theoretical, is warranted on the workings of secondary markets during sovereign
risk crisis.
1.7 Conclusions
We develop a model of sovereign debt issuance on international and domestic markets, and of
selective defaults. By adding domestic investors we introduces a new level of heterogeneity to a
standard model of strategic sovereign default. Our model is capable of replicating selective default
frequencies and business cycle statistics, and we show that including two types of investors brings
the model closer to the data, as it was suggested by Aguiar and Amador (2014). Our model
is a useful tool to study how the fractions of investors in public debt arise endogenously in an
equilibrium, and how the composition of debt is correlated with spreads and the total debt. Our
model shows that although foreign debt is more valuable and can in principle be used to smooth
both output and taxation shocks, the government would still use domestic debt to smooth the
domestic taxation shock. In a world with two uncorrelated shocks (output and taxation), two
types of debt (foreign and domestic) are issued, and selective defaults arise endogenously (as we
observe in the data).
On the positive side, we provide a theory of the role of secondary sovereign debt markets in
restoring repayment incentives. Trade in secondary markets can restore the government’s repayment
incentives when the supply of defaultable bonds from foreigners is low compared to demand from
domestic investors. However, when the supply of defaultable bonds is high (compared to demand),
then secondary markets cannot sustain repayment on both markets. If domestic investors are able to
coordinate, then trade in secondary markets can be welfare-improving for both sides. Otherwise,
if domestic investors cannot coordinate, then it is uncertain whether any trade would occur on
secondary markets.
On the other hand, if foreign investors are able to coordinate then they will be willing to accept
a voluntary haircut on the eve of foreign default. This would restore debt repayment on the foreign
market. In the absence of coordination, foreign investors will never accept haircuts and foreign
debt will be always defaulted on. In particular situations when secondary markets fail to improve
the allocation, a voluntary haircut does, and vice versa. Our results shed some light on the Greek
government debt crisis, when in 2012 private investors agreed to a voluntary haircut while trade in
government bonds on secondary markets was negligible.
How investors’ coordination may arise endogenously is an interesting and important issue for
further research. However, as investors’ coordination improves the allocation and welfare outcomes,
we hypothesize that within a group each investor has incentives to defect on coordination and free-
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ride on the coordinating majority. Instances of this behavior have been seen in recent default
episodes, especially prior to the 2014 Argentinian default.
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1.8 Appendix
1.8.1 Two Period Model
A. Algorithm
We solve for the government’s optimal domestic and foreign debt policies in the first period following
these steps:
1. Assuming that (1.3.17) and (1.3.18) are satisfied in the second period, we write the govern-
ment’s problem as (1.3.19).
2. The solution to the problem is then a set of two first-order conditions (1.3.22) and (1.3.23)
and pricing rules (1.3.20) and (1.3.21).
3. We pick a set of parameters and solve (1.3.19) numerically.
4. We confirm that the resulting policy functions bf , bh and equilibrium prices qf , qh satisfy
conditions (1.3.17)–(1.3.18), and therefore that expectations in (1.3.19) are consistent in equi-
librium.
5. We vary one parameter at a time within a range where (1.3.17)–(1.3.18) are satisfied to derive
comparative statics.
B. Parametrization
Parameter Value Range Description
y 1 Output today / High output tomorrow
σ 1 Risk aversion of Home agents
Πy 0.72 [0.5 , 1] Probability of high output
Πτ 0.8 [0.5 , 1] Probability of low tax distortion
g 0.7 [0.5 , 0.8] Gov. expenditure
yL 0.5 [0.1 0.7] Low output
τ1 0.1 [0 , 0.2] Tax distortions today
τH 0.15 [0.1 , 0.2] Tax distortions tomorrow (high)
τL 0.05 [0 , 0.15] Tax distortions tomorrow (low)
δf 0.65 [0.42 , 0.87] Output cost of Foreign default
δh 0.05 [0 , 0.15] Output cost of Home default
r 0.00 Risk-free interest rate
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1.8.2 Solution Algorithm
1. Guess price schedules p0f and p
0
h.
2. Calculate consumption in autarky caut and value of permanent autarky V aut.
3. Guess four value functions V 00, V 0fd, V 0hd and V 0td using V aut.
4. Calculate optimal policies bf and bh in repayment given V
00 as continuation value and prices.
5. Calculate value of repayment V r given optimal policies and continuation value.
6. Repeat steps 4 and 5 for foreign default and domestic default to obtain V 1fd and V 1hd.
7. Calculate value of total default V 1td given V 1fd and V 1hd and V 00.
8. Derive optimal default policies d comparing four value functions V r, V 1fd V 1hd V 1td at each
grid point {bf , bh, y, τ}.
9. Derive new value function V 10 as maximum of four value functions used in previous step at
each grid point.
10. Substitute V 00 = V 10.
11. Repeat steps 3–9 until convergence in value function.
12. Given optimal default policies d calculate prices of foreign and domestic debt q1f and q
1
h at
each grid point using pricing rules (1.4.8) and (1.4.7).
13. Update prices q0f = α
fq0f + (1− αf )q1f and q0h = αhq0h + (1− αh)q1h .
14. Repeat steps 1–13 until convergence in prices.
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1.8.3 Two Period Model. Graphical Solutions
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1.8.4 Secondary Markets. Proofs of Propositions
Proof of Proposition 4. We study situation B depicted in the Figure 1.2: outcome on the primary
market yields foreign default (FD) and domestic repayment (DR). Before engaging in the trade on
the secondary markets, both types of investors (domestic and foreign) need to form expectations
about the government’s decision to default. There are three possible outcomes: foreign default and
domestic repayment (FD, DR); foreign repayment and domestic default (FR, DD) and total default
(FD, DD). The repayment of both debts is ruled out by the fact that total debt is greater than the
total default limit bf + bh > B¯h + B¯f .
There are two thresholds related to the volume traded in the secondary markets bSM . If the
traded volume lies below lower threshold bSM ≤ B¯h−bh, domestic debt is repaid, while foreign debt
is defaulted. If the traded volume is between lower and upper threshold B¯h−bh < bSM < bf−B¯f−bh,
both debts are defaulted; if the traded volume lies above upper threshold bSM ≥ B¯h − bh domestic
debt is defaulted, while foreign debt is repaid.
We draw three best-response correspondences: for foreign investors (the solid red line), for do-
mestic investors (the dashed blue line) and for the government in a single graph with the amount of
trade bSM on the horizontal axis and the price qSM of debt on the vertical axis. The brown shaded
area represents the area of trade, in which the expectations are consistent with the government
decision: in the first panel the shaded area represents the amounts traded for which the government
will choose (FD, DR), in the second panel the shaded area represents the amounts traded for which
the government will choose (FD, DD) and in the third panel shaded area represents the amouts
traded for which the government will choose (FR, DD). A crossing of the two best best response
correspondences, which lies within shaded area represents a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies
(secondary markets clear and expectations of investors are consistent with the government’s deci-
sion). As can be seen in Figure 1.10, the only outcome that is consistent is the total default. In
this case the price on the secondary markets is zero, but the amount of trade is undetermined.
QED
Figure 1.10: Best response functions for infinitesimal investors
(a) (FD, DR) (b) (FD,DD) (c) (FR,DD)
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Proof of Proposition 5. We follow a similar procedure to Proof of Proposition 1.8.4. However, there
is one substantial difference. If domestic investors are -size, they internalize the effects of their
actions on the government’s decision. Since bf + bh > B¯h + B¯f at least one type of debt will be
defaulted. The outcome on the primary market yields domestic repayment. Since each domestic
investor is -size, she will never demand any amount that exceeds domestic default threshold, as
this will unambigously decrease her payoff. Hence bSMh ≤ B¯h − bh. In this, domestic investors can
effectively insure domestic repayment.
Therefore, the only possible outcome that is consistent in equilibrium is foreign default and
domestic repayment (FD,DR). Contrary to 1.8.4 we can narrow our considerations and study only
one game when both types of investors expect (FD, DR). The best response function of single foreign
investor depends on whether she is: (a) zero-size, (b) -size and expecting domestic investors to be
zero-size (uninformed foreign investor) or (c) -size and knows that domestic investors are -size
(informed foreign investor). In Figure 1.11 we draw best response functions for the three cases.
If foreign investors are infinitesimal (panel (a)) they do not coordinate and each of them wants
to sell all of her debt holdings (bf ) as long as price on the secondary markets is positive. Hence,
there exist a unique equilibrium where at zero price qSM the maximum possible amount of debt
bSM = B¯h − bh, that insures domestic repayment, is traded. Secondly, when foreign investors are
-size but uninformed (panel (b)), they coordinate their supply on the amount that exceeds bf − B¯h
(that will insure they are repaid by the government in the primary market) as long as price is
positive. Similarly, there exist a unique equilibrium where at zero price qSM the maximum possible
amount of debt bSM = B¯h − bh, that insures domestic repayment, is traded. Thirdly, if foreign
investors are -size and informed that domestic investors coordinate (panel (c)), the traded amount
remains bSM = B¯h − bh, but the price is undetermined qSM ∈ [0, 1].
QED
Figure 1.11: Best response functions for -size domestic investors
(a) Infinitesimal foreign in-
vestors
(b) Uninformed -size foreign in-
vestors (c) Informed -size foreign investors
Proof of Proposition 6. We consider the opposite case to the Proof of Proposition 1.8.4. Foreign
investors are -size, they internalize the effect of their actions on the government decision, while
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domestic investors are infinitesimal. Since bf + bh > B¯h + B¯f , at least the one type of debt will
be defaulted by the government. Hence, foreign investors coordinate to insure foreign repayment
(FR). The only possible outcome that is consistent in equilibrium is foreign repayment and domestic
default (FR,DD). In Figure 1.12 we draw the best response functions for this case. There exists a
unique equilibrium, where at zero price qSM the minimum possible amount bSM = bf − B¯f , that
insures foreign repayment, is traded. QED
Figure 1.12: Best response functions for -size foreign and infinitesimal domestic investors
Proof of Proposition 7 and 8. We consider an alternative way (compared to Proposition 6) to bring
foreign debt bf down (weakly) below its default threshold B¯f . Foreign investors are -size, they
internalize the effect of their actions on the government decision. As shown in the previous propo-
sition, engaging in the secondary market does not bring direct benefit for foreign investors, but
it might restore foreign repayment under very specific circumstances. The option of free disposal
plays a similar role. It does not bring a direct benefit, but it insures foreign repayment as long as
foreign investors can coordinate on the minimum amount of a haircut bf − B¯f . The free disposal
requires only the coordination between foreign investors. QED
Proof of Proposition 9. We study situation B depicted in the Figure 1.2: outcome on the primary
market yields foreign default (FD) and domestic repayment (DR). Before engaging in the trade on
the secondary markets, both types of investors (domestic and foreign) need to form expectations
about the government’s decision to default. There are three possible outcomes: foreign default and
domestic repayment (FD, DR); foreign repayment and domestic default (FR, DD) and total default
(FD, DD). The repayment of both debts is ruled out by the fact that total debt is greater than the
total default limit bf + bh > B¯h + B¯f .
There are two thresholds related to the volume traded in the secondary markets bSM . If the
traded volume lies below lower threshold bSM ≤ B¯h−bh, domestic debt is repaid, while foreign debt
52 Sovereign Debt Issuance and Selective Default
is defaulted. If the traded volume is between lower and upper threshold B¯h−bh < bSM < bf−B¯f−bh,
both debts are defaulted; if the traded volume lies above upper threshold bSM ≥ B¯h − bh domestic
debt is defaulted, while foreign debt is repaid.
We draw three best-response correspondences: for foreign investors (the solid red line), for
domestic investors (the dashed blue line) and for the government in a single graph with the amount
of trade bSM on the horizontal axis and the price qSM of debt on the vertical axis. The brown shaded
area represents the area of trade, in which the expectations are consistent with the government
decision. A crossing of the two best best response correspondences, which lies within shaded area
represents a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies (secondary markets clear and expectations of
investors are consistent with the government’s decision).
In Figure 1.13 we draw best response correspondences for the case of infinitesimal foreign and
inifinitesimal domestic investors. Only in panel (b), depicting the case when both types of investors
expect domestic repayment and foreign repayment (FR, DR), best correspondences cross in the
shaded area, which means that expectations are consistent in equilibrium. In a unique equilibrium
both debt are repaind, the volume volume is however undetermined bSM ∈ (bf − B¯f , B¯h − bh) and
the price is equal to one qSM = 1.
Figure 1.13: Best response functions for infinitesimal foreign and infinitesimal domestic investors
(a) (FD, DR) (b) (FR, DR) (c) (FR, DD)
Since bf + bh < B¯h + B¯f , both debts can be potentially repaid, even without coordination.
Coordination of foreign/domestic investors reinforces foreign/domestic repayment. Interestingly,
coordination does not change the outcome. In Figure 1.14 we plot best response correpospon-
dences of domestic and foreign investors together with government’s optimal default decision in
single graphs for three remaining cases: (a) -size foreign and infinitesimal domestic investors, (b)
infinitesimal foreign and -size domestic investors and (c) -size foreign and -size domestic in-
vestors. For each case best response correspondences differ slightly, but an equilibrium is the same
across all three cases.
Finally, let us consider two other cases, in which one class of investors consists of -size agents,
whereas the other of infinitesimal agents. As shown in Propositions 5 and 6 the class that consists
of agents of -size has an advantage, as they can coordinate on their most favourable outcome. We
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Figure 1.14: Best response functions for -size investors
(a) -size foreign and
infinitesimal domestic investors
(b) infinitesimal foreign and
-size domestic investors
(c) -size foreign and
-size domestic investors
Figure 1.15: Best response functions with one-sided advantage
(a) -size foreign and
infinitesimal domestic investors
(FR, DD)
(b) infinitesimal foreign and
-size domestic investors
(FD, DR)
want to check, whether in the case studied here, the side with an advantage can coordinate on
their most favourable outcome. In panel (a) of Figure 1.15 we plot best response correspondences
when foreign investors are -size (have an advantage) and domestic investors are infinitesimal. Both
investors expect government to default on domestic debt and repay the foreign debt (FR, DD). Even
though foreign investors might potentially coordinate on any level of debt, for example B¯h − bh,
they would not do so. This volume and the price qSM = 0 cannot be an equilibrium, because there
is a profitable deviation for each foreign investors to reduce her traded volume down to bf − B¯f
and therefore to secure domestic repayment. Foreign repayment and domestic default (FR, DD)
cannot be sustained as an equilibrium.
In panel (b) of Figure 1.15 we plot best response correspondences when domestic investors are
-size (have an advantage) and foreign investors are infinitesimal. Both investors expect government
to default on foreign debt and repay the domestic debt (FD, DR). Even though domestic investors
might potentially coordinate on any level of debt, for example bf − B¯f , they would not do so. This
volume and the price qSM = 0 cannot be an equilibrium, because there is a profitable deviation for
each domestic investors to always increase the traded volume, up until the point, where it meets
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supply from foreign investors if B¯h− bh and therefore to secure foreign repayment. Foreign default
and domestic repayment (FD, DR) cannot be sustained as an equilibrium.
QED
Chapter 2
Optimal Inflation, Average Markups
and Asymmetric Sticky Prices
Abstract
In state-of-the-art New Keynesian model firms are monopolistically competitive and prices are
sticky. However, the average markup resulting from the staggered price setting is usually assumed
away either by production subsidy or by the zero-inflation steady state. Also, in models of an open
economy the same level of price stickiness is assumed for both countries. In this paper I study
the optimal rate of inflation in a two country model keeping the average markup and allowing
price stickiness to differ between countries. There are two channels that govern the optimal rate
of inflation. First, with local currencies an inflation tax is partly imposed on the foreign country,
so it is optimal to inflate. Second, the average markup constitutes a cost of holding money so it
is optimal to deflate. The paper has four novel findings: 1) in the local currencies regime the first
motive dominates and the optimal inflation is positive. 2) In a monetary union the first motive is
absent and the optimal inflation is negative and below the Friedman rule. 3) A monetary union
improves global welfare even when stickiness is different in two countries. However, when this
difference is large, only one country (the one with higher stickiness) benefits from the integration.
4) A monetary union can be welfare improving for each country, if a transfer is introduced from the
more sticky to the more flexible country of (depending on the parameters up to) 2% of its GDP.1
Keywords: optimal inflation, monetary union, international spillovers, monetary policy
JEL Classification: E52, F41, F42
1I would like to thank A´rpa´d A´braha´m, Russell Cooper and Evi Pappa for all their advice and constant support.
The paper has benefited from discussions with seminar participants in the Cardiff Business School and at the EUI in
Florence.
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2.1 Introduction
In this paper I ask two half-century-old questions. The first one is about the optimal rate of inflation.
In a New Keynesian literature firms are monopolistically competitive and price stickiness is the main
transmission channel of a monetary policy. An inflation rate affects real variables (consumption,
labor supply and output) through both of these frictions. Therefore both are important to determine
the optimal rate of inflation. However, the New Keynesian literature almost exclusively relies on
the assumption of zero steady-state inflation. In this steady-state the average markup is constant
and independent of an inflation rate, therefore one of the frictions is effectively assumed away. I
lift this assumption and look for the optimal steady-state inflation in a simple two-country model
of overlapping generations. The two countries setup allows me to study optimal outcomes under
two different regimes: local currencies and a monetary union2.
In the local currencies economy there are two effects that determine the optimal rate of inflation.
One is an international dimension of an inflation tax (the spillover effect) and the other one is that
the average markup depends on the rate of inflation (the markup effect). The spillover effect works
in the following way. Inflation reduces a return on money holdings. This reduces labor supply.
The gain from inflation, increased utility from leisure, lies entirely within the economy. The cost
of inflation, the reduced return from money holdings, is however spread across the two economies,
as foreigners also hold the domestic currency (cash in advance) to buy imports. This creates an
inflationary pressure in an economy with local currency. Like in Cooper and Kempf (2003) the
local monetary authority finds it optimal to manipulate the terms of trade and create excessive
inflation.
The markup effect works similarly to the Friedman rule. Friedman (1969) argued that the
optimal rate of inflation should equalize costs and benefits of holding money. The real interest
rate is the opportunity cost of holding money. As long as the real interest rate is positive the
optimal rate of inflation should be negative, to compensate for this cost. In this paper the real
interest rate is zero, but the average markup constitutes a real cost of holding money. The markup
effect therefore creates a disinflationary pressure in an economy. For plausible parameter values
the spillover effect dominates the markup effect in the economy with a local currency and optimal
inflation is always positive.
In a monetary union however, the spillover effect is absent. The common monetary authority
fully internalizes international spillovers and incentives to exploit the inflation tax disappear. The
common monetary authority only cares about the average markup. Therefore, in a monetary union
optimal inflation is always negative and, when price stickiness is symmetric in both countries,
equal to one minus the average markup, that is below the Friedman rule. The monetary union
setup can also be interpreted as a model of a closed economy. Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2010)
2In this paper these settings correspond to other settings often studied in the literature: cooperation vs non-
cooperation and flexible exchange rates vs. fixed exchange rates.
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provide an excellent review of state-of-the-art literature and some new findings on the optimal rate
of inflation. They identify the striking puzzle that available theories consistently imply that the
optimal rate of inflation ranges from the Friedman rule to numbers insignificantly above zero, which
is at odds with the empirical regularity regarding the size of the inflation targets around the world.
This paper reinforces this puzzle by showing, among other things, that in a closed economy (or in
a monetary union) with monopolistic competition and sticky prices the optimal rate of inflation
is in fact below the Friedman rule. One of the novel contributions of Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe
(2010) is the proof that in a closed economy with sticky prices and monopolistic competition (and
without a production subsidy3) the optimal rate of inflation is in fact zero. This result is in stark
contrast to Paustian and Stoltenberg (2008) and Khan et al. (2003), which show that the negative
trend inflation according to the Friedman rule yields higher welfare than the zero-inflation. This is
further reinforeced by the fact that the latter two contributions assume production subsidy, which,
if anything, increases the level of steady-state optimal inflation. The result in my paper is in line
with those two contributions. Because I do not assume any production subsidies, in my model
the optimal rate of inflation is in fact below the Friedman rule. Later in the paper I explain the
possible reason of the discrepancy of the mentioned results. All three mentioned papers however,
deal with a closed economy setup. In contrast, this paper assumes two countries setup, which is
suitable to study the trade-off between the average markup and inflation tax channels.
The two countries setup is also suitable to study the second, half-century-old question: are
monetary unions optimal? It may seem that the large existing body of literature has exploited
this question in every dimension. In a classical trade-off first formulated by Friedman (1953)
and Mundell (1961), the benefit of a monetary union over a flexible exchange rates regime is
the reduction in transaction costs, while the cost is the inability of a country to respond to its
idiosyncratic shocks. In the Mundellian view the benefits from elimination of a currency conversion
and nominal exchange rate fluctuations would encourage more integration in goods and capital
markets. Both the upside and the downside of a Mundell-Friedman argument has been largely
extended and widely studied in theory and in practice ever since. This paper focuses on the upside
of this argument. The common monetary authority internalizes the interdependence of the two
economies, the spillover effect disappears and joint welfare goes up.
Surprisingly however, the role of price stickiness on the optimal design of a monetary union has
not yet been studied in detail. In a New Keynesian literature, where price stickiness is the main
transmission channel of a monetary policy, the same level of stickiness is a common assumption in
modes of an open economy4. A notable exception is Liu and Pappa (2008), who study gains from
a monetary policy coordination when sectoral composition is different in two countries and (among
other things) sectors may have different price stickiness. In their paper gains from coordination are
3Starting with Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) it is common in the DSGE literature to undo the monopolistic
competition distortion by a small production subsidy that renders steady-state efficient.
4See for example Clarida et al. (2001), Clarida et al. (2002), Pappa (2004), citeGM2008.
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significant and due to a fact, that a single social planner can eliminate terms-of-trade externality
that individual policymakers overlook. In this paper it corresponds to the elimination of the spillover
effect. Also, as Liu and Pappa (2008) study a policy coordination rather than a monetary union,
a single social planner is able to set subsidies individually for each sector in each country. In this
paper a common monetary authority only sets a common inflation rate. When the assumption of
symmetric price stickiness is lifted, gains from a monetary union are distributed unevenly. The
country with more sticky prices benefits more from the monetary integration than the country with
more flexible prices. When the difference is large, only one country benefits.
With the asymmetric stickiness the optimal choice of inflation in the local currencies regime
differs between the countries. The country with higher price stickiness faces a stronger contraction
bias and chooses lower inflation in equilibrium than the country with more flexible prices. In a
monetary union inflation is reduced in both countries, as the spillover effect is removed. When the
difference between the price stickiness between the two economies is high, a monetary union could
in fact reduce welfare in the more flexible economy, as the optimal rate of inflation in the union is
inefficiently low. The country with higher price stickiness reaps all the benefits of integration at
the expense of the more flexible country. From the joint welfare perspective however, a monetary
union is always strictly welfare improving. Therefore joining the union could also be sustained as an
optimal choice for the economy with more flexible prices if coupled with a lump sum transfer from
the economy with more sticky prices, who is a net beneficiary of an integration. The integration
with a compensating transfer is therefore a Pareto improvement upon the local currencies regime.
For plausible parameter values the size of this transfer is never greater than 2% of output of the
contributor country.
In this paper high inflation in the local currencies regime can be viewed as an example of a free-
rider problem as in Cooper and Kempf (2003), where inflation arises as a suboptimal equilibrium
solution to the game between two monetary authorities and not between a central bank and private
agents, as in Alesina and Barro (2002). In this paper monetary authorities, both in the local
currencies and in the monetary union regime do not have any commitment problem. Creating a
monetary union enables the single monetary authority to overcome this free-riding problem and
reduces inflation to the welfare-maximizing level. The novelty of this paper is generalizing Cooper
and Kempf (2003) framework by introducing sticky prices.
There is a large body of the New Open Economy Macroeconomics literature that studies the
issue of a monetary cooperation and unions under sticky prices. Pappa (2004) studies the optimal
monetary policy arrangements under cooperation, non-cooperation and union subject to technology
shocks. She finds that monetary cooperation is welfare improving, however, countries are assumed
to have same level of price stickiness and the model is evaluated around the zero steady-state
inflation. I generalize her result by showing what happens when the two assumptions are relaxed.
Finally, I rely on the empirical evidence of price stickiness offered by Dhyne et al. (2005) and
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Dhyne et al. (2009) who estimate price change frequencies and offer different indicators on price
stickiness measures for the Euro area countries. They find that prices change infrequently and
that there is substantial degree of heterogeneity in frequency of price changes across products and
countries. Table 2.1 shows that the differences in the average monthly frequency of price changes
in the Eurozone countries can be as high as double. This is the reason to allow for the possibility
of asymmetric price stickiness in the model.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section I derive competitive
equilibrium outcomes of an open economy given inflation rate. Section 3 studies the optimal
inflation rate in an economy with local currency. Section 4 studies the optimal inflation rate
and welfare gains in a monetary union. Section 5 shows how the monetary union can be Pareto
improving upon the local currencies regime when price stickiness in the two countries is highly
asymmetric. Last section concludes.
Table 2.1: Monthly frequency of price adjustment (in %) across some Eurozone countries
Country Frequency
Germany 13.5
Spain 13.3
France 20.9
Italy 10.0
Portugal 21.1
Source: Dhyne et al. (2005)
2.2 The model
The aim of this paper is to study the consequences of a price stickiness on optimal conduct of mon-
etary policy under local currencies and monetary union regimes. I build a two-country overlapping
generations model with monopolistically competitive firms and nominal rigidity in the form of the
staggered price adjustment as in Calvo (1983). Firms facing dynamic Calvo-type rigidities are opti-
mizing as in Yun (1996), Woodford (2011) and King and Wolman (2013). Consumers are active in
two periods. In first period they work, in second period they consume. The only mean to transfer
labor revenues to the next period is through paper money. This generates money demand in the
model economy. Both countries are populated by continuum of homogeneous agents. Consumers
consume goods manufactured both at Home country and Foreign country. Labor is immobile. At
time zero a monetary authority commits to a stable (time independent) money supply growth rate.
Changes in money supply come as lump sum transfers for an old generation and are perfectly antic-
ipated by a young generation. Two countries can differ in the level of price stickiness. Throughout
the analysis I will denote real variables with lower case letters and nominal variables with capital
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Table 2.2: Timing within a period in Home country
Firms Young Old
Signal to update prices Receive money transfer
Set prices Supply labor Demand goods
Produce Get paid in Home currency Exchange currencies for Home and Foreign goods
Exchange currencies
letters. Foreign variables are denoted by a ∗ and the derivations for foreign variables are skipped
whenever possible. The timing of events in Home country within one period is presented in Table
2.2.
Total consumption by Home consumers is an aggregate of consumptions of Home and Foreign
goods:
ct = (c
h
t )
θ(cft )
1−θ (2.2.1)
where θ is a parameter representing home bias in consumption. Both Home and Foreign consump-
tion are aggregates over differentiated goods produced across firms indexed by z:
cit =
(ˆ 1
0
cit(z)
−1
 dz
) 
−1
i = {h, f}
where  ≥ 0 is elasticity of substitution among differentiated goods. In next sections I analyze price
setting behavior of firms and labor supply and consumption decisions of individuals.
2.2.1 Firms
In each country there is a continuum of monopolistically competitive firms producing differentiated
goods. Each firms sells its goods to consumers in both Home and Foreign country. Each firm faces
two demand schedules (from Home and Foreign consumers) given by individuals’ solution to their
expenditure minimization problem:
cht (z) =
(
Pt(z)
Pt
)−
cht (2.2.2)
ch
∗
t (z) =
(
P ∗t (z)
P ∗t
)−
cht
∗
(2.2.3)
where cht (z) and c
h∗
t (z) are the demands for Home variety z from Home and Foreign consumers.
Home demand for variety z is a function of an aggregate demand cht for Home goods by Home
consumers, a relative price of variety z Pt(z)Pt and the elasticity of substitution .
Firms are assumed to be able to change their price only in specific states of nature and must
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satisfy all demand at a quoted price. Each period every firm faces probability 1− λ that it will be
able to adjust its price:
Pt(z) =
Pt−1(z) with prob. λP#t (z) with prob. 1− λ
where P#t (z) is an optimal price that a firm sets when it receives the signal to reset. Since there
is a chance that a firm will face the same price for many periods, the pricing problem becomes
dynamic. Firms will discount profits j periods into the future by ∆t,jλ
j , where ∆t,j is a discount
factor and λ is the probability of not updating next period. As money is the only store of value,
the proper discount factor in this economy is the reverse of gross inflation:
∆t,j =
1
(1 + pi)j
.
When updating its price each firm maximizes the discounted sum of future real profits:
max
P#t (z)
Et
∞∑
j=0
∆t,jλ
j
(
P#t (z)yt+j(z)
Pt+j
− Wt+jnt+j(z)
Pt+j
)
(2.2.4)
subject to (2.2.2), (2.2.3), linear production function:
yt(z) = nt(z) (2.2.5)
and imposing that output equals demand at both country and product level:
yt(z) = c
h
t (z) + c
h∗
t (z) (2.2.6)
yt = c
h
t + c
h∗
t . (2.2.7)
From the first order condition each updating firm will choose the same reset price P#t , so that
firm index z can be dropped:
P#t =

− 1
Et
∑∞
j=0 ∆t+jλ
jWt+jP
−1
t+j yt+j
Et
∑∞
j=0 ∆t+jλ
jP −1t+j yt+j
. (2.2.8)
In a stationary steady state with a constant rate of inflation equation 2.2.8 reduces to:
P# =

− 1W.
A firm that is able to reset its price optimally in a given period would charge a constant markup
over marginal cost, which I define it as the marginal markup: µ∗t =

−1 . A fact that a firm’s pricing
decision is in fact static is a direct conseqence of the CES preference structure. Each period all
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producers share the same cost structure and face the same, due to CES preferences static demand
schedule. Hence, their optimal pricing decision is not only symmetric but also static5.
In an inflationary equilibrium however, the average markup Pt/Wt is different than the marginal
markup, as prices are sticky. This stochastic price setting specification results in a stationary
distribution of firms in terms of the time since their last price adjustment. The fraction of firms
that last adjusted j periods ago is φj = (1−λ)λj . Thus, aggregate price level evolves according to:
Pt =
 ∞∑
j=0
φj
(
Pt−j#
)1− 11−
or, more simply:
Pt =
(
(1− λ)(P#t )1− + λ(Pt−1)1−
) 1
1−
. (2.2.9)
I define the average markup µt as aggregate nominal price to nominal wage. I can rewrite
average markup as:
µt =
Pt
Wt
=
Pt
P#t
P#t
Wt
(2.2.10)
where the first expression I define as ”price adjustment gap” and the second expression is given
by the marginal markup mu∗. In an inflationary steady-state by evaluating (2.2.9) in a situation
where both Pt and P
#
t grow at the same rate pi I obtain the formula for price adjustment gap:
Pt
P#t
=
(
1− λ (1 + pi)−1
1− λ
) 1
−1
. (2.2.11)
Then the average markup is:
µ =

− 1
(
1− λ (1 + pi)−1
1− λ
) 1
−1
. (2.2.12)
Average markup in this economy is time-independent, goes down with inflation, goes up with
price stickiness when inflation is negative and goes down with price stickiness when inflation is
positive. Figure 2.1 plots how the average markup changes with inflation and stickiness. For the
firms to generate non-negative profits average markup must be no lesser than one. The necessary
and sufficient condition for this is given by 2.2.13. This condition will limit the choice of inflation
5A notable example of departure from CES is Bergin and Feenstra (2000), who show that Calvo rigidity under
translog demand structure implies a price-setting rule that is dynamic and gives weight to prices set by competitors.
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Figure 2.1: Inflation and average markup at different λ levels
rates studied in the next chapter.
pi ≤ λ 11−
(
1−
(

− 1
)1−
(1− λ)
) 1
−1
− 1 (2.2.13)
With firms behaving as explained, monetary authority can in principle use inflation to undo the
friction caused by monopolistic competition. With prices sticky enough higher levels of inflation pi
result in smaller ’price adjustment gap’.
2.2.2 Households
Households are active in two periods. In first period households supply labor to firms, receive
wages and profits and choose levels of Home and Foreign money holdings. In the second period
they consume Home and Foreign goods. The optimization problem of a representative household
in Home country is given by
max
mht ,m
f
t ,nt
Et (log (ct+1)− g (nt)) (2.2.14)
subject to (2.2.1) and first and second period budget constraints:
Wtnt + Πt = m
h
t + etm
f
t (2.2.15)
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cht+1 =
mht + τt+1
Pt+1
cft+1 =
mft
P ∗t+1
(2.2.16)
where mht are Home money holdings, m
f
t are Foreign money holdings, Πt is an average nominal
profit of Home firms, τt+1 is Home lump sum money transfer from the monetary authority, Pt+1
and P ∗t+1 are aggregate nominal prices of Home goods and Foreign goods in local currecies and et
is the exchange rate. Labor disutility function g(nt) is assumed to be increasing and convex. Taste
preference for home goods θ is assumed to be constant and same for both countries θ ∈ [0, 1] with
θ > 0.5 representing the home bias.
First order conditions with respect to Home and Foreign money holdings yield the following
Euler equation:
1− θ
etm
f
t
=
θ
mht + τ
h
t+1
(2.2.17)
which implies that future money supply will be held in constant proportions between currencies by
the old generation. This in turn implies, that every period old generation would consume constant
fraction of home output. With respect to labor supply FOC gives:
g′(nt) =
θWt
mht + τ
h
t+1
=
θWt
Pt+1cht+1
(2.2.18)
2.2.3 Market clearing
In every period three markets clear in each country: goods market, labor market, money market
and one international foreign exchange market. Goods market clearing in Home country is given
by (2.2.7). Labor market clears:
nt =
ˆ 1
0
nt(z)dz. (2.2.19)
where nt is solution to individuals FOC on labor supply (2.2.18). Monetary authority supplies
money, which is held by old generation, who spends it on consumption goods and then firms divide
it between wages and profits:
Mt = P
h
t (c
h
t + c
h∗
t ) = Wtnt + Πt (2.2.20)
The evolution of money stocks at Home country is given by
Mt+1 = Mt(1 + σ) (2.2.21)
where σ is fixed growth rate of home money supply. In next section, it will become decision
variable for monetary authority and is taken by agents as given. Additional money supply finances
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lump-sum transfers to home old generation agents:
τt+1 = σMt (2.2.22)
Exchange market clears:
m∗ht = etm
f
t (2.2.23)
Finally, the stock of each currency after the exchange market closes is distributed between home
and foreign agents according to:
Mt = m
h
t +m
∗h
t
2.2.4 Equilibrium
Given the conditions for optimization by agents and market clearing conditions in two countries I
first characterize optimal steady-state levels of employment and consumption given stable money
growth rates. A monetary stationary rational expectations equilibrium is given by labor supply
functions (nt, n
∗
t ), consumption functions (c
h
t , c
f
t , c
∗h
t , c
∗f
t ) and system of price expectations (Pt,P
∗
t ,
et) such that agents optimize and markets clear. Equations (2.2.16), (2.2.17), (2.2.20), (2.2.21) and
(2.2.23) give the following:
mht + τ
h
t+1 = θ(1 + σ)Mt. (2.2.24)
This together with budget constraint (2.2.16), goods market clearing (2.2.7), production func-
tion (2.2.5) and money market clearing (2.2.20) imply that consumption in equilibrium is:
cht = θnt (2.2.25)
cft = (1− θ)n∗t (2.2.26)
Domestic consumption is therefore always a fixed fraction of domestic output. This stationary
property of consumption combined with money market clearing (2.2.20) and evolution of money
stock implies equilibrium property of price evolution:
Pt+1
def
= Pt(1 + pi) = Pt(1 + σ) (2.2.27)
which shows that money is neutral in the long run as pi = σ. Changes is money supply Mt only affect
prices Pt. Last two equations combined with FOC on labor supply (2.2.18), stationary property
of equilibrium and definition of average markup (2.2.10) imply stationary level of labor supply.
Because of the stationarity time indices can be dropped:
g′(n¯)n¯ =
1
µ(1 + σ)
(2.2.28)
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where n¯ stands for steady-state equilibrium level of labor supply. In steady-state equilibrium
labor and consumption of Home and Foreign goods in both countries and exchange rate are constant
and home and foreign prices grow at the rates σ and σ∗. Equilibrium condition (2.2.28) reveals
interesting properties. The model manifests long run neutrality of money (as permanent changes in
quantity of M only affect prices and not output) but not superneutrality. There will be real effects
of sustained long run inflation stemming from two sources: the average markup and the inflation
tax.
Proposition 1. Inflation has two equilibrium effects on real activity. It increases labor supply
and consumption through a decreased level of the average markup and decreases labor supply and
consumption through the inflation tax.
Proof. First part of proposition derives from equations (2.2.10) and (2.2.11). Second part of propo-
sition follows from convexity of g(n).
This result differs significantly from Cooper and Kempf (2003), where under flexible prices,
positive money growth rate worked only as an inflation tax, decreasing steady-state optimal labor
supply. This proposition shows that in the sticky prices environment there are two effects of
monetary policy working in opposite directions. First, the inflation tax effect (which works similarly
to long term Phillips curve) discourages agents from work, so they optimally choose lower labor
supply level. Second, the average markup effect (which works similarly to short term Phillips curve)
derives from the fact that prices at firm level move infrequently. In non-reseting firms with higher
inflation costs rise faster. They take wages as given and must satisfy all demand at posted price, so
they need to cut their profits, which results in lower average markups and higher average output.
In the remainder of the paper, wherever it is necessary to impose functional form on the labor
disutility function I use the following specification:
g(n) =
1
2
n2. (2.2.29)
From (2.2.28) and pi = σ optimal labor supply reads:
n¯(σ) =
 
− 1
(
1− λ (1 + σ)−1
1− λ
) 1
−1
(1 + σ)
−
1
2
(2.2.30)
To calculate the net effect of inflation on labor supply I first evaluate first derivative of 2.2.30
and later plot how optimal labor supply reacts to inflation and stickiness in Figure 2.2.
∂n¯(σ)
∂σ
= −1
2
(

− 1
)− 1
2
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
(1 + σ)−
3
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
(
1− λ (1 + σ)−1
1− λ
)− 1
2(−1)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0 since (2.2.13) holds
(
1− λ (1 + σ)
−1
1− λ (1 + σ)−1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≶0
. (2.2.31)
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Figure 2.2: Inflation and optimal labor supply at different λ levels
From (2.2.31) it follows that the sign of the derivative depends on the sign of the expression
in the last parenthesis. The first effect (inflation tax or long-term Phillips curve) will therefore
dominate, so the labor supply will decrease with inflation, whenever:
σ <
(
1
2λ
) 1
−1
− 1 (2.2.32)
and the second effect (sticky prices or short-term Phillips curve effect) will dominate, so the labor
supply will increase with inflation, whenever the reverse is true. This can be easily seen in Figure
2.2. When prices are flexible λ = 0 condition 2.2.32 is always met, so optimal labor supply decreases
in inflation. When prices are sticky λ > 0 the above condition is only met for some values of σ. For
example, when marginal markup is equal to 1.14 (which gives  = 8.14) and λ = 0.15 labor supply
goes down with inflation up to σ = 0.18. Higher inflation decreases return on money holdings and
this discourages households from supplying labor. Inflation tax effect dominates. Above this point
the average markup effect dominates. Higher inflation reduces average markup in the economy,
which in turn increases return on money. For λ = 0.25 and λ = 0.35 this switch occurs at σ = 0.11
and σ = 0.05.
It can be easily shown, that condition (2.2.32) is always more restrictive than (2.2.13) so that
both relationships are possible within the support of σ. This result has profound consequences on
optimal money supply rules chosen by monetary authorities, the topic I turn to next.
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2.3 Optimal Monetary Policy with Local Currencies
In this section I look for the rate of inflation that solves the monetary authority optimization
problem. By manipulating the rate of growth of the monetary base local monetary authority chooses
a steady state which yields highest welfare for households and it takes equilibrium outcomes and
market clearing conditions as constraints:
V (σ, σ∗) = max
σ
(u (c)− g (n)) (2.3.1)
subject to optimal consumption decision (2.2.25) and optimal labor supply decision (2.2.30). Sub-
stituting in we get:
V (σ, σ∗) = max
σ
{θlogθ + θlog(n¯(σ)) + (1− θ) log (1− θ) + (1− θ) log(n¯∗(σ∗))− g(n¯(σ))} .
(2.3.2)
Foreign country monetary authority optimization problem is symmetric. First order condition
for the problem reads:
θ
n(σ)
n¯′(σ)− g′(n¯(σ))n¯′(σ) = 0. (2.3.3)
The above condition combined with optimal labor supply condition 2.2.28 gives the following two
roots:
1
µ(σ1)(1 + σ1)
= θ (2.3.4)
n¯′(σ2) = 0. (2.3.5)
The problem is highly non-linear therefore I proceed by solving two simplified benchmark cases
first. The first benchmark is the economy with no frictions (perfect competition and flexible prices).
The second benchmark is the economy with only one friction (monopolistic competition). Both
benchmarks have closed form solutions. After that I proceed with the third, full benchmark case,
that is the economy with both frictions (monopolistic competition and sticky prices).
Benchmark 1. Open economy with flexible prices and perfect competition
This economy is analogous to Cooper and Kempf (2003). Prices are flexible (λ = 0) and average
and marginal markups are equal to one (µ = 1).
Proposition 2. In the economy with flexible prices and perfect competition first order condition
(2.3.3) of the monetary authority optimization problem has only one solution, σ1 in (2.3.4). Optimal
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rate of inflation maximizing households utility is therefore:
σB1 =
1− θ
θ
(2.3.6)
Proof. See Appendix.
Solution to (2.3.5) yields σ2 = −1, which is outside of the support for sigma and would bring
an immediate collapse of the economy, with no exchange, no production and no consumption.
With positive rate of inflation monetary authority exploits international spillovers to run in-
flationary, ’beggar-thy-neighbor’ policy. Both labor supply and home output is lower than under
no inflation. However, fraction of output is consumed abroad, so inflation tax is partly exercised
on foreign individuals. Home individuals can enjoy more leisure without paying full cost of lost
output. It is worthwhile to notice, that if both Home and Foreign country form monetary union
all spillovers are internalized by common monetary authority. There is no possibility to exercise
inflation tax on foreign individuals, as there is no ’neighbor to beggar’. It is equivalent to the
situation of a closed economy, that is θ = 1, so σB1 = 0.
Benchmark 2. Open economy with flexible prices and imperfect competition
In this economy the average markup is equal to the marginal markup µ = µ# = −1 and is
independent from the inflation rate. It follows that:
Proposition 3. In the economy with flexible prices and monopolistic competition first order con-
dition (2.3.3) of the monetary authority optimization problem has only one solution, σ1 in (2.3.4).
Optimal rate of inflation maximizing households utility is therefore:
σB2 =
1− µ#θ
µ#θ
(2.3.7)
Proof. See Appendix.
It is straightforward to notice that in the imperfect competition economy with flexible prices
optimal level of inflation is strictly smaller than in the economy with perfect competition and flexible
prices σ¯B2 < σ¯B2. It is due to the fact that the markup has the same effect on the real economy
as inflation tax, it reduces optimal level of labor supply. As the inflation tax and the markup are
substitutes, a lower level of inflation is sufficient to achieve optimal level of labor supply satisfying
g′(n¯)n¯ = θ. It may be the case that for a high markup or high openness the optimal level of
inflation is negative. Similarly to Benchmark 1 case, the second root of the first order condition is
σ¯2 = −1 and is outside of the support for σ.
In this benchmark case a monetary authority in a monetary union would no longer choose zero,
but strictly negative level of inflation σ¯B2 = 1−µ
#
µ#
. The intuition holds the same. A monetary
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Table 2.3: Parameter Values
Parameter Description Value
 Elasticity of substitution 8.14
θ Home bias in consumption 0.8
λ Probability that firm will not be able to update (0, 0.32)
authority wants to undo a negative effect of markups on optimal labor supply decision, therefore
encourages individuals to work more by imposing a negative inflation tax.
Benchmark 3. Open economy with sticky prices
On top of the effects documented in the Benchmark 2 scenario now inflation also affects the size of
the average markup. As the first order conditions 2.3.4 and 2.3.5 do not have analytical solutions
I solve the problem numerically. I discipline the model with the standard parametrization. The
elasticity of substitution  is equal to 8.14, which results in the marginal markup being equal to
1.14. The second parameter, home bias θ I set equal to 0.8, as in Pappa (2004). The stickiness
parameter λ I vary between 0 and 0.32 to asses how the model diverges from benchmark cases
studied before. The value λ = 0.32 is a yearly equivalent of 0.75 on a quarterly basis, a standard
stickiness value assumed in a quantitative literature.
Figure 2.3 plots numerical solution of all three benchmark models of the open economy for
the chosen parameter values  and θ and varying the stickiness parameter λ. The optimal level
of inflation in Benchmark 3 model is always lower than in the perfect competition (Benchmark
1) model. Intuition behind this result is similar to the one explained in Benchmark 2 case. The
existence of the average markup in the economy takes away some of the inflation tax power, as it
discourages individuals from supplying labor. Therefore, in the economy with imperfect competition
a monetary authority always chooses the lower level of inflation than in the economy with perfect
competition.
Comparing to Benchmark 2 for low stickiness λ local monetary authority now chooses higher
levels of inflation. Labor supply goes up with stickiness and is convex in inflation (see Figure
2.2). Therefore, to counter increasing labor supply resulting from higher stickiness, local monetary
authority decides for higher inflation to decrease labor supply. Consumption rises in stickiness, as
average markups are decreasing both in inflation and in stickiness (see Figure 2.1).
Optimal inflation goes up with stickiness until λ = 0.15 and the optimal rate of inflation is
σ1 = σ2 = 0.18. This is a point, where labor supply is at its minimum. Beyond this point 2.3.4
does not have a solution, so σ1 does not exist and the maximum of the monetary authority’s
problem is reached at σ2, that is where n¯
′(σ) = 0. For high stickiness the optimal rate of inflation
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Figure 2.3: Optimal Inflation with Local Currencies
is the one, which minimizes labor supply. Labor supply is still increasing in stickiness, therefore,
to counter the effect of increasing stickiness, local monetary authority must now choose the rate
of inflation that minimizes labor supply. As is evident from Figure 2.2 the minimum labor supply
point is a decreasing function of stickiness.
2.4 Optimal Monetary Policy in a Monetary Union
The structure of the world economy is the same as before. The only difference is that now the two
countries are subject to central monetary policy conducted by a single monetary authority. The
monetary authority problem is now different, as it choses only one money supply growth rate equal
for both economies in order to maximize the joint welfare of the two. Let σU be the growth rate of
the money stock in the monetary union, then the joint welfare of the two economies V U is:
V U (σU ) = wV (σU , σU ) + (1− w)V ∗(σU , σU ) (2.4.1)
where w is a weight assigned by the single monetary authority to the Home country. The single
monetary authority maximizes (2.4.1) subject to optimal consumption decisions (2.2.25), (2.2.26)
and optimal labor supply decision (2.2.30) for both Home and Foreign countries. Substituting in
we get:
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V U
(
σU
)
= max
σU
(
θlogθ + (1− w − θ − 2wθ) log (n¯ (σU))
+ (1− θ) log (1− θ) + (θ + w − 2wθ) log (n¯∗ (σU))
−wg (n¯ (σU))− (1− w) g (n¯∗ (σU))) (2.4.2)
The first order condition assuming equal weights w = 12 for the problem reads:
1
2
n¯′(σU )
(
1
n¯(σU )
− g′ (n¯(σU )))+ 1
2
n¯∗′(σU )
(
1
n¯∗(σU )
− g′ (n¯∗(σU ))) = 0 (2.4.3)
As in the previous section, as the problem is highly non-linear, I proceed by solving two simplified
benchmark cases first. The first benchmark is the monetary union economy with no frictions
(perfect competition and flexible prices). The second benchmark is the monetary union economy
with only one friction (monopolistic competition). Both benchmarks have closed form solutions.
After that I proceed with the third, full benchmark case, that is the monetary union economy with
both frictions (monopolistic competition and sticky prices). I split the third benchmark case into
two and study the optimal rate of inflation and the welfare gains when price stickiness is symmetric
and asymmetric in the two countries.
Benchmark 1. Monetary union with flexible prices and perfect competition
With λ = λ∗ = 0 Foreign and Home labor supplies are equal. The first order condition (2.4.3) boils
down to:
n¯′(σU )
(
1
n¯(σU )
− g′ (n¯(σU ))) = 0. (2.4.4)
The above condition gives the following two roots:
µ(σU1 )(1 + σ
U
1 ) = 1 (2.4.5)
n¯′(σU2 ) = 0. (2.4.6)
Proposition 4. In the economy with with flexible prices and perfect competition the optimal rate of
inflation in a monetary union is zero and adopting a common currency is welfare improving from
both individual and joint welfare perspectives.
σB1U = 0 (2.4.7)
Proof. See Appendix.
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The common central bank now fully internalizes the spillovers created by the inflationary tax,
namely the loss of consumption which happens not only in Home country, but also in Foreign
country. So the incentives to inflate are reduced.
In the economy with local currencies there are incentives to distort allocation by imposing
inflation tax on the Foreign country. As Foreign country also deviates from efficient solution, the
loss of utility not compensated by reduced working hours occurs in both countries. The common
monetary authority overcomes this externality. The common central bank internalizes cross-border
spillovers from inflation. Without markups it is optimal in a union to not inflate at all.
Benchmark 2. Monetary union with flexible prices and imperfect competition
With λ = λ∗ = 0 Foreign and Home labor supplies are equal. First order condition (2.4.3) boils
down to (2.4.4).
Proposition 5. In the economy with with flexible prices and monopolistic competition the optimal
rate of inflation in a monetary union is lower than in the local currency economy and adopting a
common currency is welfare improving from both individual and joint welfare perspectives.
σB2U =
1− µ#
µ#
(2.4.8)
Proof. See Appendix.
In the economy with constant markups incentives of a local central bank to inflate are reduced.
However, as markups discourage individuals from working, it is efficient to impose negative infla-
tion rate to undo this distortion. Another way to see this result is to look directly at the first
order condition 2.4.5. Whenever the markup is higher than one inflation must be negative for the
condition to be met. Right hand side of this first order condition can be interpreted as the inverse
of the gross interest rate (which is 1 in this model). Left hand side is the cost of holding money.
Both the average markup and inflation are costs of holding money. A monetary authority sets
negative inflation rate to compensate for the average markup cost of holding money. In such a
union inflation is always lower than in the economy with local currency.
Benchmark 3a. Monetary union with symmetric sticky prices
With λ = λ∗ > 0 Foreign and Home labor supplies are equal. The first order condition (2.4.3)
boils down to (2.4.4). In the monetary union with sticky prices incentives to ’beggar-thy-neighbor’
also vanish, so the optimal level of inflation in the union is always lower than in the local currency
economy. However, now the average markup is also a function of inflation. The negative level of
inflation increases average markups discouraging individuals from work compared to Benchmark 2.
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Figure 2.4: Optimal Inflation in the monetary union with symmetric stickiness λ = λ∗
Proposition 6. In the world economy with symmetric sticky prices and monopolistic competition
the optimal rate of inflation in a monetary union is: a) lower than in the local currency economy,
b) lower than in the flexible prices monetary union c) lower than the Friedman rule, and adopting
a common currency is welfare improving from both individual and joint welfare perspectives.
Proof. The first part of the proof for a) and b) is done numerically and the result is presented
in Figure 2.4, c) follows from the fact, the the gross interest rate in this economy is one, so the
Friedman rule would prescribe zero inflation. The optimal inflation in this economy is negative, so
it is below Friedman rule. For the proof of the second part of the Proposition see Appendix.
Figure 2.4 plots numerical solution of the three benchmark models for the chosen parameter
values  and θ and varying the symmetric stickiness parameter λ. As incentives to impose inflation
tax are removed in a monetary union, the optimal level of inflation is always lower than in the
local currencies economy in each respective benchmark and when competition is not perfect it is
always negative. To understand this result let us think about a monetary union with symmetric
sticky prices as a big closed economy. This allows us to compare this result with the results for the
closed economy with the same features presented in Chapter 6 of Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2010).
As their setup is more general, my results should be a special case of theirs. It is not the case
however, as their results say, that in a closed economy with monopolistic competition and sticky
prices the optimal level of inflation is zero. To start the discussion let us concentrate on the first
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order condition 2.4.5, which is presented below for convenience:
µ(σU )(1 + σU ) = 1
and let’s think about µ, the average markup, as a distortion, and (1 + σU ) as a cost of holding
money. In my setup the monetary authority has only one tool, the rate of growth of the monetary
stock (σU ), which in equilibrium is equal to inflation. If the monetary authority (or any other
authority with a causative power) had an additional instrument that would affect µ and nothing
else, it would use this instrument to set µ = 1. Next, as the average markup distortion had been
removed from the economy, the authority would set σ = 0, such that benefits of holding money
(minus the rate of inflation) are equal to costs (net interest rate, which in this setup is equal to 0).
In Chapter 6.2 of Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2010) authors consider the economy with production
subsidies. These production subsidies are financed by lump sum taxes and can address the average
markup distortion, so constitute a perfect candidate instrument that fits the above description.
The Benchmark 3a economy can be interpreted as a special case of Chapter 6.3 of Schmitt-
Grohe and Uribe (2010) where authors consider the economy without production subsidies. They
claim that in this economy the optimal rate of inflation is also zero. In my Benchmark 3a economy
this is not the case, because µ(σU ) is always greater than one. The discrepancy of our results can
be traced down to the setup of their proof, where they postulate that Ramsey planner maximizes
agents’ welfare with respect to independently inflation and price dispersion (which in their notation
is p˜t and in my notation would be
µ(σ)
µ#
). In this, their Ramsey planner effectively has access to an
additional tool, that fits the above description. Absent this second tool the optimal rate of inflation
would be strictly negative and below the Friedman rule.
Figure 2.4 also shows, that the optimal rate of inflation is further decreasing in stickiness. This
is because the slope of the average markup as a function of inflation is increasing in stickiness, as
can be seen in Figure 2.1. Therefore, when stickiness goes up, the cost of holding money µ(σ) goes
up for any given σ. To compensate this additional cost the monetary authority increases benefits
of holding money, by reducing σ.
Benchmark 3b. Monetary union with asymmetric sticky prices
With λ 6= λ∗ Foreign and Home labor supplies are not equal. The first order condition (2.4.3) does
not have a closed-form solution and the model is solved numerically. The average markup, as in
Benchmark 3a is also a function of inflation. The average markup and Home and Foreign labor
supply change in σ, λ and λ∗.
Figure 2.5 plots numerical solution of the Benchmark 3b economy for the chosen parameter
values  and θ and varying the asymmetric stickiness parameters λ (on the horizontal axis) and
λ∗ (four different plots represent four different values of λ∗). The optimal rate of inflation in the
monetary union economy is decreasing in both Home and Foreign stickiness, as the intuition from
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Figure 2.5: Optimal Inflation in a Union with Asymmetric Stickiness λ 6= λ∗
the Benchmark 3a would suggest.
Proposition 7. In the economy with imperfect competition and sticky prices adoption of the com-
mon currency is not always welfare improving.
Proof. Done numerically. For exposition see Figure 2.6
Let’s focus our attention on a special case where the Home country has flexible prices and
the Foreign country has very sticky prices. The optimal level of inflation in the monetary union
economy is negative, and below the level that would prevail if the Foreign country was symmetric
to the Home country. Under such a high level of deflation the average markup in the Home country
increases so much, that the gains from removing inflation tax inefficiencies are not be sufficient to
compensate for this loss. This situation is shown in Figure 2.6 where the Home country with low λ
experiences a welfare loss after forming a monetary union with the Foreign country that has high
λ. For the cases where stickiness is equal (Benchmark 3a) or relative differences in stickiness are
not too large monetary union is welfare improving from the individual welfare perspective.
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Figure 2.6: Welfare gains and welfare losses from a union with asymmetric price stickiness
2.5 Reinstating Optimality
From the Home country’s perspective a monetary union may be welfare reducing if the Foreign
country has much higher price stickiness. The single monetary authority would then be inclined
to choose a very low level of inflation. This low inflation would increase the average markup much
more in the Home country than in the Foreign country. Both countries would enjoy welfare gains
stemming from reduction in inflation tax (higher consumption), but the Home country would suffer
from reduced leisure. However:
Proposition 8. A monetary union is always welfare improving from the joint welfare perspective.
Proof. Done numerically. Code available upon request.
Therefore the optimality of a union from the individual Home country’s perspective can be
reinstated. This could be done in many different ways, of which I consider an outright transfer
within the union from net beneficiary (the Foreign country) to the net contributor (the Home
country). Formally, I find a proportion γ of the Foreign country production in the monetary union
Benchmark 3b economy n∗(σB3bU ), which has to be transfered to the Home country to make it at
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Figure 2.7: Lump sum transfer within a union in % of Foreign GDP
least as well off as in the Benchmark 3b local currency economy:
Vγ(σ
B3bU , σB3bU ) = θlog
(
θn¯(σB3bU )
)
+ (1− θ) log
(
(1− θ) (1 + γ)n¯∗(σB3bU )
)
− g(n¯(σB3bU )) ≥ V (σB3, σ∗B3)
(2.5.1)
where Vγ is the welfare of the Home country in the monetary union with the γ-transfer and V is
the welfare of the Home country in the local currency economy defined in (2.3.2). Subject to the
Foreign country not being worse off in a the union with the γ-transfer when compared the local
currency economy:
V ∗γ (σ
B3bU , σB3bU ) = θlog
(
θ(1− γ)n¯∗(σB3bU )
)
+ (1− θ) log
(
(1− θ) n¯(σB3bU )
)
− g(n¯∗(σB3bU )) ≥ V ∗(σ∗B3, σB3).
(2.5.2)
I solve 2.5.1-2.5.2 numerically assuming that the Foreign country is very rigid (λ∗ = 0.45) and the
stickiness in Home country varies between 0 and 0.45. Figure 2.7 plots the minimum γ at different
levels of λ for which (2.5.1) holds with equality. In the most extreme scenario (λ = 0, λ∗ = 0.4) a
lump sum transfer to Home country equivalent to 2% of the Foreign country’s production would
make the Home country indifferent between keeping local currency and joining the monetary union.
Naturally, as Home stickiness λ goes up, relative differences between the economies become smaller
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and required transfer becomes smaller. At λ > 0.27 Home country finds it optimal to join a union
without any transfer.
2.6 Conclusions
Are monetary unions welfare improving? There are three main ideas supporting a positive answer.
First, a monetary union reduces transaction costs. Second, it may help to promote international
trade. Third, the common central bank gains more independence which helps to overcome possible
problems with commitment or time-inconsistency. In this model I refrain from these considerations
adding new dimension to existing knowledge. Transaction costs are assumed to be non-existent,
trade does not depend on the structure of the monetary policy and commitment of any central
bank is assumed to always be in place. This paper explores another channel. Because of having a
common central bank, in a monetary union countries can effectively commit to not tax each other
with inflation. In this model monetary union always improves joint welfare.
A new finding of this paper is that, although joint welfare goes up in a monetary union, in-
dividual welfare does not necessarily so. This is because prices are sticky and the degree of price
stickiness may vary among the economies. With asymmetric stickiness the optimal choice of in-
flation in the local currencies economy differs between countries. The country with higher price
stickiness chooses lower inflation than the country with more flexible prices. In a monetary union
inflation is reduced in both countries, as the inflation tax effect is removed. When the difference in
price stickiness is high, joining a union is welfare improving for the economy with more stickiness
and is welfare reducing for the economy with less stickiness. Joining a union could be sustained as
the optimal choice for the economy with more flexible prices if coupled with a lump sum transfer
from the economy with more sticky prices. Integration with a compensating transfer is therefore a
Pareto improvement upon the local currencies regime.
Another contribution of this paper is a theoretical study of the optimal rate of inflation. I rein-
force the puzzle identified by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2010) that available theories consistently
imply that the optimal rate of inflation in a closed economy ranges from the Friedman rule to
numbers insignificantly above zero. In this model the optimal rate of inflation in a closed economy
is in fact below the Friedman rule. When production is done by monopolistically competitive firms
and prices are sticky, the average markup constitutes a cost on holding money. The only way the
monetary authority can compensate for this cost is to set the negative rate of inflation. As the net
interest rate in this model is zero, the optimal rate of inflation is therefore below the Friedman rule.
In the open economy however, this is is not necessarily the case. The equilibrium outcome of
the game between two monetary authorities is to impose impose an inflation tax on each other.
As part of home consumption is in foreign goods, and is not affected by local monetary policy, the
loss in consumption is not fully internalized by local monetary authority. In the open economy the
monetary authority faces two effects: the spillover effect, which brings the optimal inflation up,
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and the average markup effect, which brings the optimal inflation down. For reasonable parameter
values the first effect is stronger and the optimal rate of inflation is positive.
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2.7 Appendix
2.7.1 Derivations
2.1 Households
Plugging in 2.2.1 and 2.2.16 the maximization problem becomes:
max
mht ,m
f
t ,nt
Et
(
θlog
(
mht + τt+1
Pt+1
)
+ (1− θ)log
(
mft
P ∗t+1
)
− g(nt)
)
(2.7.1)
subject to 2.2.15. The three first order conditions are:
θ
mht +τt+1
Pt+1
1
Pt+1
− νt = 0 (2.7.2)
1− θ
mft
P ∗t+1
1
P ∗t+1
− νtet = 0 (2.7.3)
−g′(nt) + νtWt = 0 (2.7.4)
where νt is a Lagrange multiplier associated with the first period budget constraint 2.2.15. Com-
bining 2.7.2 with 2.7.3 gives 2.2.17 and combining 2.7.2 with 2.7.4 gives 2.2.18.
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2.7.2 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2. Feasible choices for σ are σ ∈ (−1,∞). First I show that σ2 is outside
of the support of σ. From 2.3.5:
n¯′(σ¯2) = 0. (2.7.5)
Plugging in λ = 0 to 2.2.31 we get:
n¯′(σ¯2) =− 1
2
(

− 1
)− 1
2
(1 + σ2)
− 3
2
(
1− 0 (1 + σ2)−1
1− 0
)− 1
2(−1)
(
1− 0 (1 + σ2)
−1
1− 0 (1 + σ2)−1
)
= −1
2
(

− 1
)− 1
2
(1 + σ2)
− 3
2 = 0
⇒ σ2 = −1 (2.7.6)
Therefore it must be that σ1 is the optimal inflation rate. Plugging in µ = 1 to 2.3.4 we get:
1
1 + σ1
= θ
θ + θσ1 = 1
σ1 =
1− θ
θ
(2.7.7)
QED
Proof of Proposition 3. As λ = 0 it must be that σ2 = −1 as shown in the Proof of Proposition
2. The second part of the proof is analogous. Plugging in µ = µ# to 2.3.4 we get:
1
µ#(1 + σ1)
= θ
θµ# + θµ#σ1 = 1
σ1 =
1− µ#θ
µ#θ
(2.7.8)
QED
Proof of Proposition 4. The proof of the first result, zero inflation in a monetary union, is
analogous to the Proof of Proposition 2. As λ = λ∗ = 0 it must be that σU2 = −1. Therefore it must
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be that σU1 is the optimal inflation rate. Plugging in µ = 1 to 2.4.5 we get::
1
1 + σB1U1
= 1
1 + σB1U1 = 1
σB1U1 = 0 (2.7.9)
Next I prove the second result, the welfare improvement from adoption of a common currency. As
countries are symmetric it is enough to prove the welfare improvement for Home country. Welfare
gains from the adoption of a common currency in this economy (Benchmark 1) are defined as a
difference in utility between the monetary union equilibrium and the local currency equilibrium of
each generation in the Home country :
WGB1 = V (σB1U , σB1U )− V (σB1, σ∗B1) (2.7.10)
where V (.) is defined in 2.3.2, σB1U = 0 is the optimal rate of inflation in the monetary union econ-
omy and σB1 = σ∗B1 is the optimal rate of inflation in the local currencies economy. Substituting
in equilibrium relationships we get:
WGB1 = θlog(θn¯(σB1U )) + (1− θ) log((1− θ) n¯∗(σB1U ))− g(n¯(σB1U ))
− θlog(θn¯(σB1))− (1− θ) log((1− θ) n¯∗(σB1)) + g(n¯(σB1))
= log(n(0))− log(n(σB1)) + g(n(σB1))− g(n(0)) (2.7.11)
Proposition 1 established that inflation has two equilibrium effects on labor supply. It increases labor
supply through the markup effect and decreases the labor supply through the inflation tax effect. In
the Benchamrk 1 economy prices are flexible, so the markup effect is shut down and labor supply is
decreasing in inflation. The following relations hold:
0 < σB1
n(0) > n(σB1)
log(n(0)) > log(n(σB1)).
g(n(0)) > g(n(σB1)). (2.7.12)
Therefore:
WGB1 = log(n(0))− log(n(σB1))︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+ g(n(σB1))− g(n(0))︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
(2.7.13)
To asses the sign of the welfare gains I substitute in the functional form for g(n) assumed in
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2.2.29 and the result for n(σ) obtained in 2.2.30 with λ = 0 and −1 = 1:
WGB1 = log(1) +
1
2
log(1 + σB1) +
1
2
(1 + σB1)−1 − 1
2
(1)−1
=
1
2
(
log(1 + σB1) +
1
1 + σB1
− 1
)
=
1
2
(
log(1 + σB1)− σ
B1
1 + σB1
)
≈ 1
2
(
σB1 − σ
B1
1 + σB1
)
=
1
2
(
(σB1)2
1 + σB1
)
> 0 (2.7.14)
QED
Proof of Proposition 5. The proof of the first result, the optimal rate of inflation in a monetary
union, is analogous to the Proof of Proposition 2. As λ = λ∗ = 0 it must be that σU2 = −1.
Therefore it must be that σU1 is the optimal inflation rate. Plugging in µ = µ
# to 2.4.5 we get::
1
µ#(1 + σB2U )
= 1
1 + σB2U =
1
µ#
σB2U =
1− µ#
µ#
. (2.7.15)
It is immediate to see, that as θ < 1 it must be that:
1− µ#
µ#
<
1− θµ#
θµ#
⇐⇒ σB2U < σB2 (2.7.16)
Next I prove the second result, the welfare improvement from adoption of a common currency,
following the logic of the Proof of Proposition 4. Welfare gains from the adoption of a common
currency in the Benchmark 2 economy are:
WGB2 = V (σB2U , σB2U )− V (σB2, σ∗B2)
= θlog(θn¯(σB2U )) + (1− θ) log((1− θ) n¯(σB2U ))− g(n¯(σB2U ))
− θlog(θn¯(σB2))− (1− θ) log((1− θ) n¯∗(σB2)) + g(n¯(σB2))
= log(n(σB2U ))− log(n(σB2)) + g(n(σB2))− g(n(σB2U )) (2.7.17)
To asses the sign of the welfare gains I substitute in the functional form for g(n) assumed in
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2.2.29 and the result for n(σ) obtained in 2.2.30 with λ = 0:
n(σB2U ) = (µ#)−
1
2 (1 + σB2U )−
1
2 (2.7.18)
n(σB2) = (µ#)−
1
2 (1 + σB2)−
1
2 (2.7.19)
WGB2 = −1
2
log(µ#)− 1
2
log(1 + σB2U ) +
1
2
log(µ#) +
1
2
log(1 + σB2)
+
1
2
(µ#)−1(1 + σB2)−1 − 1
2
(µ#)−1(1 + σB2U )−1
=
1
2
{
log(1 + σB2)− log(1 + σB2U ) + 1
µ#(1 + σB2)
− 1
µ#(1 + σB2U )
}
≈ 1
2
{
σB2 − σB2U + 1
µ#(1 + σB2)
− 1
µ#(1 + σB2U )
}
=
1
2
σ
B2 − σB2U + σ
B2U − σB2
µ#(1 + σB2)(1 + σB2U )︸ ︷︷ ︸
>1

>
1
2
{
σB2 − σB2U
µ#(1 + σB2)(1 + σB2U )
+
σB2U − σB2
µ#(1 + σB2)(1 + σB2U )
}
= 0
⇐⇒ WGB2 > 0 (2.7.20)
As countries are symmetric, if adopting a common currency improves welfare of a single country
it also improves joint welfare. QED
Proof of Proposition 6. First, notice that from 2.2.30 and 2.2.28:
n(σ) = (µ(σ) (1 + σ))−
1
2 (2.7.21)
next, from 2.3.4:
µ(σB3)
(
1 + σB3
)
=
1
θ
(2.7.22)
and from 2.4.5
µ(σB3aU )
(
1 + σB3aU
)
= 1. (2.7.23)
Therefore, as λ = λ∗:
n(σB3) = n∗(σB3) = θ
1
2 (2.7.24)
n(σB3aU ) = n∗(σB3aU ) = 1 (2.7.25)
88 Optimal Inflation, Average Markups and Asymmetric Sticky Prices
Welfare gains from the adoption of a common currency in the Benchmark 3a economy therefore
are:
WGB3a = V (σB3aU , σB3aU )− V (σB3, σB3) = log(n(σB3aU ))− log(n(σB3)) + g(n(σB3))− g(n(σB3aU ))
= log(1)− log(θ 12 ) + 1
2
θ − 1
2
=
1
2
(θ − 1− log(θ)) > 1
2
(θ − 1− θ + 1) = 0
⇐⇒ WGB3a > 0 (2.7.26)
As countries are symmetric, if adopting a common currency improves welfare of a single country
it also improves joint welfare. QED
Chapter 3
Foreign Banks and Monetary Policy
in Central and Eastern Europe
Joint with Piotr Denderski (VU University Amsterdam)
Abstract
We provide new evidence on the bank lending channel of monetary policy using bank-level panel
data from Central and Eastern Europe economies. We examine loan granting behavior of 440 banks
in the period between 1998 and 2012. Our findings are: i) banks adjust their loans to changes in
host country’s monetary policy, ii) foreign-owned banks are less responsive to monetary policy of
a host country than domestic-owned banks, iii) contrary to previous studies we document that the
effects i) and ii) are present not only in the times of a crisis, but also in normal times. Using a
DSGE model with the bank lending channel we present two mechanisms that can explain the second
effect. First, foreign banks may have access to funds from parent banks, which makes them less
dependent on the cost of money in a host country. Second, foreign banks may have a competitive
advantage in a sense that they serve more profitable borrowers and therefore their loan portfolio
adjusts less. The first mechanism renders monetary policy less effective in the level of foreign banks
penetration, while the second one does not. We derive testable implications of the two hypotheses
and show that data do not unambiguously favor one over the other. 1
JEL classification: E44, E50, G21
Keywords: banks, bank ownership, bank lending channel, monetary policy
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3.1 Introduction
Financial liberalization has led to an increased integration of financial markets over the last 30 years.
The emerging and developing countries, however, entered this process with under-capitalized and
weak banks. In result, large shares of the financial sector in these countries are controlled by
subsidiaries of foreign banks. Thus, the financial integration was accompanied by a development
of asymmetric cross-border owner-subsidiary relationships.
We explore the consequences of this asymmetric integration in the particular area of the Central
and Eastern Europe (CEE). Banks dominate financial structure of the CEE economies and most
of these banks are majority foreign-owned. As of 2009 the share of the majority foreign-owned
banks in the total assets of the banking sector in the CEE economies is greater than 80 percent
on average. For the other European Union members this number stands at 25 percent2. The
relationship between bank ownership and the growth of credit is currently receiving an increased
interest in the literature starting with Peek and Rosengren (1997), who show that Japanese-owned
banks in the US contracted their lending significantly in a response to a slump in the Japanese
stock market. Micco and Panizza (2006) show, using the world-wide sample of 119 countries in the
years 1995-2002, that the lending of state-owned banks is less responsive to macroeconomic shocks
than that of privately-owned banks .
The CEE transition countries have become a natural field for empirical studies of foreign-
owned banks behavior. Bonin et al. (2005) find that in the CEE countries foreign-owned banks
are more cost-efficient and provide better services, Naaborg and Lensink (2008) in the similar
sample find a somewhat contrary result, that foreign-owned banks are less profitable. de Haas and
van Lelyveld (2006) is the first study that looks at the relationship between a foreign ownership
in the CEE countries and the growth of credit. They show that in the years 1993-2000 there is
a positive relationship between foreign banks and the private sector credit growth, during crisis
periods domestic banks contract their credit base, while greenfield foreign banks do not, and that
the conditions in a home country matter for the foreign bank growth in a host country. Aydin
(2008) studies the period 1988-2005 and further confirms that credit growth is higher in foreign
banks. However, contrary to the former, she shows that conditions in a home country do not matter
for the credit granting behavior of a foreign bank in a host country. Allen et al. (2013) show that
during domestic financial crises foreign banks provide credit, while government banks contract and
that the reverse has happened during the global financial crisis of 20083. None of the cited studies
2Own calculations based on Claessens and Van Horen (2013). In 2009 in the eleven CEE economies this number
varies between 64 and 99 percent. In the non-CEE EU economies foreign bank penetration is more heterogeneous and
varies from 2 percent (Spain and Netherlands) to 95 percent (Luxembourg), with Ireland, Belgium and Luxembourg
having more than 50 percent of their banking system foreign-owned.
3Another contributions that look at the role of foreign banks during the global financial crisis in a wider geographi-
cal setting are Adams-Kane et al. (2013), Ongena et al. (2013), while Popov and Udell (2012) use paired firm-banking
data in 16 CEE economies to show, inter alia, that firm’s access to credit reflects the balance sheet conditions of
foreign parent bank.
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however, pay attention to monetary policy in host countries and whether foreign and domestic
banks reactions to changes in interest rates are different. That is, in other words, how presence of
foreign banks affects the bank lending channel of the monetary policy transmission.
The bank lending channel pioneered by Bernanke and Blinder (1992) on aggregate data and
Kashyap and Stein (2000) on bank-level data assumes that, at the bank-level, deposits and other
financing are imperfect substitutes. Therefore, when a central bank raises interest rates, the supply
of credit at the bank level goes down. The only contribution in the literature that studies the bank
lending channel in the CEE economies (pooled together with Latin America and South-East Asia
economies) is Wu et al. (2011). Using bank level data for the period of 1996-2003 they show that
foreign banks are less responsive to monetary shocks in host countries. After a monetary policy
contraction the growth of credit in foreign banks goes down less compared to domestic banks (and
the reverse is true after a monetary policy expansion). They suggest that the most convincing
mechanism that can explain those differences is an access of foreign banks to funding from parent
banks through an internal capital market. However, a close inspection of their results shows that
the existence of the bank lending channel and differences between domestic and foreign banks
reactions are only present during periods of crises and not in tranquil times.
In this paper we contribute to the empirical literature by documenting that lending by foreign
banks is less responsive to both tightening and loosening of host country’s monetary policy in both
tranquil times and during financial crisis. We collect data on credit growth and ownership for 440
banks in the eleven CEE countries4 in the years 1998-2012. We regressthe real rate of growth
of net credit on the foreign ownership dummy, the change in the monetary policy rate and their
interaction (plus bank-level and macroeconomic controls). Next, we explicitly control for the effects
of the global financial crisis, and finally we run a battery of robustness checks to control for possible
endogeneity issues and different monetary policy regimes. At each stage we employ three different
empirical strategies: pooled OLS, fixed effects panel estimation and a difference GMM estimation.
The existence of the bank lending channel and the differences between domestic and foreign banks
in both crisis and normal times comes out as a robust finding of the empirical part of this paper.
Next, we build a theoretical, stylized DSGE model with the bank lending channel and show that
the observed data patterns can be driven by the two equally plausible mechanisms: the internal
capital market as in Wu et al. (2011) (later referred to as the internal market hypothesis) and
a market segmentation that favors foreign banks (later referred to as the market segmentation
hypothesis). The bottom line of the theoretical analysis is that observing a different micro lending
behavior of foreign and domestic-owned banks on its own is not a sufficient statistic for deriving
conclusions on shifts in the aggregate lending channel.
The first explanation assumes that foreign-owned banks may trade easily within the financial
conglomerate they are a part of, which would make host country monetary policy less relevant for
4Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and
Slovenia.
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their operations. Foreign-owned banks could also be forced to transfer liquidity in the case of a
direct dependence, especially when a parent bank is in troubles.
The second explanation assumes that the links with a parent bank are not important for the
credit granting behavior of a foreign bank in a host country, but instead assumes that foreign
banks operate their business differently than domestic banks. We highlight two possible rationales.
First, a foreign bank may inherit credit relationships with firms that are clients of its parent bank.
When there is selection into foreign expansion, then foreign-owned banks lend to more productive
companies. Such credit is less sensitive to changes of host country’s monetary policy because of
implicit costs embedded in adjusting terms of contracts. De Haas and Naaborg (2006) find that
an acquisition of a domestic bank by a foreign bank leads to a bias in the acquired bank’s lending
towards large multinational companies. Second, if foreign-owned banks have better know-how (e.g.
screening technology or marketing) then they grant credit to more reliable customers which can
still service their liabilities under higher interest rates. In this world, domestic banks have larger
shares of contracts that are prone to termination because of an increase in interest rates. Bonin
et al. (2005) shows evidence that foreign banks indeed bring know-how into the CEE economies
banking sector.
Our theoretical model borrows from the framework put forth in Gerali et al. (2010) and Gam-
bacorta and Signoretti (2014). This environment facilitates handling bank ownership heterogeneity
by using of the analytically tractable monopolistic competition framework5. We put the two hy-
potheses to race in the model. Most importantly, we demonstrate that while the internal market
hypothesis implies weakening of the bank lending channel in the aggregate, the market segmenta-
tion hypothesis does not. Despite its ability to reproduce observed differential loans responses to
monetary shocks, the model falls short of replicating the size of these differences. Using the panel
data from the empirical part of the paper we show that data do not unambiguously favor one over
the other and at this stage we can assert that both can be at play.
3.2 Empirical Analysis
3.2.1 Data
We construct our sample using bank-level and macroeconomic data. Our primary source of data is
Bankscope, a commercial database provided by Bureau van Dijk. Bankscope provides a large set
of standardized and comparable bank-level data in a form of a panel. Our sample with identified
ownership structure includes 440 banks in the CEE countries active for at least one year between
1998 and 2012 (out of the total number of 514 banks registered in Bankscope) giving rise to a total
number of 4008 bank-year observations. Schmitz (2004) compares Bankscope data with the IFS
data and finds that approximately 70% to 90% of total banking assets is covered by Bankscope
5albeit at the expense of shutting down other margins of dynamic competition like entry, exit and bank size
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for the CEE countries. Mathieson and Roldos (2001) on the other hand estimate data coverage to
be about 90% of the total banking assets in the CEE countries. The coverage of Bankscope data
increases in time due to market concentration and data quality improvements.
We use data on net loans to construct our dependent variable, the real rate of growth of net
loans at the bank level. We also use Bankscope to construct four bank control variables: size,
liquidity, capitalization and profitability6. The first one is a ratio of total assets of a bank in a
given year to the sum of total assets in all banks in the same country in the same year. The
remaining three are ratios of each bank’s liquid assets, operating profit and total equity to total
assets. All original variables are denominated in local currencies.
Identifying foreign-owned banks is the most important (and the most cumbersome) aspect of
our data collection. We define a bank as foreign-owned if immediate shareholders owning more
than 50 percent of its capital are located in a different country than the bank itself. The ownership
data however, is not easily accessible. Bankscope does not provide a panel view of the ownership
data, only the most recent record. We collected the data on banks’ ownership using three sources:
Claessens and Van Horen (2013) dataset, most recent records on Bankscope and investigating
individual bank reports history both on Bankscope and outside this database (banks’ websites).
We use the same procedure to identify banks that are government-owned. Our final sample with
identified ownership covers on average 97.25% of the volume of net loans reported in Bankscope.
Tables 3.9 and 3.10 in the Appendix present data coverage of our sample broken down into individual
countries and years. The coverage of the ownership data is reasonably balanced across both years
and countries.
The second key variable in our study is the interest rate set by a central bank. We collect
data on central bank monetary policy instruments from Eurostat and central bank websites. Our
variable of interest is a change in the yearly average of the short term interest rate. The sample
covers rich variation in the stance of monetary policy across countries. Between years 1998 and
2012 negative interest rate changes stood for about 60% of all covered cases. The pre-2008 sample
is more balanced: negative changes correspond to 55% of all cases. We use the same sources for
the macroeconomic controls, the growth rate of GDP, inflation and (for the robustness analyses)
the euro exchange rates.
We document in detail the cross-section facts about foreign and domestic banks in Appendix
A. We find that in our sample foreign-owned banks are larger than domestic banks, have lower
liquidity and capitalization but are more profitable. We also find that the capitalization and
liquidity measures were decreasing in time in both groups. The average size of a domestic bank
declined sharply after 2002 which roughly corresponds to the end of the biggest wave of penetration
6This similar set of controls is also used in related studies: Allen et al. (2013) use the same set plus a lagged ratio
of deposits to total assets, de Haas and van Lelyveld (2006) use the same set plus a a net interest margin to measure
efficiency, Wu et al. (2011) use size, liquidity, capitalization, cost efficiency and credit risk, while Aydin (2008) uses
somewhat different measures for size, liquidity and capitalization, two measures for profitability plus a net interest
margin, costs to income and deposits and loan loss provisions to total assets.
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of local markets by foreign banks.
3.2.2 Panel Estimation
We estimate the model of the real rate of growth of loans of bank i in country j at time t, denoted
by ∆Lijt. To test if there are differences between foreign and domestic banks reactions to monetary
policy we employ the following model specification:
∆Lijt = β1FGNit + β2∆MPjt + β3∆MPjt ∗ FGNijt + β4Bankit + β5Economyjt + β0 (3.2.1)
We introduce the foreign ownership dummy FGNit that takes one if more than 50% of bank’s
capital is owned by shareholders located abroad and zero otherwise. In this, we label FGN both
subsidiaries of foreign banks operating in host country j and independent banks that have majority
owership located abroad. If foreign banks have different credit policies then this estimate should
be significant, as in Aydin (2008) and Allen et al. (2013), who find it to be significant and positive.
Our main variables of interest are: the change in the monetary policy instrument in country j in
time t denoted by ∆MPjt and its interaction with the foreign dummy ∆MPjt ∗ FGNit. If the
bank lending channel is at work then the first estimate will be significant and negative. If the bank
lending channel operates differently in foreign and domestic banks then the second estimate will
be significant. If foreign banks react more to changes in monetary policy then we should see a
negative estimate, if on the other hand they react less, we should see positive estimate that is less
in absolute value than the estimate of ∆MPjt.
Apart from the foreign dummy we employ four bank controls Bankit of bank i in time t including
size Sizeit (0), liquidity Liqit (+/-), capitalization Capit (+) and profitability Profit (+) with
expected signs in parentheses7. Lastly, we add macroeconomic conditions Economyjt differing
across countries j and time t by putting the GDP growth rate GDPjt and the inflation rate pijt to
control for possible demand effects. We expect credit growth to respond positively to GDP growth
and negatively to inflation. The details of construction of the all variables are provided in the
Appendix A.
We estimate three versions of the model. For start, we run a classical OLS regression. We rec-
ognize however, that the estimates from the OLS might be biased due to the endogeneity problem.
Firstly, our main variable of interest, the bank ownership, might not be exogenous to the credit
policy of a bank. In theory, it is possible, that domestic-owned banks that exhibit faster growth
of credit are more prone to be bought by a foreign owner. Secondly, bank-level control variables
7Out of the four most related studies to ours Wu et al. (2011) do not report estimates of bank controls, others
find consistently that size does not matter for credit growth, Allen et al. (2013) find positive estimate of profitability,
negative of liquidity and capitalization to be not significant, de Haas and van Lelyveld (2006) find positive estimate
of profitability and capitalization and liquidity to be not significant, while Aydin (2008) finds mixed evidence for
profitability and positive estimate for liquidity.
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(size, capitalization, liquidity and profitability) might also be endogenous to the credit growth and
macro controls.
Secondly, we apply fixed effects panel estimation (FE). We control for bank and time fixed
effects. Controlling for time fixed effects allows us to remove any possible trend or time-specific
factors that may affect credit behavior of all banks in a given year8.
Some studies related to ours9 deal with the endogeneity problem by employing one period lag
for bank control variables. We follow this approach augmented by the difference GMM estimation10
developed by Arellano and Bond (1991). In this estimation we allow dependent variable (∆Lijt)
to be potentially autocorrelated, contemporary bank controls (Sizeit, Liqit, Capit and Profit) to
be endogenous11 and ownership (FGNijt) to be predetermined but not strictly exogenous. Macro
controls (GDPjt and pijt), lagged bank controls (Sizeit−1, Liqit−1, Capit−1 and Profit−1) and
independent variable (∆MPjt) are treated as strictly exogenous and therefore in the estimation
process are potential instruments for the differenced endogenous variables. Formally, we estimate
differenced equation 3.2.1, where lagged credit growth and lagged levels of banks controls deal
as potential instruments for the differenced independent variables. In each specification to avoid
spurious inference, we cluster the errors on a country level.
3.2.3 Baseline Results
In Table 3.1 we present the results of the estimation of the benchmark model from the equation
(3.2.1). First, the results confirm the existence of the bank lending channel. Banks contract their
credit action after an increase in the monetary policy rate (and expand after a decrease in the
MP rate). Second, foreign banks react differently than domestic banks to changes in the monetary
policy rate. The reaction of their credit is more tamed (by more than a half). Interestingly, previous
studies found that the very fact of banks being foreign-owned affects their credit granting behavior.
In none of our estimations foreign dummy variable FGN is significant, but in all three methods its
interaction with the monetary policy rate is significant, positive and less than the estimate of the
change in monetary policy rate in absolute value. Our results show that the differences between
foreign and domestic banks come exclusively from their reactions to the monetary policy rate, that
is through the bank lending channel.
In the two models (OLS and FE) the size of a bank, as expected, does not affect its credit
granting behavior. However, a difference GMM estimation shows that credit grows faster in bigger
banks. More liquid banks and better capitalized banks extend less credit (as in Allen et al. (2013)).
As expected, profitability increases the growth of credit at the bank-level in all three estimations.
8Formally we estimate bank and time-specific intercepts β0 = [βi βt].
9Wu et al. (2011), Adams-Kane et al. (2013), Claessens and Van Horen (2013), Gambacorta (2005) and Brzoza-
Brzezina et al. (2010)
10We would like to thank the anonymous referee for suggesting this approach.
11For the sake of brevity we suppress coefficient estimates for the lagged bank controls in all regression results
tables
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Table 3.1: Determinants of bank lending 1998-2012
OLS FE GMM
FGN -1.243 2.967 1.438
(2.298) (3.152) (2.791)
MP -1.582*** -1.734*** -1.332***
(0.281) (0.378) (0.351)
FGN*MP 1.137*** 0.930*** 1.137**
(0.342) (0.228) (0.499)
Size -0.0416 -0.0160 2.292**
(0.0630) (0.277) (1.008)
Liq -0.0687 -0.353*** -0.713***
(0.0479) (0.0617) (0.120)
Cap -0.235** -0.648** -2.103***
(0.0937) (0.203) (0.406)
Prof 1.581*** 1.561*** 1.756***
(0.451) (0.408) (0.238)
GDP 2.204*** 1.156*** 0.825**
(0.304) (0.157) (0.259)
Pi -0.382 -1.099*** -1.027***
(0.234) (0.145) (0.179)
L.Delta Net Loans 0.212***
(0.0256)
Observations 2403 2403 2001
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.010
Macroeconomic controls that affect the demand for credit work as expected. The volume of credit
at the bank-level increases in GDP growth and decreases in inflation. According to the results of the
difference GMM estimation the growth of credit is positively autocorrelated, albeit the coefficient
is not high.
Once we bring domestic monetary policy in the picture, the significance of foreign ownership
dummy, found in other studies, vanishes. The data suggest that it is the differential response to
the domestic monetary policy that is differentiating foreign-owned banks from domestic banks.
3.2.4 Results - Financial Crisis
Next we distinguish between reactions to monetary policy in normal times and during financial
turmoil by estimating the following equation:
∆Lit = β1FGNit + β2∆MPjt + β3∆MPjt ∗ FGNijt + β4Bankit + β5Economyjt
+ β5Crisis ∗∆MPjt + β6Crisis ∗∆MPjt ∗ FGNit + β0
(3.2.2)
where we include the interaction of the crisis dummy, that takes value one for the period 2008-2012
and zero otherwise, with the change in monetary policy rate Crisis ∗∆MPjt and the interaction
of the crisis dummy with both change in monetary policy rate and the foreign dummy Crisis ∗
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Table 3.2: Determinants of bank lending - including Financial Crisis
OLS FE GMM
FGN -1.154 2.692 1.655
(2.145) (3.052) (2.742)
MP -1.628*** -1.904*** -1.307***
(0.403) (0.434) (0.376)
FGN*MP 0.660** 0.735** 1.137*
(0.273) (0.241) (0.571)
Crisis*MP 0.407 1.442 -0.131
(1.162) (0.810) (0.555)
Crisis*MP*FGN 2.549*** 0.987 0.0573
(0.606) (0.559) (0.664)
Size -0.0376 -0.0327 2.295**
(0.0615) (0.290) (1.011)
Liq -0.0725 -0.356*** -0.713***
(0.0493) (0.0627) (0.120)
Cap -0.236** -0.651** -2.105***
(0.0918) (0.206) (0.406)
Prof 1.579*** 1.561*** 1.754***
(0.453) (0.413) (0.235)
GDP 2.068*** 1.144*** 0.824**
(0.244) (0.161) (0.258)
Pi -0.456* -1.079*** -1.038***
(0.228) (0.159) (0.184)
L.Delta Net Loans 0.211***
(0.0256)
Observations 2403 2403 2001
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.010
∆MPjt ∗ FGNit. We do not need to include crisis dummy itself, as we estimate the model with
time fixed effects.
In Table 3.2 we present the results of the estimation of the benchmark model enriched with the
Financial Crisis dummy and their interactions as in equation (3.2.2). We see that controlling for
Financial Crisis does not change the baseline results. The bank lending channel is still significant
and of the same magnitude and the difference between domestic and foreign banks reaction to
changes in the monetary policy rate is still significant and of the same magnitude. Most importantly,
we find that during financial turmoil of 2008-2012 in the CEE countries bank lending channel did
not change neither for domestic banks nor for foreign-owned banks. This further confirms our
benchmark results and shows that the differences in reactions to the monetary policy instrument
between domestic and foreign banks cannot be attributed to the idiosyncrasy of the financial crisis
episode.
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3.2.5 Robustness - Monetary Policy Regimes
Our sample consists of countries with similar, albeit not identical monetary policy arrangements.
While in the analyzed time-frame the majority of the countries followed an independent monetary
policy interest rate setting rule, some countries had their exchange rate pegged to the euro and some
did not enjoy an independent monetary policy at all, due to their presence in the common currency
area. In this subsection we analyze how do different monetary policy regimes affect our findings
from two previous sections. Our hypothesis is that banks, when deciding on their credit growth,
take into account monetary policy rate regardless of what a monetary policy regime produced that
interest rate. Our findings confirm this hypothesis.
In order to verify our hypothesis we run five additional regressions. In the regression presented
in column (1) of the Table 3.11 (see Appendix) we include country fixed effects. This allows
us to capture differences in the mean growth of credit at the bank level stemming from time
invariant particular characteristics of the economy and institutions, like the monetary policy regime.
Additionally, we also add time fixed effects to control for common, time-variant global shocks. Our
main finding, that foreign banks reaction to monetary policy is more tamed compared to domestic
banks, is unaffected.
Secondly, we expand our baseline model to include the dummy variable IndependentMP . This
variable takes value 1 for countries that in the given year enjoyed independent monetary policy
regime and 0 otherwise. Results of this analysis are reported in column (2). The monetary policy
independence does not affect the growth of credit at the bank-level. In column (3) of Table 3.11
we present the results of the more detailed exercise. Additionally, we employ time fixed effects and
bank fixed effects. Including the latter allows us to capture the differences in mean credit growth
stemming from the time invariant particular credit policies of each bank. Similarly to the previous
analysis, the choice of a monetary policy regime does not affect credit policy at the bank level.
In column (4) we take a somewhat different approach. Instead of looking at the institutional
arrangements regarding the monetary policy conduct directly, we take a look at possible symptoms.
Different degrees of freedom in setting interest rate lead to different volatilities in local exchange
rates, particularly versus the euro. Thus, we expand the set of independent variables to include
the yearly relative change in the exchange rate of a local currency versus the euro. The variable
turns out to be significant. Local currency depreciation of a 1% leads to a decrease in the average
growth of a credit at the bank level by 0.39 p.p.. Extending the set of controls does not affect our
key finding, however. In column (5) we expand the analysis from column (4) by adding country
and time fixed effects. We observe that the significance of the exchange rate found in column (4)
vanishes and again, our main finding is still unaffected.
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3.2.6 Robustness - Further Evidence
To further confirm the robustness of our results we run two alternative specifications of our bench-
mark model. In the first we include government ownership dummy GOVit and its interactions with
the change in the monetary policy rate and with the crisis dummy (see Table 3.12 in Appendix).
Contrary to previous studies12 we find that public-owned banks neither differ in their credit grant-
ing behavior from private domestic banks, nor do they differ in their reaction to monetary policy
rate changes. Controlling for public banks we confirm the robustness of our baseline results.
Next, we take a close look at takeovers of domestic banks by foreign owners. Table 3.13 show
the results of estimations in which we address possible problem of the ownership endogeneity. We
drop all observations of banks that became foreign owned. We also have to drop the variable FGNit
as it becomes co-linear with the sum of bank fixed-effects for foreign-owned banks. We find that
our baseline results are robust both qualitatively and quantitatively.
3.3 Sketch of the DSGE model
Our theoretical analysis builds on Gerali et al. (2010) and Gambacorta and Signoretti (2014). The
details of the derivations are explained in Appendix 3.6.4. Here we discuss the most important
equations and building blocks of the model.
There are two groups of agents in the private sector: households and entrepreneurs. Both
groups are risk averse, households care about consumption and leisure while entrepreneurs are only
concerned with consumption. Because of different rate of time preferences, entrepreneurs borrow
while households save. Entrepreneurs buy capital from capital producing firms and hire labor in
the competitive market. There is a central bank that sets nominal interest rates.
There is a unit mass of banks, of which a fraction µ is foreign-owned. Each bank comprises
of two branches: a wholesale branch that deals on the interbank market and collects deposits in
a perfectly competitive market and a retail branch that grants loans. Foreign direct owners take
decisions on the balance sheet structure of their subsidiaries by deciding on dividends. Adjusting
the dividends implies costs on the owner bank.
There is a set of financial frictions at play. Both savings and borrowing can only be done
via intermediaries. Borrowing is also subject to a borrowing constraint such that the amount
borrowed is related to the valuation of entrepreneur’s capital. We also postulate that due to
product differentiation loans at different banks are imperfect substitutes.
12Micco and Panizza (2006) for worldwide study of banks lending behavior between 1995-2002 and Allen et al.
(2013) for study of CEE banks between 1994-2010.
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3.3.1 Households and Entrepreneurs
Households discount future at a rate βH . Each period each household decides how much to consume
ct (i), how much labor to supply l
H
t (i) and how much to save in bank deposits dt (i) given the wage
rate Wt and last period savings dt−1 (i) to maximize expected stream of utilities. Households own
banks and retail good packers and receive their dividends and profits. Formally, household i solves:
max
cHt ,l
H
t ,d
H
t
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtH
(
log
(
cHt (i)
)− lHt (i)1+φ
1 + φ
)
(3.3.1)
subject to: cHt (i) + d
H
t (i) ≤ wtlHt (i) +
(
1 + rdt−1
)
dHt−1 (i) + T
H
t . (3.3.2)
with THt is a transfer including dividends from retail firms and bank dividends, pit inflation and r
d
t
the nominal return on deposits.
We assume that entrepreneurs maximize the utility of consumption discounted at a rate βE <
βH . Entrepreneur i solves:
max
cEt ,l
E
t ,k
E
t ,b
E
t
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtE log
(
cEt (i)
)
(3.3.3)
subject to: yEt (i) = a
E
t
(
kEt
)α (
lEt (i)
)1−α
, (3.3.4)
yEt (i)
xt
+ bEt (i) + q
k
t (1− δ) kEt−1 (i) = cEt (i) + wtlEt (i) +
(
1 + rbEt−1
)
bEt−1 (i) + q
k
t k
E
t (j) , (3.3.5)(
1 + rbEt
)
bEt (i) ≤ mEEt
(
qkt+1 (1− δ) kEt (i)
)
. (3.3.6)
where 3.3.4 is the production function, 3.3.5 is the budget constraint and 3.3.6 the borrowing
constraint, all denoted in real terms. lEt is demand for labor, k
E
t is the chosen stock of capital, a
E
t
is a TFP random variable, yt is the quantity of the intermediate good, q
k
t is the price of capital.
Parameter mE measures the severity of the collateral constraint.
Investment decisions are taken by competitive capital producers. The relative price of capital
qkt is a ratio of the nominal price of capital P
K
t and the aggregate price level Pt (for capital good
producers problem solution see Appendix D).
3.3.2 Aggregate price level
The model features monopolistically competitive retail good packers that aggregate goods produced
by each entrepreneur to the single final good and sell it at a markup. The optimization of retail
good packers yields a Phillips curve featuring persistence with respect to inflation rate and its
deviation from the steady state level (see Appendix D).
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3.3.3 Banks
Each bank has two branches: a wholesale and a retail branch. The wholesale branch owns bank
equity (also called bank capital) Kb (o, j) and collects deposits Dt(o, j) from households on which
it pays the interest rate set by the central bank ribt . It also issues wholesale loans to retail branch
Bt(o, j) commissioning the interest rate R
b
t(o, j). Following GNSS we assume that there exists a
target value of the ratio of bank capital to loans ν (leverage or capitalization ratio). This assumption
is crucial to generate realistic interactions between real and financial sectors.
We differentiate banks by ownership o ∈ {dom, fgn}. Each bank has to obey the basic balance
sheet identity:
Bt (o, j) = Dt (o, j) +K
b
t (o, j) . (3.3.7)
Bank capital of a domestic bank is financed from the retained earnings:
Kbt (dom, j) = (1− δb)Kbt−1 (dom, j) + (1− ωH) Jbt−1 (dom, j) , (3.3.8)
while a foreign bank’s dividends stream is a choice variable of the parent bank:
Kbt (fgn, j) = (1− δb)Kbt−1 (fgn, j) + (1− ωt (fgn, j)) Jbt−1 (fgn, j) , (3.3.9)
with ωH denoting the share of the earnings paid out to households by domestic banks. The
market for deposits is competitive with the quantity of deposits pinned down exactly by the choice
of the risk-free rate by the central bank. The key idea here is that the adjustment of the dividends
stream acts implicitly as the internal market for bank capital. Domestically owned banks have
a rigid dividends policy because their ownership is more dispersed. The presence of a dominant
foreign owner, who has access to outside capital however, allows for adjusting the dividends. We
also assume that there are quadratic costs of adjusting the dividend parameter from the reference
value (equal to ωH):
Adj (ωt, ωH) =
κω
2
(ωt − ωH)2 . (3.3.10)
The optimization problem of a foreign bank is identical with one exception. The foreign bank
owner decides on the allocation of the dividends, taking into account how it affects future profits.
If the dividends increase too much today, they will negatively affect the subsidiary’s profits next
period. Formally foreign bank owner solves:
Div∗t = max
ωt(j)
ˆ
µ
(
ωt (j) J (fgn, j)− κω
2
(ωt (j)− ωH)2
)
dj + βH∗EDiv∗t+1. (3.3.11)
There are two points to be made here. First, the foreign owner bank can potentially mitigate
the costs stemming from changes in monetary policy in the Home country trading them against
the costs of adjusting the dividends. Second, observe that setting κω 7→ ∞ yields the foreign and
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domestic banks identical, as it forces ωt = ωH and in this case these banks are homogeneous.
3.3.4 Wholesale branch
The wholesale branch solves:
max
Dt(o,j),Bt(o,j)
{Rbt (o, j)Bt (o, j)− ribt Dt (o, j)−
κb
2
(
Kbt (o, j)
Bt (o, j)
− ν
)2
Kbt (o, j)} (3.3.12)
subject to the balance sheet identity for pre-determined bank capital. The last expression in 3.3.12
is a loans adjustment cost function. We follow the assumption that it is a quadratic function
in adjustment from the target leverage ratio νb and is multiplicative in the level of bank capital
Kbt (o, j). We plug the balance sheet constraint into the target function and calculate the first order
conditions to get:
Rbt (o, j) = r
ib
t − κKb
(
Kbt (o, j)
Bt (o, j)
− νb
)(
Kbt (o, j)
Bt(o, j)
)2
. (3.3.13)
Banks optimal policy collapses to choosing a time-varying markup over the central bank’s rate.
Loan branch The loan branch collects the wholesale loans and differentiates them at no cost
generating monopolistic power over its own loan type j of the total loan variety which gives rise to
the standard demand equation:
bEt (o, j) =
(
rbEt (o, j)
rbEt
)−εbE
bEt . (3.3.14)
with pricing equation involving a markup on the wholesale rate Rbt (o, j) which is proportional to
the elasticity of substitution between loans of different banks:
rbEt (o, j) =
εbE
εbE − 1R
b
t (o, j) . (3.3.15)
The law of motion for profits of bank j reads:
Jbt (o, j) = r
bE
t (o, j) b
E
t (o, j)−
κKb
2
(
Kbt (o, j)
Bt (o, j)
− νb
)2
Kbt (o, j)−AdjBt (o, j) (3.3.16)
with the last term being the cost of adjustment of bank capital structure. Equilibrium conditions
and aggregation equations are relegated to the Appendix.
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3.3.5 Central bank and monetary policy
The central bank follows a Taylor rule that features smoothing of rates in addition to tracking the
deviations of inflation and product:
(1 + rt) = (1 + r)
1−φR (1 + rt−1)φR
(pit
pi
)φpi(1−φR)( Yt
Yt−1
)φpi(1−φR)
εRt . (3.3.17)
3.4 Simulations
Before proceeding to simulation-based comparative exercises we go over the response of the homogeneous-
banks version of the model to a monetary shock. In Figure 3.1 we plot the response of bank profits,
bank capital, loans and deposits to a one standard deviation monetary shock. The decrease of
loans is intuitive. In this model the deposits also fell because of entrepreneurs reducing their labor
demand and capital stock due to the tightening of the borrowing constraint. Despite the higher
rate of return the households consume part of their deposits to smooth the negative income shock
triggered by firms cutting production inputs. Because the drop in deposits is stronger than the drop
in the loans, the initial bank profits rise to then fall sharply. The response of profits determines
the path of bank capital - there is initial accumulation in the initial period and de-accumulation
on the convergence to the steady state.
The increase in bank profits is driven by the preference parameters of the households and the
entrepreneurs, especially how the hours worked changes are weighted in the utility function. The
second component that contributes to our results is the tightness of the borrowing constraint. With
more relaxed constraint the immediate effect of the change in interest rates on the loans would be
weakened. Note, however, that due to parameter heterogeneity the results we present here are not
directly comparable to the results of the next section.
We do two thought experiments, using a calibration borrowing from the literature to investigate
the response of bank lending conditional on the composition of the banking sector (how many
banks are foreign banks), and adjust some parameters of the model to mimic the internal market
and market segmentation hypotheses. We vary the parameters governing the bank balance sheet
dynamics of the foreign-owned banks.
First, we decrease the punishment parameter κKb for deviations from the target leverage ratio.
This is to model the possibility of liquidity transfer from and to the bank owner. We also decrease
the target ratio of bank capital to bank loans for foreign-owned banks, allowing them to fund more
loans with a given level of bank capital. Also, foreign bank can freely (but costly) adjust their
dividends ratio, while this possibility is ruled out for domestic banks. This exercise corresponds to
internal market hypothesis.
Second, we shut the dividend smoothing channel and leverage smoothing channel and assume
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Figure 3.1: Response of banking variables to a one standard deviation monetary shock, homoge-
neous banks model
same target leverage and same penalties upon deviations from target leverage and target dividends.
Instead, we introduce two sub-markets in the market for loans, each with different elasticity of
substitution εlbE < εbE < ε
h
be picking the values of ε
l
bE and ε
h
bE such that under the assumption
that the two sub-markets are penetrated proportionately by foreign-owned and domestic banks the
dynamics of the model remain as in the homogeneous case corresponding to one elasticity εbE to
facilitate comparison. This exercise corresponds to market segmentation hypothesis.
For each of the parameters combinations we hit the economy with a one standard deviation
monetary shock. We are interested in how the total volume of loans reacts to this shock and how
foreign banks loans responses differ from domestic banks loans responses within a one year horizon
(one period in our model). We also want to know how the two objects vary with the level of banking
sector penetration µ. This exercise is aimed at answering two questions. First, any dependence of
the response of total loans on µ would constitute an indirect measure of the strength of the bank
balance sheet transmission channel. Second, the differential response of foreign and domestic banks
would be a validation test for the model to replicate qualitatively our empirical findings.
The internal market mechanism operates through the wholesale interest rate setting equation.
Upon a monetary shock, the foreign owner adjusts the stream of dividends which reduces the
response of the wholesale branch rate that pins down the loan rate. The market segmentation
mechanism operates primarily through the demand for loans.
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3.4.1 Internal market hypothesis
In Figure 3.2 we plot the response of total loans to a monetary shock under low, µ = 0.05 and
high µ = 0.95 penetration of a domestic banking system by foreign banks. What we find is
that the response of aggregate loans is tamed when foreign-owned banks dominate the domestic
banking system. Thus, the balance sheet transmission channel is weakened due to the more flexible
adjustment of bank capital in the foreign owned banks. The model can also replicate a weaker
response of the foreign banks, as expected. Under the parametrization that corresponds to the
results presented in this sub-section we managed to get the first-period response of foreign-owned
banks loans to be weaker by about one-third than the reaction of domestic banks loans.
Figure 3.2: Response of a total bank lending to a one standard deviation monetary shock in internal
market hypothesis.
The deterioration of the bank lending transmission channel implies that the real effects of
monetary shocks are diminished. Thus, the response of prices to monetary policy is also mitigated,
in a somewhat similar fashion to the monetary policy trilemma mechanism in a small open economy.
The response of the interest rate set by the bank is tamed thanks to a more flexible adjustment of
bank capital which leads to a smaller change in the deposits and hence, consumption.
3.4.2 Market segmentation hypothesis
Now, we assume that the banks balance sheet parameters are the same among the two types of
banks. We postulate, however, that they manage to introduce some form of market segmentation,
where foreign owned banks access more profitable segments of the market for loans. We assume
that there are two markets for loans and each entrepreneur is confined to pick from a portfolio of
loans in one of the sub-markets. The size of each market is fixed: γl for low-elasticity market and
γh = 1− γl for the high elasticity market.
Then, we assume that a fraction µεl > 0.5 of foreign banks operate in the low-elasticity market.
In this way we introduce a skew in the composition of the foreign-owned banks loans portfolio such
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Figure 3.3: Response of a total bank lending to a one standard deviation monetary shock in market
segmentation hypothesis.
that out of the total measure of 1 of all banks µµεl are foreign-owned banks in the low elasticity
market and (1− µ)µεl is the measure of the domestic banks operating in the low-elasticity market
etc. We keep γl fixed in our experiments as changing it would change the steady state of the model.
What we find is an increasing differential in the response of loans across two types of banks.
In this scenario the level of profits (in the steady state with µ = 0.5 and µεl = 0.8) differs across
banks. We find that foreign banks have steady-state profits roughly equal to 1.5 times the profits
of domestic banks. We also find the first-period response of foreign banks loans to be weaker by
about 15% than the reaction of domestic banks loans.
Importantly however, switching from low to high penetration scenario makes almost no differ-
ence in the dynamics of the total loans after a monetary shock. Regardless of whether there are
many foreign banks in the domestic banking sector (µ = 0.95) or very few (µ = 0.05) the reaction
of gross credit in the economy to the change in the interest rates is the same. We document this
finding in Figure 3.3. The solid line represents reaction of an economy with many foreign banks,
while dotted line represents a reaction of an economy with few foreign banks to a one standard
deviation monetary shock. Unlike in Figure 3.2 the two economies are indistinguishable. Foreign
banks penetration does not affect the aggregate bank lending channel.
Notice that the market segmentation hypothesis implies that the distinction between “foreign”
and “domestic” banks boils down to recovering underlying demand heterogeneity. With all the
banks being “foreign” or “domestic” no observable difference between the banks would show up
in the panel estimation assuming uniform access to both sub-markets. This is why the aggregate
response functions don’t differ, although on a micro level the differences in the elasticity of the
demand for loans introduce differentiated lending patterns.
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3.4.3 Discussion
Our simulations show that the two different types of bank heterogeneity lead to qualitatively similar
results when it comes to differences in banks lending response to a monetary shock. Lending by
foreign-owned banks is less responsive to monetary policy either because of low demand elasticity, or
because the bank capital adjustment is smoother. There are several caveats to our results, however.
First, the stability of the steady-state of the model hinges on the size of the penalty parameters
measuring deviations from target dividend rates and leverage which comes from the deposits and
bank capital being perfect substitutes in the balance sheet identity. Second, the mechanism of
competition between banks is to a large extent shut down because of absence of entry and exit.
Relaxing those assumptions is left for future research.
The implications for the behavior of the total loans of the two mechanisms are different, though.
If the main outcome of ownership heterogeneity is flexibility in adjusting the bank capital, then
an increased presence of foreign-owned banks weakens monetary policy transmission channel and
is prone to instability abroad, as foreign bank import foreign shocks through the internal capital
market. On the other hand, due to low dependence on host country conditions foreign banks are
less prone to variations not only in the monetary policy rate, but also in host country’s GDP. If,
however, different ownership leads to bank customer heterogeneity then, what we see is a different
partition of the banking sector profits, with no impact on total loans dynamics.
The data used or the empirical part of this paper do not allow us to detect internal capital
market directly. However, we can test which of the two hypotheses is more relevant indirectly, by
testing assumption and implications.
Testing Assumptions. In this section we have simulated the DSGE model under two different
parametrizations to reflect the two different hypotheses regarding the foreign banks credit granting
behavior. First, to mimic the internal market hypothesis we made three assumptions: i) the target
leverage ratio is lower in foreign banks, ii) the penalty multiplier on deviations from the target
leverage is lower in foreign banks, iii) the penalty multiplier on deviations from the target dividends
ratio is lower in foreign banks. Those assumption yield following consequences, that should be
observed at the bank-level data: i) capitalization in domestic banks is significantly higher than in
foreign banks, ii) standard deviation of capitalization in foreign banks is significantly higher than
in domestic banks, iii) standard deviation of dividend ratio in foreign banks is significantly higher
than in domestic banks.
Second, to mimic the market segmentation hypothesis we made only one assumption: more
foreign banks operate in the segment where the elasticity of substitution is lower. The consequence
of this assumption that we should be able to observe in the data, is that domestic banks are on
average less profitable than foreign banks. We collect assumption, testable consequences and data
test results in Table 3.3.
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Table 3.3: Testing Assumptions Behind Two Hypotheses
Hypothesis Assumption Data Test Result Verification
Internal market νfgn < νdom Capdom − Capfgn = 2.087*** YES
κfgnb < κ
dom
b σ(Cap
fgn)− σ(Capdom) = -0.951*** NO
κfgnω < κdomω σ(Div
fgn)− σ(Divdom) = -4.005 NO
Market segmentation fgnbE < 
fgn
bE Prof
dom − Proffgn = -0.133 NO
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010
As indicated in the Table 3.3 the data slightly favour assumptions behind the internal market
hypothesis: mean capitalization is lower in foreign banks. Contrary to our assumptions however,
both capitalization (significantly) and dividends ratio (not significantly) are less volatile in foreign
banks than in domestic banks. Regarding the assumption behind the market segmentation hypoth-
esis, the data shows that foreign banks are on average more profitable, but the difference is not
significantly different from zero.
Testing Implications. Next, we test implications of each hypothesis. The internal market hy-
pothesis implies that foreign banks should react to innovations abroad, namely to the changes in
the interest rate and GDP in the country of the parent bank. Also, foreign banks, because of
the facilitated access to funds from abroad, should react less to the changes in the host country
GDP. The second hypothesis on the other hand implies that foreign banks do not react to the
innovations abroad and that their reaction to the changes in the host country GDP are the same as
domestic banks. To test these assumptions we expand our regression equation in 3.2.1 to include
additional terms: monetary policy in the country of the parent bank MPinFGN , change in the
GDP in the Eurozone EzoneGDP and its interaction term with the foreign ownership dummy
FGN ∗ EzoneGDP and an interaction term of the foreign ownership dummy with changes in the
host country’s GDP FGN ∗GDP . The results of the augmented regression are presented in Table
3.4. Again, we run three different models: pooled OLS, fixed effects and a difference GMM.
The results of this regression show, that none of the three implications of the internal market
hypothesis are to be found in the data. Foreign banks neither react to the monetary policy nor
to changes in the GDP in their home country. Also, foreign banks do not react differently to the
changes in the host country GDP, as the existence of the internal capital market would suggest.
This, on the other hand, points towards the direction of the alternative hypothesis, the market
segmentation. To conclude, we show that the data do not unambiguously favor one hypothesis other
the other. Although the assumptions of the internal market hypothesis are valid, the implications
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Table 3.4: Determinants of bank lending - testing implications
OLS FE GMM
FGN -1.022 1.895 0.797
(1.622) (3.164) (2.246)
MP -1.542*** -1.648*** -1.302***
(0.320) (0.407) (0.441)
FGN*MP 1.018** 0.811*** 1.099**
(0.340) (0.201) (0.533)
GDP 2.554*** 1.210*** 0.957**
(0.464) (0.309) (0.386)
Pi -0.388 -1.103*** -1.032***
(0.232) (0.142) (0.140)
Eurozone GDP -1.089 1.725** 0.253
(0.921) (0.670) (0.822)
EurozoneGDP*FGN 1.112 0.743 0.877
(0.991) (0.803) (0.926)
MPinFGN 1.618 0.292 -0.239
(1.148) (0.638) (1.027)
FGN*GDP -0.525 -0.0445 -0.190
(0.338) (0.391) (0.491)
Observations 2403 2403 2001
Standard errors in parentheses
* p¡0.10, ** p¡0.05, *** p¡0.010
Table 3.5: Testing Implications of Two Hypotheses
Hypothesis Implication Verification
Internal market Foreign banks react to changes in foreign monetary policy NO
Foreign banks react to changes in foreign GDP NO
Foreign banks react less to changes in domestic GDP NO
are not. Conversely, although the assumption of the market segmentation hypothesis are not
validated in the data, the implications find much more support.
3.5 Lessons for policy and directions for future research
We have documented that foreign-owned banks presence may pose additional challenges for policy
makers not only during the times of financial turmoil. Using a variant of a DSGE model featuring
monopolistic competition between banks we have demonstrated that the differential response to
monetary policy stemming from different ownership does not have to be driven by flows between
the subsidiary and the owner. If that was the case, then an increased presence of foreign owned
banks would decrease the strength of the bank balance sheet transmission channel.
We argue that industry competition dynamics in the banking sector may also be driving the
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empirical patterns. If that is indeed the case then an increased presence of foreign-owned banks in
the economy does not weaken the bank balance sheet transmission channel but may skew the impact
of monetary policy within the banking sector negatively towards domestic owned banks. That is,
an increasing penetration by foreign banks may up to some point yield competition concerns for
the policy makers. If the weakest, least productive banks are not taken over by foreign banks then
monetary policy may affect their profitability and sector concentration.
Our empirical results confirm that the bank ownership can be a worry for monetary policy
makers in times of financial distress. Monitoring of bank-owner financial health can prove vital for
assessing the risks present in the domestic banking sector.
We think it is worthwhile to approach the issue of foreign banks penetration and monetary policy
in a dynamic industry competition model which we leave for future research. It would be interesting
to analyze individual country data complementing the cross-country patterns. Possibly different
individual experiences can be explained in greater detail by country-specific banking competition
factors.
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3.6 Appendix
3.6.1 Data construction and definitions
Table 3.6: Definitions of variables
∆Lijt Growth rate of Net Loans in bank i in country j in year t less Inflation rate in country j in year t multiplied
by 100. To neutralize the impact of outliers this variable is winsorized at 5th and 95th percentile. Net
Loans reported in local currency. Source of Net Loans: Bankscope. Source of Inflation: Eurostat.
Monetary Policy
MPjt Monetary policy tool; yearly average of Repo Rate of the central bank in country j in year t less yearly
average in year t− 1. To neutralize the impact of outliers this variable has been cleaned from values lower
than -10 (no observations were higher than +10). Source: ECB and central bank’s websites.
MPinFGNijt Foreign monetary policy tool; defined only for observations with FGN = 1; yearly average of Repo Rate
of the central bank in a residence country of major foreign owner in year t less yearly average in year t−1.
Source: ECB and central bank’s websites.
IndependentMP Independent Monetary Policy dummy; takes value 0 if a country is withing a Eurozone or in a currency
peg and 1 otherwise.
Ownership
FGNijt Foreign ownership dummy. Takes value 1 if more than 50% of the shares of bank i in country j in year t are
owned by a party located in country different than j. Source: Bankscope and individual banks’ websites.
GOVijt Government ownership dummy. Takes value 1 if more than 50% of the shares of bank i in country j in
year t are owned by a government of country j. Source: Bankscope and individual banks’ websites.
Bank Controls
Sizeijt Bank’s size; Total Assets in bank i in country j in year t divided by the sum of Total Assets in all banks
in country j in time t times 100; winsorized at 99th percentile. Total Assets reported in local currency.
Source: Bankscope.
Liqijt Bank’s liquidity; Liquid Assets divided by Total Assets in bank i in country j in year t times 100; winsorized
at 99th percentile and cleared from negative values. Total Assets and Liquid Assets reported in local
currency. Source: Bankscope.
Capijt Bank’s capitalization; Total Equity divided by Total Assets in bank i in country j in year t times 100;
winsorized at 99th percentile and cleared from negative values. Total Assets and Total Equity reported in
local currency. Source: Bankscope.
Profijt Bank’s profitability; Operating Profit divided by Total Assets in bank i in country j in year t times 100;
winsorized at 1st and 99th percentile. Total Assets and Operating Profit reported in local currency. Source:
Bankscope.
Macro Controls
GDPjt Growth rate of real GDP per capita in country j in year t. Source: Eurostat.
EzoneGDP Growth rate of real GDP per capita in Eurozone in year t. Source: Eurostat.
Pijt Inflation in country j in year t. Source: Eurostat.
Crisis Financial Crisis dummy, takes value 1 for years 2008-2012.
Exchange Rates
EUR x-rate Relative change of a yearly average local currency to Euro exchange rate in country j in year t. Source:
Eurostat.
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3.6.2 Data coverage
Table 3.9: Data coverage by country
Number of bank-years Sample coverage (in %)
ownership net loans in # of bank-years in volume of net loans
BG 353 288 95.83 99.31
CZ 430 381 88.19 91.00
EE 114 97 91.75 99.25
HR 527 476 98.32 99.69
HU 448 455 84.40 98.50
LT 145 130 99.23 99.31
LV 310 229 98.69 98.76
PL 683 478 92.68 98.56
RO 437 344 92.44 99.57
SI 282 256 92.58 97.66
SK 279 246 93.09 95.49
Total 4008 3380 92.75 97.25
Table 3.10: Data coverage by year
Number of bank-years Sample coverage (in %)
ownership net loans in # of bank-years in volume of net loans
1998 242 163 93.87 88.34
1999 242 168 91.67 89.22
2000 252 183 88.52 89.78
2001 244 176 86.93 87.29
2002 251 179 90.50 90.40
2003 266 188 94.68 93.31
2004 271 223 94.62 96.95
2005 282 251 95.22 96.70
2006 268 249 95.18 96.75
2007 266 253 93.28 96.95
2008 289 267 95.13 99.73
2009 282 283 91.52 98.43
2010 284 286 91.61 99.03
2011 284 272 93.75 97.65
2012 285 239 92.05 98.43
Total 4008 3380 92.75 97.25
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3.6.3 Estimation results: robustness checks
Table 3.11: Determinants of bank lending, accounting for different monetary policy regimes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
FGN -0.557 -1.280 3.059 -1.650 3.647
(2.131) (2.301) (3.124) (2.143) (3.671)
MP -1.816*** -1.578*** -1.677*** -1.688*** -1.629***
(0.323) (0.276) (0.401) (0.204) (0.404)
FGN*MP 1.166*** 1.138*** 0.921*** 1.103*** 0.850***
(0.326) (0.344) (0.228) (0.264) (0.237)
Size -0.0734 -0.0374 -0.00511 -0.0462 0.0339
(0.0503) (0.0608) (0.292) (0.0577) (0.251)
Liq -0.147** -0.0697 -0.349*** -0.0749 -0.360***
(0.0558) (0.0471) (0.0621) (0.0495) (0.0650)
Cap -0.253* -0.236** -0.665*** -0.265** -0.649**
(0.124) (0.0923) (0.201) (0.0972) (0.225)
Prof 1.315** 1.566*** 1.590*** 1.603*** 1.539***
(0.429) (0.457) (0.428) (0.473) (0.394)
GDP 1.310*** 2.204*** 1.147*** 2.126*** 1.412***
(0.160) (0.305) (0.151) (0.259) (0.313)
Pi -0.981*** -0.385 -1.112*** -0.125 -0.914***
(0.139) (0.239) (0.145) (0.206) (0.196)
Independent MP 0.478 -3.636
(1.562) (2.362)
Change in EUR x-rate -0.388** -0.267
(0.140) (0.146)
Time Fixed Effects Yes No Yes No Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes No No No No
Bank Fixed Effects Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 2403 2403 2403 2361 2361
R2 0.244 0.165 0.305 0.172 0.308
Standard errors in parentheses
* p¡0.10, ** p¡0.05, *** p¡0.010
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Table 3.12: Determinants of bank lending- government banks
OLS FE GMM
FGN -1.809 0.345 0.0313
(2.303) (4.687) (4.056)
GOV -2.188 -7.680 -5.464
(1.610) (7.237) (3.457)
MP -1.777*** -1.676** -1.474**
(0.525) (0.577) (0.523)
FGN*MP 1.340*** 0.879** 1.313*
(0.284) (0.272) (0.668)
GOV*MP 0.588 -0.303 0.0828
(0.860) (0.943) (0.777)
Size -0.0288 0.0113 2.296**
(0.0579) (0.320) (1.006)
Liq -0.0639 -0.353*** -0.705***
(0.0484) (0.0609) (0.118)
Cap -0.226** -0.655** -2.084***
(0.0968) (0.208) (0.424)
Prof 1.558*** 1.539*** 1.702***
(0.456) (0.415) (0.249)
GDP 2.201*** 1.143*** 0.864***
(0.301) (0.166) (0.258)
Pi -0.384 -1.118*** -1.014***
(0.236) (0.156) (0.173)
L.Delta Net Loans 0.212***
(0.0270)
Observations 2403 2403 2001
Standard errors in parentheses
* p¡0.10, ** p¡0.05, *** p¡0.010
3.6.4 DSGE model
Households Standard intra-temporal condition for labor supply:
1
cHt (i)
=
lHt (i)
φ
wt
, (3.6.1)
and an inter-temporal condition for consumption choice:
1
cHt (i)
= βH
(
1 + rdt
)
Et
[
1
cHt+1 (i)
]
. (3.6.2)
Given those two conditions, deposits are determined via budget constraint that holds with
equality:
cHt (i) + d
H
t (i) = Wtl
H
t (i) +
(
1 + rdt−1
)
dHt−1 (i) + T
H
t . (3.6.3)
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Table 3.13: Determinants of bank lending - without ownership change banks
OLS FE GMM
MP -1.827*** -1.909*** -1.502**
(0.249) (0.535) (0.562)
FGN*MP 1.567*** 1.105** 1.399***
(0.417) (0.421) (0.423)
Size 0.0994 -0.156 1.976
(0.0782) (0.533) (1.236)
Liq -0.0630 -0.271*** -0.673***
(0.0577) (0.0816) (0.152)
Cap -0.246** -0.591** -2.113***
(0.102) (0.243) (0.454)
Prof 1.348** 1.444*** 2.096***
(0.502) (0.418) (0.347)
GDP 2.285*** 1.145*** 0.997***
(0.281) (0.211) (0.303)
Pi -0.364 -1.099*** -0.994***
(0.214) (0.170) (0.235)
L.Delta Net Loans 0.210***
(0.0357)
Observations 1825 1825 1502
Standard errors in parentheses
* p¡0.10, ** p¡0.05, *** p¡0.010
Entrepreneurs
1
cEt (i)
− ζEt (i) = βEE
1 + rbt
cEt+1 (i)
(3.6.4)
E
[ζEt (i)mEqkt+1 (1− δk)
1 + rbt
+
βE
cEt+1 (i)
(
qkt+1
(
1− δk
)
+ rkt+1
) ]
=
qkt
cEt (i)
(3.6.5)
(1− α) yEt (i)
ldt (i)xt
= wt (3.6.6)
rkt ≡
∂yEt (i)
∂kt(i)
xt
(3.6.7)
Banks - aggregation of loans The problem of entrepreneur i choosing his total loans bE (i)
facing a continuum of banks indexed with j to allocate these loans among the continuum of banks
is a standard cost-minimization problem:
min
bE(i,j)
ˆ 1
0
rb (j) bE (i, j) dj (3.6.8)
subject to:
[ˆ 1
0
bE (i, j)
ε−1
ε dj
] ε
ε−1
= bE (i) (3.6.9)
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For a given aggregate price rb the entrepreneur optimally chooses the total amount of loans and its
partition among monopolistically competitive banks. Note, we can write:[ˆ 1
0
bE (i, j)
ε−1
ε dj
]
= bE (i)
ε−1
ε . (3.6.10)
The first order condition of retail branch j gives the demand for loans at bank j charging rbE (j),
given aggregate price for loans rbE :
bE (i, j) =
(
rbE (j)
rbE
)−ε
bE (i) (3.6.11)
which we integrate on the both sides wrt to i to get:
bE (j) =
(
rbE (j)
rbE
)−ε
bE . (3.6.12)
With rbE =
[´ 1
0 rbE (j)
1−ε dj
] 1
1−ε
being the price index. Now, we have the two following equations
(the first one is postulated to reflect the monopolistic competition assumption, the other follows):
bE (i) =
[ˆ 1
0
bE (i, j)
ε−1
ε dj
] ε
ε−1
, (3.6.13)
r =
[ˆ 1
0
r (j)1−ε dj
] 1
1−ε
. (3.6.14)
Let us assume a within-ownership symmetric equilibrium such that a measure of foreign banks µ
chooses rf,bE and a measure of domestic banks 1− µ chooses rh,bE . Without loss of generality we
say the banks with j ∈ [0, µ) set rf,bE . We than have that:
rbE =
[ˆ 1
0
rbE (j)
1−ε dj
] 1
1−ε
=
[
µr1−εf,bE + (1− µ) r1−εh,bE
] 1
1−ε
. (3.6.15)
Now, we use the demand equations to derive the index of quantities, by differentiating equation
(3.6.12) with respect to j which yields:
bE =
(
µb
ε−1
ε
f,E + (1− µ) b
ε−1
ε
h,E
) ε
ε−1
. (3.6.16)
The last two equations are used in aggregation of individual demands and prices to aggregate
demands and prices in the loans market.
120 Foreign Banks and Monetary Policy in Central and Eastern Europe
Retailers Retail good producers buy the good produced by entrepreneurs, aggregate them to
the final good and sell it with a markup subject to Rotemberg type of adjustment costs. The first
equation is the definition of retailer profits, κp is the parameter governing the inertia of the aggregate
price level. The second equation is the first order condition of the optimal pricing problem, can be
thought of as a Philips curve.
JRt = yt
(
1− 1
xt
− κp
2
(
pit −
(
pi
ζp
t−1p¯i
1−ζp
))2)
(3.6.17)
1 = εyt +
εyt
xt
− κp
(
pit −
(
pi
ζp
t−1p¯i
1−ζp
))
pit+ (3.6.18)
βPEt
[
λPt+1
λPt
κp
(
pit+1 −
(
pi
ζp
t p¯i
1−ζp
)
pit+1
) yt+1
yt
]
Capital good producers The role the capital good producers play in the model is twofold.
First, their presence encapsulates the economy-wide investment equation and capital accumulation.
Without loss of generality, this decision could be placed at the firm level as well. Next, and more
importantly, it is a way of introducing the price of capital to the model hence facilitating the use
of the collateral constraint on capital in a meaningful way.
kt = (1− δk) kt−1 + it
(
1− κi
2
(
it
it−1
− 1
)2)
(3.6.19)
1 = qk
(
1− κi
2
(
it
it−1
− 1
)2)
+ βEEt
[
ζEt+1q
k
t+1
ζEt
κi
(
it+1
it
− 1
)(
it+1
it
)2]
. (3.6.20)
Aggregation The aggregation conditions read:
Yt = Ct + q
k
t
(
Kt −
(
1− δk
)
Kt−1
)
+
δbKbt−1
pit
(3.6.21)
Bt = Dt +K
b
t (3.6.22)
Ct =
ˆ
cHt (i) + c
E
t (i) di (3.6.23)
Bt = bE,t (3.6.24)
Dt = dt (3.6.25)
Kt = k
e
t (3.6.26)
Yt = y
e
t (3.6.27)
ldt = l
p
t . (3.6.28)
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3.6.5 Calibration
In this section we discuss calibration of the model parameters. We calibrate the model using
standard values for yearly data as this is the frequency micro data is reported in Bankscope. Let
us start with the discussion of our calibration targets.
First, observe that the central bank rate pins down the rate of return on bonds. Thus, we wish
to replicate a 6% p.a. value here, higher than the standard US value of 4% by two percentage
points. This assumption determines the household discount factor βH . We pick entrepreneurs
patience to be captured by βE =. We pick the inverse of the Frisch elasticity to be equal to 1.
The capital share in the production function is set at α = 0.3. The depreciation rate of physical
capital is δk = 0.02. The LTV ratio m
E is postulated to be equal to 0.35. We assume a markup in
the goods market at 15% and the markup on the interbank rate to be about 40%. The monetary
policy inertia we set at 0.8. The cost for managing bank capital is determined in the equilibrium
to assure that the banks achieve their target balance structure. The multiplier on the quadratic
cost of deviations from the optimal balance sheet structure κb is put at 10.The price stickiness
parameter is set κp to 30. The elasticity of loans is equal to 4.
For the internal market hypothesis we increased the penalty multiplier κb in foreign banks to
100, we also postulate the target leverage to be νfgn = 0.045 in foreign-owned banks while the
domestic banks have it on νdom = 0.09. The segmentation market hypothesis has ε
H
l = 7 and ε
L
l
follows to map the steady state banking variables for the homogeneous elasticities baseline case.
We set the country size parameter η to match the ratio of GDP of the Eurozone and Poland. Other
parameters we keep symmetric apart from the markup on the interbank market to be half of the
one used for the Home country. We pick the penalty parameter κω to allow for up to 10% deviations
in the stream of the dividends in the policy simulations experiments.
